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SUMMARY
Cloud Computing represents a recent paradigm shift that enables users to
share and remotely access high-powered computing resources (both infrastructure and
software/services) contained in off-site data centers thereby allowing a more efficient
use of hardware and software infrastructures. This growing trend in cloud computing,
combined with the demands for Big Data and Big Data analytics, is driving the rapid
evolution of datacenter technologies towards more cost-effective, consumer-driven,
more privacy conscious and technology agnostic solutions.
This dissertation is dedicated to taking a systematic approach to develop system-
level techniques and algorithms to tackle the challenges of large-scale data processing
in the Cloud and scaling and delivering privacy-aware services with anytime-anywhere
availability. We analyze the key challenges in effective provisioning of Cloud services in
the context of MapReduce-based parallel data processing considering the concerns of
cost-effectiveness, performance guarantees and user-privacy and we develop a suite of
solution techniques, architectures and models to support cost-optimized and privacy-
preserving service provisioning in the Cloud.
At the Cloud resource provisioning layer, we develop a utility-driven MapReduce
Cloud resource planning and management system called Cura for cost-optimally al-
locating resources to jobs. While existing services require users to select a number
of complex cluster and job parameters and use those potentially sub-optimal per-job
configurations, the Cura resource management achieves global resource optimization
in the cloud by minimizing cost and maximizing resource utilization. We also address
the challenges of resource management and job scheduling for large-scale parallel data
1
processing in the Cloud in the presence of networking and storage bottlenecks com-
monly experienced in Cloud data centers. We develop Purlieus, a self-configurable
locality-based data and virtual machine management framework that enables MapRe-
duce jobs to access their data either locally or from close-by nodes including all input,
output and intermediate data achieving significant improvements in job response time.
We then extend our cloud resource management framework to support privacy-
preserving data access and efficient privacy-conscious query processing. Concretely,
we propose and implement VNCache: an efficient solution for MapReduce analysis of
cloud-archived log data for privacy-conscious enterprises. Through a seamless data
streaming and prefetching model in VNCache, Hadoop jobs begin execution as soon
as they are launched without requiring any apriori downloading. At the cloud service
delivery tier, we develop mix-zone based techniques for delivering anonymous cloud
services to mobile users on the move through Mobimix, a novel road-network mix-
zone based framework that enables real time, location based service delivery without




Cloud computing and its pay-as-you-go cost structure have enabled hardware infras-
tructure service providers, platform service providers as well as software and appli-
cation service providers to offer computing services on demand and pay per use just
like how we use utility today. This growing trend in cloud computing, combined
with the demands for Big Data and Big Data analytics, is driving the rapid evolution
of datacenter technologies towards more cost-effective, more consumer-driven, more
privacy conscious and technology agnostic solutions. Cost effective resource opti-
mization techniques that are highly effective and yet greatly agile are critical for both
cloud providers and cloud consumers. We identify three key challenges in effective
provisioning and delivery of cloud services to a wide range of audiences. First, cloud
service providers are faced with the challenges of offering cost-effective solutions to
a much broader range of consumers than traditional data centers that are serving
in-house brands. Yield management, once only popular in airline and hotel industry,
becomes a critical factor in the equilibrium of the supply-demand and performance-
cost trade-off decision making process. Second, the cloud service providers are facing
the overwhelming challenge of meeting the service level agreements of diverse cloud
consumer jobs in terms of performance demand, resource need and infrastructure and
computing rental cost while minimizing the expenses of operating, maintenance and
upgrade of their cloud services. This calls for highly effective and yet greatly ag-
ile resource management and capacity planning at the cloud provider end to handle
workload variations, resource demand variations, as well as energy and maintenance
cost variations, while minimizing the overall service provisioning and delivery cost.
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Third but not the least, computing in the Cloud also demands for protection of data
privacy, access privacy and execution privacy of the consumer jobs against any unau-
thorized data access and program execution, which can lead to unwanted privacy
breaches.
This dissertation research is dedicated to addressing the above mentioned research
challenges with the focus on parallel processing of large scale data using Map-Reduce
and delivering privacy-conscious continuous data services with anytime-anywhere
availability.
1.1 Technical Challenges
A cloud service allows enterprises to cost-effectively analyze large amounts of data
without creating large infrastructures and parallel computing platforms of their own.
Using virtual machines (VMs) and storage hosted by the cloud, enterprises can simply
create virtual clusters to process and analyze their data.
One of the technologies that made large scale data processing and data analytics
popular and accessible to enterprises of all sizes is MapReduce [57] (and its open-
source Hadoop [4] implementation). With the ability to automatically parallelize the
application on a cluster of commodity hardware, MapReduce allows enterprises to
analyze terabytes and petabytes of data more conveniently than ever. A MapReduce
job is comprised of two main components – a map function (Figure 1) that processes
key/value pairs from input data to generate a set of intermediate key/value pairs,
and a reduce function that merges all intermediate values associated with the same
intermediate key. A number of web applications lend themselves well to this model,
for example, web search indexing [5], behavior analysis for ad recommendation sys-
tems and analyzing clickstream data [3]. A unique capability of this model is its
ability to execute map and reduce tasks of a job on a distributed cluster of machines,






























Figure 1: MapReduce Execution Overview
are stored in a distributed filesystem throughout the cluster. A cluster master then
automatically schedules the map tasks at various worker nodes which process those
blocks to create intermediate key/value pairs. Some of these blocks may be present
locally on the worker node while others may require a remote-read to obtain from
another node. The intermediate values, generated as the output of the map tasks are
then scheduled to be processed by worker nodes to execute the reduce tasks which
write the output into files stored within the filesystem. The data transfer from the
map to the reduce tasks includes a shuffle phase in which reducers read data from all
mappers.
A cloud service for such large scale data processing introduces several technical
challenges in terms of efficient resource management, performance optimization and
privacy. We discuss them as follows.
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1.1.1 Cost-effectiveness
First, we argue that the existing cloud models for MapReduce are not cost-effective
leading to poor resource utilization in the datacenters and results in higher costs for
the customers. In general, there are two approaches in use today for MapReduce-
based large scale data processing in a cloud. In the first approach, customers use
a dedicated MapReduce cloud service (e.g. Amazon Elastic MapReduce [9]) and
buy on-demand clusters of VMs for each job or a workflow. Once the MapReduce
job (or workflow) is submitted, the cloud provider creates VMs that execute that
job and after job completion the VMs are deprovisioned. In the second approach
customers lease dedicated clusters from a generic cloud service like Amazon Elastic
Compute Cloud [10] and operate MapReduce on them as if they were using a private
MapReduce infrastructure. In this case, based on the type of analytics workload they
may use different number of VMs for each submitted job, however the entire cluster
needs to be maintained by the client enterprise.
Unfortunately, both of these models require users to figure out the complex job
configuration parameters (e.g. type of VMs, number of VMs and MapReduce config-
uration like number of mappers per VM etc.) while simultaneously forcing the cloud
provider to use those potentially sub-optimal configurations resulting in poor resource
utilization and higher cost. We note that the per-job optimized configurations cre-
ated from a user perspective are often suboptimal from a cloud provider perspective
and hence lead to requiring more cloud resources than that required by a globally
optimized schema with resource management performed at the cloud provider-end.
1.1.2 Datacenter Network Load
Another important challenge for the cloud provider is to manage the network resources
for multiple virtual clusters executing concurrently, a diverse set of jobs on shared
physical machines. Concretely, each MapReduce job generates different loads on the
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shared physical infrastructure – (a) computation load: number and size of each VM
(CPU, memory), (b) storage load: amount of input, output and intermediate data,
and (c) network load: traffic generated during the map, shuffle and reduce phases.
The network load is of special concern with MapReduce as large amounts of traffic
can be generated in the shuffle phase when the output of map tasks is transferred to
reduce tasks. As each reduce task needs to read the output of all map tasks [57], a
sudden explosion of network traffic can significantly deteriorate cloud performance.
This is especially true when data has to traverse greater number of network hops
while going across racks of servers in the data center [24]. Further, the problem
sometimes is exacerbated by TCP incast [109] with a recent study finding goodput
of the network reduced by an order of magnitude for a MapReduce workload [42].
To reduce network traffic for MapReduce workloads, we argue for improved data
locality for both Map and Reduce phases of the job. The goal is to reduce the network
distance between storage and compute nodes for both map and reduce processing – for
map phase, the VM executing the map task should be close to the node that stores the
input data (preferably local to that node) and for reduce phase, the VMs executing
reduce tasks should be close to the map-task VMs which generate the intermediate
data used as reduce input.
1.1.3 Privacy-conscious Data access
Additionally, computing in the cloud is fundamentally challenged by the issues of
data privacy, access privacy and execution privacy of consumer jobs against any
unauthorized data access and program execution, which can lead to serious privacy
breaches. As quite many data analysis operate on datasets that can be potentially
sensitive and private, privacy-conscious enterprises may choose to keep only encrypted
data in public clouds and decrypt to process them at their enterprise sites. In a
cloud both data access needs to be private and service execution needs to be private.
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Therefore it is important that the privacy-conscious data processing techniques are
scalable and cost-effective.
Additionally, when services are requested from client’s mobile devices, the location
information of the mobile clients need to be private to avoid any location privacy
breaches [49].
1.2 Dissertation focus and Contributions
In this dissertation, we focus on addressing the above mentioned challenges through
global resource optimization, locality-based job scheduling, effective caching tech-
niques and privacy aware service execution and delivery. This dissertation makes the
following contributions.
1.2.1 Cost-optimized Cloud Model
The first contribution of this dissertation research is the development of a utility-
driven cloud resource management system for MapReduce called Cura [106]. Cura
determines how to best provision virtual MapReduce clusters for jobs submitted to
the cloud by taking into consideration two sometimes conflicting requirements namely
meeting the service quality requirements in terms of throughputs and response times
on one hand while minimizing the overall consumption cost of the MapReduce cloud
data center on the other hand. Cura enables cloud consumers to get the desired
services at minimal cost while enabling cloud providers to maximize the utilization
rate of their service infrastructure. In contrast to existing MapReduce cloud services,
the resource management techniques in Cura aim at minimizing the overall resource
utilization in the cloud as opposed to per-job or per-customer resource optimization
in the existing services. Cura benefits from a number of novel performance enhance-
ments including pre-created virtual machine pools for scheduling, cost-aware resource
provisioning, VM-aware scheduling, intelligent capacity planning and online virtual
machine reconfiguration. Concretely, the first approach in Cura performs a VM-aware
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job scheduling using static virtual machine pools by utilizing pre-created virtual ma-
chines. The second approach of Cura performs VM-aware scheduling using dynamic
planning of virtual machines through online virtual machine reconfiguration, taking
into account dynamic characteristics of workload changes and the cost of the recon-
figuration process. The utility-driven scheduling and capacity planning approach of
Cura achieves significant improvements on the overall cost of operating the cloud
data center from the cloud service providers’ point of view without compromising the
service level agreement (SLA) of cloud consumers while making services available at
a lower cost to cloud users.
1.2.2 Locality-aware Cloud Resource Allocation
The second contribution of this dissertation is the development of a MapReduce
Cloud resource allocation system - Purlieus. Purlieus is a self-configurable locality-
based data and virtual machine management framework that enables MapReduce
jobs to access most of their data either locally or from close-by nodes including all
input, output and intermediate data generated during map and reduce phases of
the jobs. The first feature of Purlieus is to identify and categorize jobs using a
data-size sensitive classifier into three categories namely map-input heavy, reduce-
input heavy and map-and-reduce input heavy. The second feature of Purlieus is to
provision virtual MapReduce clusters in a locality-aware manner, enabling efficient
pairing and allocation of MapReduce virtual machines (VMs) such that the map and
reduce processing can access all the input and intermediate data from local or close-by
physical machines. We demonstrate how this locality-awareness during both map and
reduce phases of the job not only improves runtime performance of individual jobs but
also has an additional advantage of reducing network traffic generated in the cloud
data center. This is accomplished using a novel coupling of, otherwise independent,
data and VM placement steps.
9
1.2.3 Privacy-conscious Cloud Resource Management
To address the concerns of privacy-conscious data access and query processing, we first
investigate on efficient MapReduce analysis for private data archived in a cloud. We
then address the challenges of provisioning location privacy-preserving cloud services
to mobile cloud users.
1.2.3.1 MapReduce Analysis for Archived Private Data
We note that public storage clouds have become a popular choice for archiving certain
classes of enterprise data such as application and infrastructure logs. As these logs can
contain sensitive information like IP addresses or user logins, regulatory and security
requirements often require data to be encrypted before moved to the cloud. In order
to leverage such data for any business value, we note that the current solutions are
highly inefficient, requiring to first download the data from the public clouds, decrypt
it and then process it at the secure enterprise site.
We propose VNCache: an efficient solution for MapReduce analysis of such cloud-
archived log data without requiring an apriori data transfer and loading into the local
Hadoop cluster. VNcache dynamically integrates cloud-archived data into a virtual
namespace at the enterprise Hadoop cluster. Through a seamless data streaming and
prefetching model, Hadoop jobs can begin execution as soon as they are launched
without requiring any apriori downloading. With VNcache’s accurate pre-fetching
and caching, jobs often run on a local cached copy of the data block significantly im-
proving performance. When no longer needed, data is safely evicted from the enter-
prise cluster reducing the total storage footprint. Uniquely, VNcache is implemented
with NO changes to the Hadoop application stack. While our first two contributions
of the thesis namely the Cura cost-optimized Cloud system and Purlieus locality-
aware resource management are at the cloud provider tier, our VNCache system is
implemented at the application service provider tier.
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1.2.3.2 Location Privacy-aware Mobile Cloud Services
The next contribution of this dissertation extends our cloud service framework at the
cloud consumer tier to support privacy-preserving ubiquitous data access and query
processing. Concretely, the goal in this context is to offer anonymous cloud services
to mobile users on the move. Cloud users request location dependent data services
having their own location privacy constraints and thus the service requests must be
honored with respect to personalized location privacy requirements. Spatial cloaking
techniques are extensively studied to anonymize GPS or WiFi localization traces such
that the exact location of a mobile user is cloaked with a k-anonymized spatial region
before forwarding and storing them at an untrusted cloud provider. However spa-
tial cloaking suffers from a number of serious limitations, such as inability to support
pseudo-identity based services, lower quality of services due to lower spatial resolution
of anonymized locations and vulnerability of privacy leakages for continuous services.
As part of this dissertation, we have developed a novel road-network mix-zone based
framework for anonymizing location data and serving location based service requests
without disclosing privacy in real-time. In contrast to spatial cloaking based location
privacy protection, the MobiMix approach aims at breaking the continuity of location
exposure through the development of attack resilient road network mix-zones. We
have devised non-rectangular road network mix-zones [104] to protect snapshot query
users against location privacy risks by offering both timing attack resilience and tran-
sition attack resilience even when the mobility patterns and road-network topology
are exposed to the attackers. To protect continuous query users, we have devel-
oped three types of delay-tolerant road network mix-zones (i.e., temporal, spatial and
spatio-temporal) that achieve higher anonymity and attack resilience to CQ-timing
attacks and CQ-transition attacks [105]. Overall, the MobiMix approach can provide
higher level of anonymity while offering better quality of service for location based
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services with hard continuity constraints. The cloud services powered by the Mo-
biMix system offers access privacy protection for cloud consumers enabling them to
use cloud service anytime and anywhere worry free of location privacy risks.
The overall goal of this dissertation lies in scalable and cost-effective provisioning
and privacy-conscious delivery of Cloud services. We firmly believe that an important
enabling technology for cloud services is the ability to offer cost-aware elasticity as well
as privacy-conscious scalability and high performance in supporting Big Data appli-
cations. This dissertation research scope focuses on taking a systematic approach to
developing system-level techniques and algorithms to addressing these challenges and
is dedicated to relevant research solutions to the next generation of cloud computing
services.
1.3 Organization of the Dissertation
This dissertation is organized into a series of chapters. Each chapter presents the
background of the problem being addressed and introduces the technical concepts
and discusses the solution techniques followed by experimental evaluation. We discuss
related work along every chapter. Below we present a brief overview of every chapter.
Chapter 2: In this chapter, we discuss the cost-inefficiencies in existing cloud
models for MapReduce and present the Cura cost-optimized model for MapReduce
Clouds. We also discuss the performance enhancement schemes in Cura namely
VM-aware scheduling and online virtual machine reconfiguration and present the
experimental evaluation.
Chapter 3: We provide an overview of the Purlieus locality-aware resource al-
location system. We discuss the challenges related to datacenter networking bottle-
necks and argue for improved data locality in the cloud. We present the Purlieus
coupled storage-compute architecture for MapReduce and describe its resource allo-
cation techniques.
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Chapter 4: In this chapter, we present our caching techniques for privacy-
conscious enterprises to efficiently process archived data stored in Public clouds.
Chapter 5: In this chapter, we introduce the location privacy risks involved in
accessing cloud services from mobile devices. We present the MobiMix road net-
work based mix-zone framework for protecting location privacy of mobile users. We
discuss the unique features of the MobiMix approach and presents its experimental
evaluation.
Chapter 6: We introduce the privacy risks involved in accessing continuous query
services and present the delay-tolerant mix-zone approach as an effective countermea-
sure to deal with the privacy attacks related to accessing continuous data services.
Chapter 7: We conclude with a summary of our thesis contribution and discuss
open issues and future research directions to the work presented in this thesis.
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CHAPTER II
CURA: A COST-OPTIMIZED MODEL FOR
MAPREDUCE IN A CLOUD
2.1 Introduction
One of the major IT trends impacting modern enterprises is big data and big data
analytics. As enterprises generate more and more data, deriving business value from
it using analytics becomes a differentiating capability – whether it is understanding
customer buying behavior or detecting fraud in online transactions. The most popular
approach towards such big data analytics is using MapReduce [57] and its open-
source implementation called Hadoop [4]. With the ability to automatically parallelize
the application on a scale-out cluster of machines, MapReduce can allow analysis of
terabytes and petabytes of data in a single analytics job. Today MapReduce forms
the core of technologies powering enterprises like Google, Yahoo and Facebook. This
MapReduce analytics capability, when paired with another major IT trend – cloud
computing, offers a unique opportunity for enterprises interested in big data analytics.
A recent Gartner survey shows increasing cloud computing spending with 39% of
enterprises having allotted IT budgets for it [77].
In general, there are two approaches in use today for MapReduce in a cloud. In
the first approach, customers use a dedicated MapReduce cloud service (e.g. Amazon
Elastic MapReduce [9]) and buy on-demand clusters of VMs for each job or a work-
flow. Once the MapReduce job (or workflow) is submitted, the cloud provider creates
VMs that execute that job and after job completion the VMs are deprovisioned. In
the second approach customers lease dedicated clusters from a generic cloud service
like Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud [10] and operate MapReduce on them as if they
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were using a private MapReduce infrastructure. In this case, based on the type of
analytics workload they may use different number of VMs for each submitted job,
however the entire cluster needs to be maintained by the client enterprise.
In this chapter we argue that these MapReduce cloud models suffer from the
following drawbacks:
Interactive workloads: Many modern MapReduce workloads constitute a large
fraction of interactive short jobs [37, 94, 43] that require short response times. A
recent study on the Facebook and Yahoo production workload traces [44, 43] show
that more than 95% of their production MapReduce jobs are short running jobs with
an average running time of 30 sec. These jobs typically process a smaller amount
of data (less than 200 MB in the Facebook trace [44] that are part of bigger data
sets, for example, a friend recommendation query that is issued interactively when
a Facebook user browses his/her profile. These jobs process a small amount of data
corresponding to a small subset of the social network graph to recommend the most
likely known friends to the user. As these jobs are highly interactive, providing high
quality of service in terms of job response time is infeasible in a dedicated MapReduce
cloud model (the first approach) since it requires virtual clusters to be created afresh
for each submitted job. On the other hand an owned cluster in a generic compute
cloud (the second approach) has high costs due to low utilization since the cluster
needs to be continuously up waiting for jobs and serving them when submitted.
Lack of global optimization: Secondly, both of these models require users to
figure out the complex job configuration parameters (e.g. type of VMs, number of
VMs and MapReduce configuration like number of mappers per VM etc.) that have
an impact on the performance and thus cost of the job. With growing popularity
of MapReduce and associated eco-system like Pig [8], Hive [127], many MapReduce
jobs nowadays are actually fired by non-engineer data analysts and putting such a
burden on those users is impractical. Additionally, even if MapReduce performance
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prediction tools like [74] are used in the current cloud models, the per-job optimized
configurations created by them from a user perspective are often suboptimal from
a cloud provider perspective and hence lead to requiring more cloud resources than
that required by a globally optimized schema with resource management performed
at the cloud provider-end. A good example of such a cloud managed system is the
recent Google BigQuery system [7] which allows to run SQL-like queries against very
large datasets with potentially billions of rows. In BigQuery service, customers only
submit the queries to be processed on the large datasets and the Cloud service provider
intelligently manages the resources for the SQL-like queries.
Low service differentiation: Thirdly, both existing models fail to incorpo-
rate significant other optimization opportunities available for the cloud provider to
improve its resource utilization. MapReduce workloads often have a large number
of jobs that do not require immediate execution, rather feed into a scheduled flow
- e.g. MapReduce job analyzing system logs for a daily/weekly status report. By
delaying the execution of such jobs, cloud provider can multiplex its resources better
for significant cost savings. For instance, the batch query model in Google BigQuery
service [7] has 43% lower cost than the interactive query model in which case the
queries are instantaneously executed.
To alleviate these drawbacks, we propose a MapReduce cloud service model called Cura.
Cura uses a secure instant VM allocation scheme that helps reduce the response time
for short jobs by up to 65%. To reduce user complexity, Cura automatically cre-
ates the best cluster configuration for the customers jobs with the goal of optimizing
the overall resource usage of the cloud. Finally, Cura includes a suite of resource
management techniques which leverage deadline awareness for cost-aware resource
provisioning. Overall, the use of these techniques including intelligent VM-aware
scheduling and online VM reconfiguration techniques lead to more than 80% savings
in the cloud infrastructure cost. While Cura focuses on cloud provider’s resource
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costs, we believe that any cost savings of the cloud provider in terms of infrastructure
cost and energy cost based on resource usage would in turn reflect positively in the
price of the services for the customers.
2.2 Cura: Model and Architecture
In this section, we present the cloud service model and system architecture for Cura.
2.2.1 Cloud Operational Model
Table 1 shows possible cloud service models for providing MapReduce as a cloud
service. The first operational model (immediate execution) is a completely customer
managed model where each job and its resources are specified by the customer on
a per-job basis and the cloud provider only ensures that the requested resources are
provisioned upon job arrival. Many existing cloud services such as Amazon Elastic
Compute Cloud [10], Amazon Elastic MapReduce [9] use this model. This model has
the lowest rewards since there is lack of global optimization across jobs as well as
other drawbacks discussed earlier. The second possible model (delayed start) [123] is
partly customer-managed and partly cloud-managed model where customers specify
which resources to use for their jobs and the cloud provider has the flexibility to
schedule the jobs as long as they begin execution within a specified deadline. Here,
the cloud provider takes slightly greater risk to make sure that all jobs begin exe-
cution within their deadlines and as a reward can potentially do better multiplexing
of its resources. However, specifically with MapReduce, this model still provides low
cost benefits since jobs are being optimized on a per-job basis by disparate users. In
fact customers in this model always tend to greedily choose low-cost small cluster
configurations involving fewer VMs that would require the job to begin execution
almost immediately. For example, consider a job that takes 180 minutes to complete
in a cluster of 2 small instances but takes 20 minutes to complete using a cluster of
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Table 1: Cloud Operational Models
Model Optimization Provider risk Potential benefits
Immediate execution Per-job Limited Low
Delayed start Per-job Moderate Low – Moderate
Cloud managed Global High High
6 large instances1. Here if the job needs to be completed in more than 180 minutes,
the per-job optimization by the customer will tend to choose the cluster of 2 small
instances as it has lower resource usage cost compared to the 6 large instance cluster.
This cluster configuration, however, expects the job to be started immediately and
does not provide opportunity for delayed start. This observation leads us to the next
model. The third model – which is the subject of this chapter – is a completely
cloud managed model where the customers only submit jobs and specify job comple-
tion deadlines. Here, the cloud provider takes greater risk and performs a globally
optimized resource management to meet the job SLAs for the customers. Similar
high-risk high-reward model is the database-as-a-service model [50, 31, 141] where
the cloud provider estimates the execution time of the customer queries and performs
resource provisioning and scheduling to ensure that the queries meet their response
time requirements. As MapReduce also lends itself well to prediction of execution
time [73, 101, 79, 110, 80], we have designed Cura on a similar model. Another recent
example of this model is the Batch query model in Google’s Big Query cloud service
[7] where the Cloud provider manages the resources required for the SQL-like queries
so as to provide a service level agreement of executing the query within 3 hours.
2.2.2 System Model: User Interaction
Cura’s system model significantly simplifies the way users deal with the cloud service.
With Cura, users simply submit their jobs (or composite job workflows) and specify
the required service quality in terms of response time requirements. After that, the












Figure 2: Cura: System Architecture
cloud provider has complete control on the type and schedule of resources to be
devoted to that job. From the user perspective, the deadline will typically be driven
by their quality of service requirements for the job. As MapReduce jobs perform
repeated analytics tasks, deadlines could simply be chosen based on those tasks (e.g.
8 AM for a daily log analysis job). For ad-hoc jobs that are not run per a set schedule,
the cloud provider can try to incentivize longer deadlines by offering to lower costs
if users are willing to wait for their jobs to be executed2. However, this model does
not preclude an immediate execution mode in which case the job is scheduled to
be executed at the time of submission, similar to existing MapReduce cloud service
models.
2.2.3 System Architecture
Once a job is submitted to Cura, it may take one of the two paths (Figure 2). If
a job is submitted for the very first time, Cura processes it to be profiled prior to
execution as part of its profile and analyze service. This develops a performance
2Design of a complete costing mechanism is beyond the scope of this work
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model for the job in order to be able to generate predictions for its performance for
different VM types, cluster sizes and job parameters. This model is used by Cura in
optimizing the global resource allocation. MapReduce profiling has been an active
area of research [73, 101, 80] and open-source tools such as Starfish [73] are available
to create such profiles. Recent work had leveraged MapReduce profiling for Cloud
resource management and showed that such profiles can be obtained with very high
accuracy with less than 12% error rate for the predicted running time [79].
The profile and analyze service is used only once when a customer’s job first goes
from development-and-testing into production in its software life cycle. For subse-
quent instances of the production job, Cura directly sends the job for scheduling.
Since typically production jobs including interactive or long running jobs do not
change frequently (only their input data may differ for each instance of their execu-
tion), profiling will most often be a one-time cost. Further, from an architectural
standpoint, Cura users may even choose to skip profiling and instead provide VM
type, cluster size and job parameters to the cloud service similar to existing dedi-
cated MapReduce cloud service models like [9]. Jobs that skip the one-time profile
and analyze step will still benefit from the response time optimizations in Cura de-
scribed below, however, they will fail to leverage the benefits provided by Cura’s
global resource optimization strategies. Jobs that are already profiled are directly
submitted to the Cura resource management system.
Cura’s resource management system is composed of the following components:
2.2.3.1 Secure instant VM allocation
In contrast to existing MapReduce services that create VMs on demand, Cura employs
a secure instant VM allocation scheme that reduces response times for jobs, especially
significant for short running jobs. Upon completion of a job’s execution, Cura only
destroys the Hadoop instance used by the job (including all local data) but retains the
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VM to be used for other jobs that need the same VM configuration. For the new job,
only a quick Hadoop initialization phase is required which prevents having to recreate
and boot up VMs3. Operationally, Cura creates pools of VMs of different instance
types as shown in Figure 3 and dynamically creates Hadoop clusters on them.
Pool of small 
instances
Pool of Large 
instances
Pool of extra 
large instances
Figure 3: VM Pool
When time sharing a VM across jobs it is important to ensure that an untrusted
MapReduce program is not able to gain control over the data or applications of other
customers. Cura’s security management is based on SELinux [12] and is similar to
that of the Airavat system proposed in [114] that showed that enforcing SELinux
access policies in a MapReduce cloud does not lead to performance overheads. While
Airavat shares multiple customer jobs across the same HDFS, Cura runs only one
Hadoop instance at a time and the HDFS and MapReduce framework is used by only
one customer before it is destroyed. Therefore, enforcing Cura’s SELinux policies
does not require modifications to the Hadoop framework and requires creation of only
two SELinux domains, one trusted and the other untrusted. The Hadoop framework
3Even with our secure instant VM allocation technique data still needs to be loaded for each job
into its HDFS, but it is very fast for small jobs as they each process small amount of data, typically
less than 200 MB in the Facebook and Yahoo workloads [44].
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including the HDFS runs in the trusted domain and the untrusted customer programs
run in the untrusted domain. While the trusted domain has regular access privileges
including access to the network for network communication, the untrusted domain
has very limited permissions and has no access to any trusted files and other system
resources. An alternate solution for Cura’s secure instant VM allocation is to take
VM snapshots upon VM creation and once a customer job finishes, the VM can revert
to the old snapshot. This approach is also significantly faster than destroying and
recreating VMs, but it can however incur noticeable delays in starting a new job
before the VM gets reverted to a secure earlier snapshot.
Overall this ability of Cura to serve short jobs better is a key distinguishing feature.
However as discussed next, Cura has many other optimizations that benefit any type
of job including long running batch jobs.
2.2.3.2 Job Scheduler
The job scheduler at the cloud provider forms an integral component of the Cura sys-
tem. Where existing MapReduce services simply provision customer-specified VMs
to execute the job, Cura’s VM-aware scheduler (Section 2.3.1) is faced with the chal-
lenge of scheduling jobs among available VM pools while minimizing global cloud
resource usage. Therefore, carefully executing jobs in the best VM type and cluster
size among the available VM pools becomes a crucial factor for performance. The
scheduler has knowledge of the relative performance of the jobs across different cluster
configurations from the predictions obtained from the profile and analyze service and
uses it to obtain global resource optimization.
2.2.3.3 VM Pool Manager
The third main component in Cura is the VM Pool Manager that deals with the
challenge of dynamically managing the VM pools to help the job scheduler effectively
obtain efficient resource allocations. For instance, if more number of jobs in the
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current workload require small VM instances and the cloud infrastructure has fewer
small instances, the scheduler will be forced to schedule them in other instance types
leading to higher resource usage cost. The VM pool manager understands the current
workload characteristics of the jobs and is responsible for online reconfiguration of
VMs for adapting to changes in workload patterns (Section 2.3.2). In addition, this
component may perform further optimization such as power management by suitably
shutting down VMs at low load conditions.
2.3 Cura: Resource Management
In this section, we describe Cura’s core resource management techniques. We first
present Cura’s VM-aware job scheduler that intelligently schedules jobs within the
available set of VM pools. We then present our reconfiguration-based VM pool man-
ager that dynamically manages the VM instance pools by adaptively reconfiguring
VMs based on current workload requirements.
2.3.1 VM-aware Scheduling
The goal of the cloud provider is to minimize the infrastructure cost by minimizing
the number of servers required to handle the data center workload. Typically the
peak workload decides the infrastructure cost for the data center. The goal of Cura
VM-aware scheduling is to schedule all jobs within available VM pools to meet their
deadlines while minimizing the overall resource usage in the data center reducing this
total infrastructure cost. As jobs are incrementally submitted to the cloud, scheduling
requires an online algorithm that can place one job at a time on an infrastructure
already executing some jobs. To better understand the complexity of the problem,
we first analyze an offline version which leads us to the design of an online scheduler.
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2.3.1.1 Offline VM-aware Scheduling
In the offline VM-aware scheduling problem, we assume that information about the
jobs, their arrival time and deadlines are known apriori and the goal of the algorithm
is to schedule all jobs to meet their deadline by appropriately provisioning VM clusters
and to minimize the overall resource usage in the cloud. We assume each job, Ji is
profiled when it first goes to production and based on the profile it has a number
of predictions across various cluster configurations, Ck,n in terms of instance types
denoted by k and number of VMs denoted by n. Let tarrival(Ji) and tdeadline(Ji)
denote the arrival time and deadline of job, Ji respectively. The running time of the
job, Ji using the cluster configuration, C
k,n is given by trun(Ji, C
k,n) and it includes
both execution time and the time for loading data into the HDFS4. Cost(Ji, C
k,n)
represents the resource usage cost of scheduling job, Ji using the cluster configuration,
Ck,n. Precisely, the cost, Cost(Ji, C
k,n) represents the product of the number of
physical servers required to host the virtual cluster, Ck,n and the running time of the
job, trun(Ji, C
k,n). If Rk represents number of units of physical resources in VM type,
k and if each physical server has M units of physical resources5, the resource usage
cost can be computed as:
Cost(Ji, C
k,n) = trun(Ji, C
k,n)× n×Rk
M
Let tstart(Ji) denote the actual starting time of the job, Ji and therefore the end time
of job, Ji is given by
tend(Ji) = tstart(Ji) +
∑
k,n
Xk,ni × trun(Ji, Ck,n)
4Additionally, trun(Ji, C
k,n) can also include an error bound in the prediction to ensure that the
job will complete within its deadline even when there is prediction error.
5Though we present a scalar capacity value, VM resources may have multiple dimensions like
CPU, memory and disk. To handle this, our model can be extended to include a vector of resources
or compute dimensions can be captured in a scalar value, e.g. the volume metric [139].
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In order to ensure that all jobs get completed within their deadlines, we have
∀i, tend(Ji) ≤ tdeadline(Ji)
The sum of concurrent usage of VMs among the running jobs is also constrained by
the number of VMs, Vk in the VM pools where k represents the VM type. If S
t
i is a
Boolean variable indicating if job, Ji is executing at time, t, we have
Sti =







(Xk,ni × n)) ≤ Vk
With the above constraints ensuring that the jobs get scheduled to meet deadlines,







An optimal solution for this problem is NP-Hard with a reduction from the known
NP-Hard multi bin-packing problem [62] with additional job moldability constraints.
Therefore, we use a heuristics based VM-aware scheduler which is designed to work
in an online fashion.
2.3.1.2 Online VM-aware Scheduler
Given VM pools for each VM instance type and continually incoming jobs, the online
VM-aware scheduler decides (a) when to schedule each job in the job queue, (b) which
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VM instance pool to use and (c) how many VMs to use for the jobs. The scheduler
also decides best Hadoop configuration settings to be used for the job by consulting
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(b) VM-aware schedule with Reconf-based VM pool management
Figure 4: Scheduling in Cura
Depending upon deadlines for the submitted jobs, the VM-aware scheduler typ-
ically needs to make future reservations on VM pool resources (e.g. reserving 100
small instances from time instance 100 to 150). In order to maintain the most agility
in dealing with incrementally incoming jobs and minimizing the number of reserva-
tion cancellations, Cura uses a strategy of trying to create minimum number of future
reservations without under-utilizing any resources. For implementing this strategy,
the scheduler operates by identifying the highest priority job to schedule at any given
time and creates a tentative reservation for resources for that job. It then uses the
end time of that job’s reservation as the bound for limiting the number of reservations
i.e. jobs in the job queue that are not schedulable (in terms of start time) within that
reservation time window are not considered for reservation. This ensures that we are
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not unnecessarily creating a large number of reservations which may need cancellation
and rescheduling after another job with more stringent deadline enters the queue.
A job Ji is said to have higher priority over job Jj if the schedule obtained by
reserving job Ji after reserving job Jj would incur higher resource cost compared to
the schedule obtained by reserving job Jj after reserving Ji. The highest priority job
is picked by performing pairwise cost comparisons. It is chosen such that it will incur
higher overall resource usage cost if the highest priority job is deferred as compared
to deferring any other job.
For each VM pool, the algorithm picks the highest priority job, Jprior in the job
queue and makes a reservation for it using the cluster configuration with the lowest
possible resource cost at the earliest possible time based on the performance predic-
tions obtained from the profile and analyze service. Note that the lowest resource
cost cluster configuration need not be the job’s optimal cluster configuration (that
has lowest per-job cost). For instance, if using the job’s optimal cluster configuration
at the current time cannot meet the deadline, the lowest resource cost cluster will
represent the one that has the minimal resource usage cost among all the cluster
configurations that can meet the job’s deadline.
Once the highest priority job, Jprior is reserved for all VM pools, the reservation
time windows for the corresponding VM pools are fixed. Subsequently, the scheduler
picks the next highest priority job in the job queue by considering priority only
with respect to the reservations that are possible within the current reservation time
windows of the VM pools. The scheduler keeps on picking the highest priority job one
by one in this manner and tries to make reservations to them on the VM pools within
the reservation time window. Either when all jobs are considered in the queue and no
more jobs are schedulable within the reservation time window or when the reservations
have filled all the resources until the reservation time windows, the scheduler stops
reserving.
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Then at each time instance, the scheduler picks the reservations for the current
time and schedules them on the VM pools by creating Hadoop clusters of the required
sizes in the reservation. After scheduling the set of jobs that have reservation starting
at the current time, the scheduler waits for one unit of time and considers scheduling
for the next time unit. If no new jobs arrived within this one unit of time, the
scheduler can simply look at the reservations made earlier and schedule the jobs that
are reserved for the current time, however, if some new jobs arrived within the last one
unit of time, then the scheduler needs to check if some of the newly arrived jobs have
higher priority over the reserved jobs and in that case, the scheduler may require to
cancel some existing reservations to reserve some newly arrived jobs that have higher
priority over the ones in the reserved list.
Algorithm 1 VM-aware Scheduling
1: Wlist: jobs that are waiting to be reserved or scheduled
2: Nlist: jobs that arrived since the last time tick
3: Rlist: jobs that have a tentative reservation
4: window(V ): reservation time window of VM type V
5: twindow : is the set of time windows of all the VM types
6: CostV M (Ji, Jj , V ): lowest possible resource usage cost of scheduling jobs Ji and Jj by reserving Ji before job Jj
in VM type V
7: Cost(Ji, Jj): lowest possible cost of scheduling jobs Ji and Jj on any VM type
8: Costtwindow(Ji, Jj): lowest possible cost of scheduling Ji and Jj by reserving Ji before Jj such that they both
start within the time window of the VM pools
9: Sched(Ji, twindow): determines if the Job Ji is schedulable within the current time window of the VM pools
10: All cost calculations consider only cluster configurations that can meet the job’s deadline
11: procedure VMawareSchedule(Wlist, Nlist, Rlist)
12: Assign redo reserve = true if ∃Jn ∈ Nlist, ∃Jr ∈ Rlist such that Cost(Jn, Jr) ≥ Cost(Jr, Jn)
13: Assign redo timewindow = true if ∃Jn ∈ Nlist, ∃Jr ∈ Rlist such that Cost(Jn, Jr) > Cost(Jr, Jn) and Jr is
a time window deciding job
14: if ( redo reserve == false) then
15: return
16: end if
17: if (redo timewindow == true) then
18: CJlist = Rlist ∪Nlist ∪Wlist
19: Cancel all reservations
20: for all V ∈ VMtypes do
21: Pick and reserve job Ji that maximizes
22:
∑
Jj∈CJlist Cost(Jj , Ji)− CostV M (Ji, Jj , V ))
23: twindow(V ) = min(tend(Ji), tbound)
24: end for
25: else
26: CJlist = Rlist ∪Nlist
27: Cancel all reservations except twindow deciding ones
28: end if
29: while ( ∃Ji ∈ CJlist|sched(Ji, twindow) == true) do
30: Pick and reserve job Ji that maximizes
31:
∑
Jj∈CJlist Costtwindow(Jj , Ji)− Costtwindow (Ji, Jj)
32: end while
33: Run jobs having reservations start at the current time
34: end procedure
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If the scheduler finds that some newly arrived jobs take priority over some jobs
in the current reservation list, it first tries to check if the reservation time window
of the VM pools need to be changed. It needs to be changed only when some newly
arrived jobs take priority over the current highest priority job of the VM pools that
decides the reservation time window. If there exists such newly arrived jobs, the
algorithm cancels all reserved jobs and moves them back to the job queue and adds
all the newly arrived jobs to the job queue. It then picks the highest priority job,
Jprior for each VM pool from the job queue that decides the reservation time window
for each VM pool. Once the new reservation time window of the VM pools are
updated, the scheduler considers the other jobs in the queue for reservation within
the reservation time window of the VM pools until when either all jobs are considered
or when no more resources are left for reservation. In case, the newly arrived jobs do
not have higher priority over the time window deciding jobs but have higher priority
over some other reserved jobs, the scheduler will not cancel the time window deciding
reservations. However, it will cancel the other reservations and move the jobs back
to the job queue along with the new jobs and repeat the process of reserving jobs
within the reservation time windows from the job queue in the decreasing order of
priority. For a data center of a given size, assuming constant number of profile and
analyze predictions for each job, it can be shown that the algorithm runs in polynomial
time with O(n2) complexity. We present a complete pseudo-code for this VM-aware
scheduler in Algorithm 1.
While even a centralized VM-aware scheduler scales well for several thousands of
servers with tens of thousands of jobs, it is also straight forward to obtain a distributed
implementation to scale further. As seen from the pseudocode, the main operation
of the VM-aware scheduler is finding the highest priority job among the n jobs in
the queue based on pairwise cost comparisons. In a distributed implementation, this
operation can be distributed and parallelized so that if there are n jobs in the queue,
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Figure 4(a) shows an example VM-aware schedule obtained for 15 jobs using 40
VMs in each VM type, VM-1, VM-2 and VM-3. Here we assume that jobs 1, 2, 5,
6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 have their optimal cluster configuration using VM-1 and
jobs 3, 12, and 14 are optimal with VM-2 and job 4 is optimal with VM-3. Here, the
VM-aware scheduler tries its best effort to minimize the overall resource usage cost
by provisioning the right jobs in the right VM types and using the minimal cluster
size required to meet the deadline requirements. However, when the optimal choice
of the resource is not available for some jobs, the scheduler considers the next best
cluster configuration and schedules them in a cost-aware manner. Below, we discuss













10 900 1500 562.5 1875 321.42 2142.85
20 473.68 1578.94 296.05 1973.68 169.17 2255.63
30 333.33 1666.66 208.33 2083.33 119.04 2380.95
40 264.70 1764.70 165.44 2205.88 94.53 2521.00













10 1250 2083.33 500 1666.66 357.14 2380.95
20 657.89 2192.98 263.15 1754.38 187.96 2506.26
30 462.96 2314.81 185.18 1851.85 132.27 2645.50
40 367.64 2450.98 147.05 1960.78 105.04 2801.12













10 5000 8333.33 2187.5 7291.66 875 5833.33
20 2631.57 8771.92 1151.31 7675.43 460.52 6140.35
30 1851.85 9259.25 810.18 8101.85 324.07 6481.48
40 1470.58 9803.92 643.38 8578.43 257.35 6862.74














10 250 416.66 156.25 520.83 89.28 595.23
20 131.57 438.59 82.23 548.24 46.99 626.56
30 92.59 462.96 57.87 578.70 33.06 661.37
40 73.52 490.19 45.95 612.74 26.26 700.28
Table 5: Job type -4: Optimal with virtual machine type -1
Table 6 shows a simple workload of 15 jobs scheduled using the VM-aware sched-
uler. The workload consists of 4 types of jobs. Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5 show the perfor-
mances predictions of these 4 job types made across 3 VM types. VM-1 is assumed
to have 2 GB memory and 2 VCPUs and VM-2 and VM-3 are assumed to have 4
GB memory and 4 VCPUs and 8 GB memory and 8 VCPUs respectively. The tables
compare 4 different cluster configurations for each VM type by varying the number
of VMs from 10 to 40. The running time of the job in each cluster configuration is
shown as trun and the resource utilization cost is shown as Cost. We find that job
type 1 is optimal with the VM-1 and incurs 20% additional cost with VM-2 and 30%
additional cost with VM-3. Similarly, job type 2 is optimal with VM-2 and incurs
20% additional cost with VM-1 and 30% additional cost with VM-3. Job type 3 is
optimal for VM-3 and incurs 30% additional cost with VM-1 and 20% additional cost
with VM-2. Job type 4 is similar to job type-1 which is optimal for VM-1, but it has
shorter running time.
In Table 6, the arrival time and the deadline of the jobs are shown. Now, the
scheduler’s goal is to choose the number of virtual machines and the virtual machine
type to use for each job. At time t = 0, we find jobs, 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 in the system.
Based on the type of the jobs and by comparing the cost shown in Tables 2 - 5, jobs
1, 2 and 5 are optimal with VM-1 whereas job 3 is optimal with VM-2 and job 4
is optimal with VM-3. The VM-aware scheduler chooses job 1 as the time window
deciding job for VM-1 based on the cost-based priority and chooses jobs 3 and 4 as the
time window deciding jobs for VM-2 and VM-3 respectively. Once the time windows
are decided, it reserves and schedules job 2 in VM-1 based on the cost-based priorities
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by referring to the performance comparison tables. Similarly it reserves and schedules
job 5 in VM-3, however job 5 is optimal only with VM-1. As there is not enough
resources available in the VM pool of VM-1, the scheduler is forced to schedule it in
VM-3 although it knows that it is less efficient.
At time t = 5, job 6 arrives and it is scheduled in VM-2 within the reservation
time window as the other permissible cluster configurations using the VM types can
not meet its deadline. When job 7 arrives at time, t = 105 it is reserved and scheduled
in VM-1 within its reservation time window. At time t = 160 When job 8 arrives,
the scheduler identifies that it is optimal with VM-1, however as there is not enough
VMs in VM-1, it schedules it in VM-3 as the reservation of job 8 starts within the
current reservation time window of VM-3. When job 9 arrives, it gets reserved on
VM-1 to start at t = 225 as it is optimal with VM-1. However, when job 10 arrives at
t = 220 it overrides job 9 by possessing higher priority and hence job 9’s reservation
is cancelled and job 10 is reserved and scheduled at t = 225.
After job 11 arrives at time t = 230 and gets scheduled at t = 250, the reservation
time window needs to be updated for VM-1. The scheduler compares the priority
based on the cost and identifies job 11 as the time window deciding job and schedules
it at time t = 250. Subsequently, job 9’s reservation is also made at the earliest
possible, t = 357 within the new reservation time window. When job 12 arrives, the
scheduler identifies that it is optimal with VM-2 and it is reserved at the earliest
possible time t = 302 and at that time the reservation time window for VM-2 is
also updated with job 12. We note that job 13 is optimal with VM-1, however it
gets reserved and scheduled only with VM-3 as it has stronger deadline requirements
that only VM-3 can satisfy given the available resources in the other pools. Job 14
arrives at t = 430 and gets reserved and scheduled at t = 450 which also updates
the reservation time window of VM-2. However, Job 15 which is optimal with VM-1
needs to be scheduled with VM-3 due to lack of available resources in VM-1 pool.
32
Thus the VM-aware scheduler minimizes the overall resource usage cost even though
some jobs violate their per-job optimality.





1 4 0 270 1 10 0 250
2 4 0 150 1 20 0 132
3 2 0 275 2 20 0 264
4 3 0 475 3 20 0 461
5 1 0 185 3 20 0 170
6 1 5 310 2 20 0 302
7 1 105 250 1 30 132 225
8 1 160 500 3 10 170 492
9 1 215 850 1 20 357 831
10 1 220 400 1 20 225 357
11 1 230 650 1 20 250 624
12 2 240 460 2 40 302 450
13 1 400 800 3 10 461 783
14 2 430 730 2 20 450 714
15 4 460 700 3 20 492 662
Table 6: VM-aware schedule
2.3.2 Reconfiguration-based VM Management
Although the VM-aware scheduler tries to effectively minimize the global resource
usage by scheduling jobs based on resource usage cost, it may not be efficient if the
underlying VM pools are not optimal for the current workload characteristics. Cura’s
reconfiguration-based VM manager understands the workload characteristics of the
jobs as an online process and performs online reconfiguration of the underlying VM
pools to better suit the current workload. For example, the VM pool allocation shown
in Figure 3 can be reconfigured as shown in Figure 5 to have more small instances by
shutting down some large and extra large instances if the current workload pattern
requires more small instances.
The reconfiguration-based VM manager considers the recent history of job exe-
cutions by observing the jobs that arrived within a period of time referred to as the
reconfiguration time window. For each job, Ji arriving within the reconfiguration time
window, the reconfiguration algorithm understands the optimal cluster configuration,
Copt(Ji) that incurs the lowest resource usage cost among all cluster configurations
that can meet the job’s deadline requirements. At the end of the reconfiguration
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instances
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instances
Pool of extra 
large instances
Figure 5: Reconfiguration-based VM Management
time window period, the algorithm decides on the reconfiguration plan by making
a suitable tradeoff between the performance enhancement obtained after reconfigu-
ration and the cost of the reconfiguration process. If Y k,ni is a Boolean variable
indicating if Ck,n is the optimal cluster configuration for job, Ji, then the proportion
of physical resources, Pk to be allocated to each VM type k can be estimated based
on the cumulative resource usage in each VM pool computed as the product of total
running time of the jobs and the size of the cluster used:
Pk =
∑
i,n(trun(Ji, Copt(Ji))× n× Y
k,n
i )∑
i,k,n(trun(Ji, Copt(Ji))× n× Y
k,n
i )





where Rk represents the physical resource in VM type, k, and Vk is the number of
VMs in the existing VM pool of type k. Therefore, the number of VMs, V ′k in the
new reconfigured VM pools is given by
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V ′k = Pk ×
Rtotal
Rk
Such reconfiguration has to be balanced against the cost of reconfiguration op-
erations (shutting down some instances and starting others). For this, we compute
the benefit of doing such reconfiguration. The overall observed cost represents the
actual cumulative resource cost of the jobs executed during the reconfiguration time
window using existing VM pools. Here, Zk,ni is a Boolean variable indicating if the








Next, we compute the estimated overall cost with new VM pools assuming that the
jobs were scheduled using their optimal cluster configurations, Copt(Ji). Reconfigura-





Reconfbenefit = Overallcostestimate −Overallcostactual
Assuming the reconfiguration process incurs an average reconfiguration overhead,
Reconfoverhead that represents the resource usage spent on the reconfiguration pro-





|(V ′k − Vk)| ×Reconfoverhead
The algorithm then triggers the reconfiguration process only if it finds that the esti-
mated benefit exceeds the reconfiguration cost by a factor of β, i.e., if Reconfbenefit ≥
β × Reconfcost where β > 1. As Reconfbenefit only represents an estimate of the
benefit, β is often chosen as a value greater than 1. When the reconfiguration process
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starts to execute, it shuts down some VMs whose instance types needs to be de-
creased in number and creates new VMs of the instance types that needs to created.
The rest of the process is similar to any VM reconfiguration process that focuses
on the bin-packing aspect of placing VMs within the set of physical servers during
reconfiguration [139, 121].
Continuing the example of Figure 4, we find that the basic VM-aware scheduler in
Figure 4(a) without reconfiguration support schedules jobs 5, 6, 8, 13, 15 using VM-2
and VM-3 types even though they are optimal with VM-1, The reconfiguration based
VM-aware schedule in Figure 4(b) provisions more VM-1 instances (notice changed
Y-axis scale) by understanding the workload characteristics and hence in addition to
the other jobs, jobs 5, 6, 8 13 and 15 also get scheduled with their optimal choice
of VM-type namely VM-1, thereby minimizing the overall resource usage cost in the
cloud data center.
For the same workload shown in Table 6, with the reconfiguration-based VM pool
management, the allocation of the VMs in each pool is based on the current workload
characteristics. For the example simplicity, we do not show the reconfiguration process
in detail, instead we assume that the reconfiguration is performed and illustrate the
example with the efficient schedule obtained by the VM-aware scheduler with the
reconfigured VM pools. In Table 7, we note that all the jobs of job type 1 and job
type 4 are scheduled using their optimal VM type VM-1. Similarly type 2 and type
3 jobs also obtain their optimal VM types VM-2 and VM-3 respectively.
2.4 Experimental Evaluation
We divide the experimental evaluation of Cura into two – first, we provide detailed
analysis on the effectiveness of Cura compared to conventional MapReduce services
and then we present an extensive micro analysis on the different set of techniques in
Cura that contribute to the overall performance. We first start with our experimental
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1 4 0 270 1 10 0 250
2 4 0 150 1 20 0 132
3 2 0 275 2 20 0 264
4 3 0 475 3 20 0 461
5 1 0 185 1 70 0 172
6 1 5 310 1 40 0 270
7 1 105 250 1 30 132 225
8 1 160 510 1 30 172 502
9 1 215 850 1 20 357 831
10 1 220 400 1 20 225 357
11 1 230 650 1 20 250 624
12 2 240 460 2 20 264 529
13 1 400 800 1 30 400 734
14 2 480 730 2 20 529 773
15 4 460 700 1 20 460 592
Table 7: Schedule with Reconfiguration-based VM Management
setup.
2.4.1 Experimental setup
Metrics: We evaluate our techniques on four key metrics with the goal of measur-
ing their cost effectiveness and performance– (1) number of servers: techniques that
require more number of physical servers to successfully meet the service quality re-
quirements are less cost-effective; this metric measures the capital expense on the pro-
visioning of physical infrastructure in the data center, (2) response time: techniques
that have higher response time provide poor service quality; this metric captures
the service quality of the jobs, (3) per-job infrastructure cost - this metric represents
the average per-job fraction of the infrastructure cost; techniques that require fewer
servers will have lower per-job cost and (4) effective utilization: techniques that result
in poor utilization lead to higher cost; this metric captures both the cost-effectiveness
and the performance of the techniques. It should be noted that the effective utiliza-
tion captures only the useful utilization that represents job execution and does not
include the time taken for creating and destroying VMs.
Cluster Setup: Our cluster consists of 20 CentOS 5.5 physical machines (KVM as
the hypervisor) with 16 core 2.53GHz Intel processors and 16 GB RAM. The machines
are organized in two racks, each rack containing 10 physical machines. The network
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is 1 Gbps and the nodes within a rack are connected through a single switch. We
considered 6 VM instance types with the lowest configuration starting from 2 2 GHz
VCPUs and 2 GB RAM to the highest configuration having 12 2GHz VCPUs and 12
GB RAM with each VM configuration differing by 2 2 GHz VCPUs and 2 GB RAM
with the next higher configuration.
Workload: We created 50 jobs using the Swim MapReduce workload generator [44]
that richly represent the characteristics of the production MapReduce workload in the
Facebook MapReduce cluster. The workload generator uses a real MapReduce trace
from the Facebook production cluster and generates jobs with similar characteristics
as observed in the Facebook cluster. Using the Starfish profiling tool [73], each job is
profiled on our cluster setup using clusters of VMs of all 6 VM types. Each profile is
then analyzed using Starfish to develop predictions across various hypothetical cluster
configurations and input data sizes.
Before discussing the experimental results, we briefly discuss the set of techniques
compared in the evaluation.
Per-job cluster services: Per job services are similar to dedicated MapReduce
services such as Amazon Elastic MapReduce [9] that create clusters per job or per
workflow. While this model does not automatically pick VM and Hadoop param-
eters, for a fair comparison we use Starfish to create the optimal VM and Hadoop
configuration even in this model.
Dedicated cluster services: Dedicated clusters are similar to private cloud infras-
tructures where all VMs are managed by the customer enterprises and Hadoop clusters
are formed on demand when jobs arrive. Here again the VM and job parameters are
chosen via Starfish.
Cura: Cura incorporates both the VM-aware scheduler and reconfiguration-based
VM pool management. For the micro-analysis, we also compare the following sub-
techniques to better evaluate Cura: 1) Per-job Optimization technique that uses
38
Cura’s secure instant VM allocation but always uses the per-job optimal number of
VMs and the optimal VM type, 2) VM-aware scheduler described in Section 2.3.1
and 3) Reconfiguration based VM Management (Section 2.3.2).
2.4.2 Experimental Results
We first present the experimental evaluation of Cura by comparing with the existing
techniques for various experimental conditions determined by distribution of the job
deadlines, size of the MapReduce jobs, number of servers in the system and the
amount of prediction error in the profile and analyze process. By default, we use a
composite workload consisting of equal proportion of jobs of three different categories:
small jobs, medium jobs and large jobs. Small jobs read 100 MB of data, whereas
medium jobs and large jobs read 1 GB and 10 GB of input data respectively. We
model Poisson job arrivals with rate parameter, λ = 0.5 and the jobs are uniformly
distributed among 50 customers. The evaluation uses 11,500 jobs arriving within a
period of 100 minutes. Each of the arrived job represents one of the 50 profiled jobs
with input data size ranging from 100 MB to 10 GB based on the job size category.
By default, we assume that jobs run for the same amount of time predicted in the
profile and analyze process, however, we dedicate a separate set of experiments to
study the performance of the techniques when such predictions are erroneous. Note
that a job’s complete execution includes both the data loading time from the storage
infrastructure to the compute infrastructure and the Hadoop startup time for setting
up the Hadoop cluster in the cluster of VMs. The data loading time is computed by
assuming a network throughput of 50 MBps per VM 6 from the storage server and
the Hadoop startup time is taken as 10 sec.
6Here, the 50 MBps throughput is a conservative estimate of the throughput between the storage
and compute infrastructures based on measurement studies on real cloud infrastructures [63].
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2.4.2.1 Effect of job deadlines
In this set of experiments, we first study the effect of job deadlines on the performance
of Cura with other techniques (Figure 6) and then we analyze the performance of
Cura in terms of the contributions of each of its sub-techniques (Figure 7). Figure
6(a) shows the performance of the techniques for different maximum deadlines with
respect to number of servers required for the cloud provider to satisfy the workload.
Here, the deadlines are uniformly distributed within the maximum deadline value




















































































Figure 6: Effect of Job-deadlines
We find that provisioning dedicated clusters for each customer results in a lot of
resources as dedicated clusters are based on the peak requirements of each customer
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and therefore the resources are under-utilized. On the other hand, per-job cluster
services require lower number of servers (Figure 6(a)) as these resources are shared
among the customers. However, the Cura approach in Figure 6(a) has a much lower
resource requirement having up to 80% reduction in terms of the number of servers.
This is due to the designed global optimization capability of Cura. Where per-job
and dedicated cluster services always attempt to place jobs based on per-job optimal
configuration obtained from Starfish, resources for which may not be available in the
cloud, Cura on the other hand can schedule jobs using other than their individual
optimal configurations to better adapt to available resources in the cloud.
We also compare the approaches in terms of the mean response time in Figure 6(b).
To allow each compared technique to successfully schedule all jobs (and not cause
failures), we use the number of servers obtained in Figure 6(a) for each individual
technique. As a result, in this response time comparison, Cura is using much fewer
servers than the other techniques. We find that the Cura approach and the dedicated














































Figure 7: Effect of Job-deadlines
In the per-job cluster approach, the VM clusters are created for each job and it
takes additional time for the VM creation and booting process before the jobs can
begin execution leading to the increased response time of the jobs. Similar to the
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comparison on the number of servers, we see the same trend with respect to the per-
job cost in Figure 6(c) that shows that the Cura approach can significantly reduce
the per-job infrastructure cost of the jobs (up to 80%). The effective utilization in
Figure 6(d) shows that the per-job cluster services and dedicated cluster approach
have much lower effective utilization compared to the Cura approach. The per-job
services spend a lot of resources in creating VMs for every job arrival. Especially with
short response time jobs, the VM creation becomes a bigger overhead and reduces the
effective utilization. The dedicated cluster approach does not create VMs for every
job instance, however it has poor utilization because dedicated clusters are sized based
on peak utilization. But the Cura approach has a high effective utilization having
up to 7x improvement compared to the other techniques as Cura effectively leverages
global optimization and deadline-awareness to achieve better resource management.
Micro Analysis: Next, we discuss the performance of the sub-techniques of Cura
and illustrate how much each sub-technique contributes to the overall performance
under different deadlines. Figure 7(a) shows that with only per-job optimization
(which only leverages instant VM allocation), it requires up to 2.6x higher number
of servers compared to using reconfiguration-based VM pool management scheme
with the VM-aware scheduler. The per-job optimization scheduler always chooses the
optimal VM type and the optimal number of VMs for each job and in case the optimal
resources are not available when the job arrives, the scheduler keeps on queuing
the job until the required optimal resource becomes available when some other jobs
complete. It drops the request when it finds out that the job cannot meet its deadline
if the optimal resources are provisioned. However, with the VM-aware approach, the
scheduler will be able to still schedule the job by provisioning higher resources in order
to meet the deadline. Second, with the per-job optimization scheduler, even when
some sub-optimal resources are available when the job is waiting, they remain unused
as the job is expecting to be scheduled only using the optimal resources. Therefore
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the per-job optimization results in poor performance. The number of servers required
by the VM-aware approach is significantly reduced by up to 45% servers by efficient
reconfiguration-based VM management that dynamically manages the VMs in each
VM pool. Figure 7(b) shows the mean response time of the jobs for various sub-
techniques. We find that the sub-techniques have similar response times except for
the per-job optimization case that has up to 11% higher mean response time. As per-
job optimization scheduler keeps the jobs waiting until it finds their optimal resources,
it leads to higher queuing time that causes this increase.
2.4.2.2 Effect of Prediction Error
This set of experiments evaluates the techniques by studying the effect of inaccuracies
in the performance prediction. As accurate performance predictions may not always
be available, it is important that the techniques can tolerate inaccuracies in perfor-
mance prediction and yet perform efficiently. Figure 8 shows the comparison of the
techniques while varying the error rate from 0 to 70%. Here, the mean deadline of the
jobs is taken as 200 second. The error rate means that accurate running time of the
jobs can be anywhere within the error range on both sides of the predicted value. The
comparison of number of servers in Figure 8(a) shows that all the techniques require
more number of servers when the prediction error increases. The Cura approach on
an average requires 4% additional number of servers for every 10% increase in predic-
tion error. Note that even the per-job cluster and dedicated cluster schemes require
increased number of servers as they also decide the resource requirements based on
the performance predictions of the jobs across different cluster configurations.
Figure 8(b) shows that the response time of the techniques decreases with increase
in the error rate. While the Cura and dedicated cluster approaches have a decrease
of 4.2% and 3.7% respectively, the per-job cluster approach has a decrease of only



















































































Figure 8: Effect of Prediction Error
in these services is due to the VM creation process. As error rate increases, the
techniques provision more resources to ensure that even in the worst case, when the
jobs run for the maximum possible time within the error range, the jobs complete
within the deadline. Therefore, in cases where the job completes within the maximum
possible running time, these additional resources make the job complete earlier than
its deadline and therefore it speeds up the execution resulting in lower response time.
The cost trend shown in Figure 8(c) also shows that the techniques that require fewer
servers result in lower per-job cost. Similarly the effective utilization comparison in
Figure 8(d) shows similar relative performance as in Figure 6(d)
We compare the performance of the sub-techniques of Cura under different error
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rates in Figure 9. We find that the number of servers in Figure 9(a) shows a similar
relative performance among the sub-techniques as in 8(a). Here again, the response
time as shown in Figure 9(b) shows that the per-job optimization scheduler leads
to higher response time due to queue wait times and the response time of the sub-










































Figure 9: Effect of Prediction Error
2.4.2.3 Varying number of Servers
We next study the performance of the techniques by varying the number of servers
provisioned to handle the workload. Figure 10(a) shows the success rate of the ap-
proaches for various number of servers. Here, the success rate represents the fraction
of jobs that successfully meet their deadlines. We find that the Cura approach has a
high success rate even with 250 servers, whereas the per-job cluster approach obtains
close to 100% rate only with 2000 servers. Figure 10(b) shows that the response time
of successful jobs in the compared approaches show a similar trend as in Figure 6(b)
where the Cura approach performs better than the per-job cluster services.
2.4.2.4 Varying job sizes
This set of experiments evaluates the performance of the techniques for various job













































Figure 10: Effect of servers
data, medium jobs process 1 GB of data and large and extra large jobs process 10
GB and 100 GB of data respectively. Also small, medium and large jobs have a mean
deadline of 100 second and the extra large jobs have a mean deadline of 1000 second
as they are long running. We find that the performance in terms of number of servers
in Figure 11(a) has up to 9x improvement for the short and medium jobs with Cura
approach compared to the per-job cluster approach. It is because in addition to the
VM-aware scheduling and reconfiguration-based VM management, these jobs benefit
the most from the secure instant VM allocation as these are short jobs. For large and
extra large jobs, the Cura approach still performs significantly better having up to 4x
and 2x improvement for large and extra large jobs compared to the per-job cluster
services. The dedicated cluster service requires significantly higher resources for large
jobs as the peak workload utilization becomes high (its numbers significantly cross
the max Y-axis value). This set of experiments show that the global optimization
techniques in Cura are not only efficient for short jobs but also for long running
batch workloads. The response time improvements of Cura and dedicated cluster
approach in Figure 11(b) also show that the improvement is very significant for short
jobs having up to 87% reduced response time and up to 69% for medium jobs. It is


















































































Figure 11: Effect of Job type
large jobs with up to 30% reduced response time. The cost comparison in Figure 11(c)
also shows a similar trend that the Cura approach, although is significantly effective
for both large and extra large jobs, the cost reduction is much more significant for
small and medium jobs.
The sub-technique comparison of Cura for various job types in terms of number
of servers is shown in Figure 12(a). We find that the sub-techniques have impact
on all kind of jobs irrespective of the job size. While secure instant VM allocation
contributes more to the performance of the small jobs compared to large jobs, the sub-
techniques in Cura have equal impact on the overall performance for all job categories.
















































Figure 12: Effect of Job type
sub-techniques have similar response time, however, for large and extra large jobs, the
per-job optimization leads to increased response time by up to 24.8% as large jobs in
the per-job optimization require incur longer waiting time in the queue as they often
request more resources that may not be immediately available.
2.5 Related Work
Resource Allocation and Job Scheduling: There is a large body of work on
resource allocation and job scheduling in grid and parallel computing. Some repre-
sentative examples of generic schedulers include [102, 122]. The techniques proposed
in [26, 113] consider the class of malleable jobs where the number processors provi-
sioned can be varied at runtime. Similarly, the scheduling techniques presented in
[124, 46] consider moldable jobs that can be run on different number of processors.
These techniques do not consider a virtualized setting and hence do not deal with
the challenges of dynamically managing and reconfiguring the VM pools to adapt for
workload changes. Therefore, unlike Cura they do not make scheduling decisions over
dynamically managed VM pools. Chard et. al present a resource allocation frame-
work for grid and cloud computing frameworks by employing economic principles in
job scheduling [41]. Hacker et. al propose techniques for allocating virtual clusters by
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queuing job requests to minimize the spare resources in the cloud [70]. Recently, there
has been work on cloud auto scaling with the goal of minimizing customer cost while
provisioning the resources required to provide the needed service quality [90]. The
authors in [123] propose techniques for combining on demand provisioning of virtual
resources with batch processing to increase system utilization. Although the above
mentioned systems have considered cost reduction as a primary objective of resource
management, these systems are based on either per-job or per-customer optimization
and hence unlike Cura, they do not lead to a globally optimal resource management.
MapReduce task placement: There have been several efforts that investigate task
placement techniques for MapReduce while considering fairness constraints [115, 142].
Mantri tries to improve job performance by minimizing outliers by making network-
aware task placement [24]. Similar to Yahoo’s capacity scheduler and Facebook’s
fairness scheduler, the goal of these techniques is to appropriately place tasks for
the jobs running in a given Hadoop cluster to optimize for locality, fairness and
performance. Cura, on the other hand deals with the challenges of appropriately
provisioning the right Hadoop clusters for the jobs in terms of VM instance type and
cluster size to globally optimize for resource cost while dynamically reconfiguring the
VM pools to adapt for workload changes.
MapReduce in a cloud: Recently, motivated by MapReduce, there has been work
on resource allocation for data intensive applications in the cloud context [78, 103].
Quincy [78] is a resource allocation system for scheduling concurrent jobs on clus-
ters and Purlieus [103] is a MapReduce cloud system that improves job performance
through locality optimizations achieved by optimizing data and compute placements
in an integrated fashion. However, unlike Cura these systems are not aimed at im-
proving the usage model for MapReduce in a Cloud to better serve modern workloads
with lower cost.
MapReduce Profile and Analyze tools: A number of MapReduce profiling tools
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have been developed in the recent past with an objective of minimizing customer’s
cost in the cloud [80, 129, 101, 110, 133]. Herodotou et al. developed an automated
performance prediction tool based on their profile and analyze tool Starfish [73] to
guide customers to choose the best cluster size for meeting their job requirements [74].
Similar performance prediction tool is developed by Verma. et. al [133] based on a
linear regression model with the goal of guiding customers to minimize cost. Popescu.
et. al developed a technique for predicting runtime performance for jobs running
over varying input data set [110]. Recently, a new tool called Bazaar [79] has been
developed to guide MapReduce customers in a cloud by predicting job performance
using a gray-box approach that has very high prediction accuracy with less than 12%
prediction error. However, as discussed earlier, these job optimizations initiated from
the customer-end may lead to requiring higher resources at the cloud. Cura while
leveraging existing profiling research, addresses the challenge of optimizing the global
resource allocation at the cloud provider-end with the goal of minimizing customer
costs. As seen in evaluation, Cura benefits from both its cost-optimized usage model
and its intelligent scheduling and online reconfiguration-based VM pool management.
2.6 Summary
In this chapter, we presented a new MapReduce cloud service model, Cura, for data
analytics in the cloud. We argued that existing cloud services for MapReduce are inad-
equate and inefficient for production workloads. In contrast to existing services, Cura
automatically creates the best cluster configuration for the jobs using MapReduce pro-
filing and leverages deadline-awareness which, by delaying execution of certain jobs,
allows the cloud provider to optimize its global resource allocation efficiently and re-
duce its costs. Cura’s resource management techniques include cost-aware resource
provisioning, VM-aware scheduling and online virtual machine reconfiguration.
While in this chapter we addressed the cost-inefficiencies of the current cloud
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models, in the next chapter, we discuss on the job performance issues related to dat-
acenter networking and storage bottlenecks and present our architecture and solution
techniques to alleviate them.
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CHAPTER III
LOCALITY-AWARE RESOURCE ALLOCATION FOR
MAPREDUCE IN A CLOUD
3.1 Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 2, MapReduce offered as a service in the cloud provides
an attractive usage model for enterprises. Using virtual machines (VMs) and stor-
age hosted by the cloud, enterprises can simply create virtual MapReduce clusters
to analyze their data. However, an important challenge for the cloud provider is to
manage multiple virtual MapReduce clusters executing concurrently, a diverse set of
jobs on shared physical machines. Concretely, each MapReduce job generates dif-
ferent loads on the shared physical infrastructure – (a) computation load: number
and size of each VM (CPU, memory), (b) storage load: amount of input, output and
intermediate data, and (c) network load: traffic generated during the map, shuffle
and reduce phases. The network load is of special concern with MapReduce as large
amounts of traffic can be generated in the shuffle phase when the output of map
tasks is transferred to reduce tasks. As each reduce task needs to read the output of
all map tasks [57], a sudden explosion of network traffic can significantly deteriorate
cloud performance. This is especially true when data has to traverse greater number
of network hops while going across racks of servers in the data center [24]. Fur-
ther, the problem sometimes is exacerbated by TCP incast [109] with a recent study
finding goodput of the network reduced by an order of magnitude for a MapReduce
workload [42].
To reduce network traffic for MapReduce workloads, in this chapter, we argue for
improved data locality for both Map and Reduce phases of the job. The goal is
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to reduce the network distance between storage and compute nodes for both map
and reduce processing – for map phase, the VM executing the map task should be
close to the node that stores the input data (preferably local to that node) and
for reduce phase, the VMs executing reduce tasks should be close to the map-task
VMs which generate the intermediate data used as reduce input. Improved data
locality in this manner is beneficial in two ways – (1) it reduces job execution times
as network transfer times are big components of total execution time and (2) it reduces
cumulative data center network traffic. While map locality is well understood and
implemented in MapReduce systems, reduce locality has surprisingly received little
attention in spite of its significant potential impact. As an example, Figure 13 shows
the impact of improved reduce locality for a Sort workload. It shows the Hadoop task
execution timelines for a 10 GB dataset in a 2-rack 20-node physical cluster, where 20
Hadoop VMs were placed without and with reduce locality (top and bottom figures
respectively). As seen from the graph, reduce locality resulted in a significantly







































Figure 13: Impact of Reduce-locality. Timeline plotted using Hadoop’s
job history summary. Merge and Waste series are omitted since they were
negligible
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In this chapter, we present Purlieus – an intelligent MapReduce cloud resource al-
location system. Purlieus improves data locality during both map and reduce phases
of the MapReduce job by carefully coupling data and computation (VM) placement
in the cloud. Purlieus categorizes MapReduce jobs based on how much data they
access during the map and reduce phases and analyzes the network flows between
sets of machines that store the input/intermediate data and those that process the
data. It places data on those machines that can either be used to process the data
themself or are close to the machines that can do the processing. This is in contrast
to conventional MapReduce systems which place data independent of map and re-
duce computational placement – data is placed on any node in the cluster which has
sufficient storage capacity [57, 4] and only map tasks are attempted to be scheduled
local to the node storing the data block.
Additionally, Purlieus is different from conventional MapReduce clouds (e.g.,
Amazon Elastic MapReduce [9]) that use a separate compute cloud for performing
MapReduce computation and a separate storage cloud for storing the data persis-
tently. Such an architecture delays job execution and duplicates data in the cloud. In
contrast, Purlieus stores the data in a dedicated MapReduce cloud and jobs execute
on the same machines that store the data without waiting to load data from a remote
storage cloud.
To the best of our knowledge, Purlieus is the first effort that attempts to improve
data locality for MapReduce in a cloud. Secondly, Purlieus tackles the locality
problem in a fundamental manner by coupling data placement with VM placement
to provide both map and reduce locality. This leads to significant savings and can
reduce job execution times by close to 50% while reducing up to 70% of cross-rack
network traffic in some scenarios.
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3.2 System Model
In this section, we provide a brief background on MapReduce and introduce our
system model.
3.2.1 MapReduce: Background
A MapReduce job is comprised of two main components – a map function that pro-
cesses key/value pairs from input data to generate a set of intermediate key/value
pairs, and a reduce function that merges all intermediate values associated with the
same intermediate key to generate the output [57]. A unique capability of this model
is the execution of map and reduce tasks on a distributed cluster of machines, trans-
parently to the application programmer. The input data is split into blocks that
are stored in a distributed filesystem throughout the cluster. A cluster master then
automatically schedules the map tasks at various worker nodes which process those
blocks to create intermediate key/value pairs. Some of these input blocks may be
present locally on the worker node while others may require a remote-read from an-
other node. The map outputs are then scheduled to be processed by worker nodes for
reduce tasks which write the output into files stored within the filesystem. The data
transfer from the map to the reduce tasks includes a shuffle phase in which reducers
read data from all mappers. This phase, in particular, can cause significant network
traffic and perform poorly [24].
3.2.2 Model
In our system model, customers using the MapReduce cloud service load their input
datasets and MapReduce jobs into the service. This step is similar to any typical
cloud service which requires setting up of the application stack and data. There
is one key distinction, however. Typically cloud service providers use two distinct
infrastructures for storage and compute (e.g. Amazon S3 [11] for storage and Amazon
EC2 [10] for compute). Executing a MapReduce job in such infrastructures requires
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an additional loading step, in which data is loaded from the storage cloud into the
distributed filesystem (e.g. Hadoop’s HDFS) of the MapReduce VMs running in the
compute cloud before even the job begins execution. Such additional loading has
two drawbacks –(1) depending upon the amount of data required to be loaded and
connectivity between the compute and storage infrastructures, this step adversely
impacts performance, and (2) while the job is running (often for long durations) the
dataset is duplicated in the cloud – along with the storage cloud original, there is
a copy in the compute cloud for MapReduce processing, leading to higher costs for


























































































(b) Load-aware data placement
Figure 14: Load Awareness in Data placement
is directly stored on the same physical machines that run MapReduce VMs. This
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prevents the need for a wasteful data loading step before executing a MapReduce
job. We contend that since MapReduce input data is often predominantly used for
MapReduce analysis, storing it into a dedicated cloud service provides the greatest
opportunity for optimization.
In our proposed service, when customers upload their data into the service, the
data is broken up into chunks corresponding to MapReduce blocks and stored on a
distributed filesystem of the physical machines. The placement of data – deciding
which machines to use for each dataset – is done intelligently based on techniques
described later. When the job begins executing (i.e. MapReduce VMs are initialized),
the key challenge is to make data stored in the physical machines seamlessly available
to the MapReduce VMs running on those machines. We tackle this challenge using
two specific techniques in our design – (1) loopback mounts: For a job, when its data
is loaded into the cloud, the chunks being placed on each machine are stored via a
loopback mount [14] into a single data file (we refer to it as a vdisk-file)1 and (2)
VM disk-attach: The vdisk-file is then attached to the VM as a block device using
server virtualization tools (e.g. Xen’s xm block-attach command2). The VM can
then mount the vdisk file like it would any typical filesystem. The mount point of
this vdisk-file inside the VM serves as the MapReduce DFS directory (e.g. Hadoop’s
data.dir configuration variable). Note that if a MapReduce VM is required to be
placed on a physical machine other than the one containing that job’s data chunks,
the vdisk file is copied over to the appropriate physical machine and then attached
to the VM – analogous to traditional MapReduce’s remote-read. Also, similar to
Amazon Elastic MapReduce [9] the same VMs are used for both map and reduce
task execution. Note that when the job finishes execution, its VMs are de-provisioned
1To do this, a sparse empty file is created which is then loopback mounted and formatted using
ext2 providing access similar to any local filesystem, even though all data is being stored in a single
file on the physical filesystem.
2Similar commands exist for KVM and VMware
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while the input data continues to reside on the physical machines.
3.3 Purlieus: Principles and Problem Analysis
Under our proposed system model, the cloud provider faces two key questions – (1)
Data Placement: Which physical machines in the cluster should be used for each
dataset? and (2) VM Placement: Where should the VMs be provisioned to process
these data blocks? Poor placement of data or VMs may result in poor performance.
Purlieus tackles this challenge with a unique coupled placement strategy, where data
placement is aware of likely VM placement and attempts to improve locality. In this
section, we describe the principles of our design and provide a formal analysis of the
problem.
3.3.1 Principles
We argue that unlike traditional MapReduce, where data is placed independently of
the type of job processing it or loads on the servers, in a multi-tenant virtualized
cloud these attributes need to be accounted during data placement.
1. Job Specific Locality-awareness: Placing data in the MapReduce cloud service
should incorporate job characteristics - specifically the amount of data accessed in the
map and reduce phases. For example, a job that processes a lot of reduce data
(referred to as a reduce-input heavy job) is best served by provisioning the VMs of
MapReduce cluster close to each other on the cluster network, as each reducer reads
the outputs of all mappers. If the VMs are far from each other, each reducer would
have to read map outputs over longer network paths, which will increase job execution
time and also increase cross-rack traffic in the data center. On the other hand, map-
input heavy jobs that generate little intermediate data do not benefit by placing its
data blocks close to each other on the cluster. An efficient data placement scheme
could distribute data blocks for such a map-input heavy job across the network to
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preserve resources for placing reduce-input heavy jobs on a set of closely connected
machines.
Specifically, we use three distinct classes of jobs – (1) Map-input heavy (e.g. a
large grep workload which generates small intermediate data simply indicating if a
word occurs in input data), (2) Map-and-Reduce-input heavy (e.g. a sort workload:
intermediate data is equal to input data) and (3) Reduce-input-heavy (e.g. a permu-
tation generator workload which generates all permutations of given input strings).
Purlieus uses different strategies of data placement for different job types with the
goal of improving data locality3.
2. Load Awareness: Placing data in a MapReduce cloud should also account for
computational load (CPU, memory) on the physical machines. A good technique
should place data only on machines that are likely to have available capacity to
execute that job, else remote-reads will be required to pull data from busy machines
to be processed at less-utilized machines. For example, in Figure 14(a), consider
datasets A, B, C, D and E placed on six physical machines, M1 to M6. A load
unaware placement may collocate the blocks of datasets A, C and D together as
shown in Figure 14(a), even if jobs execute on A, C, D more frequently and generate
higher load than B and E. Here, when the job on the dataset D arrives and requests
for a virtual cluster of 3 VMs, say each with 40% CPU resources of the physical
machine, even though it would be best to place the VMs on the physical machines,
M1, M2 and M3 as they contain the data blocks of the dataset D, the system may
be forced to place the VMs on M4, M5 and M6, resulting in remote reads for the job
executing on dataset D. In contrast, the data placement shown in Figure 14(b) is able
to achieve local execution for all the map tasks. Here, while placing the data blocks,
it is made sure that the expected load on the servers does not exceed a particular
3For completeness a Map-and-Reduce-input light class can also be considered, however data
locality has little impact on its overall performance
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threshold. This incorporates the frequency and load generated by jobs executing on
datasets stored on these servers.
It is important to note that information about expected loads is available to a
cloud provider by monitoring the cloud environment. Typically with MapReduce, a
set of jobs are repeatedly executed on a similar input data set – e.g. periodic execu-
tion of indexing on web crawled data. This allows the cloud provider to understand
the load characteristics of such jobs and use this knowledge. Additionally, there are
many proposals that profile MapReduce jobs via trial executions on a small subset of
data [101, 32, 80, 40]. These show that understanding MapReduce job characteristics
can be quick and accurate. For the scope of this work, we assume that the expected
load on each dataset is known. Also that the cloud provider has enough data to
estimate job arrival rate and the mean execution time. Later in Section 3.5, we will
demonstrate that our proposed techniques perform well even when such estimates are
partly erroneous.
3. Job-specific Data Replication: Traditionally, data blocks in MapReduce are
replicated within the cluster for resiliency (by default, each block of the dataset is
replicated 3 times). While the job is executing any replica of the block can be used for
processing. Purlieus handles replicas in a different manner. Depending upon the type
and frequency of jobs, we place each replica of the entire dataset based on a particular
strategy. As an example, if an input dataset is used by three sets of MapReduce jobs,
two of which are reduce-input heavy and one map-input heavy, we place two replicas
of data blocks in a reduce-input heavy fashion and the third using map-input heavy
strategy. This allows maintaining greater data locality, especially during the reduce
phase, since otherwise by processing data block replicas far from other input data
blocks during the map phase, the reducers may be forced to read more data over the
network.
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3.3.2 The Data Placement Problem
Next, we formally analyze the data placement problem. We start with notation for
representing datasets, physical cloud infrastructure and their relationship.
Datasets and Jobs: Let D = {Di : 1 ≤ i ≤ |D|} be the set of datasets that
need to be stored in the MapReduce cloud. For the sake of presentation simplicity,
assume that each dataset is associated with only one MapReduce job-type and that
the replication factor is 14 Each dataset Di is divided into uniform sized blocks Bi,j :
1 ≤ i ≤ |D|, 1 ≤ j ≤ Qi} where Q = {Qi : 1 ≤ i ≤ |Q|} represent the number of
blocks for Di.
We assume that the job arrivals on the datasets follow a Poisson process and let
λ = {λi : 1 ≤ i ≤ |D|} denote the arrival rate of the jobs on the datasets. After a
job starts, it first executes map tasks. We denote the mean size of the expected map
output of each block of dataset, Di by mapoutput(Di).
Cloud Infrastructure: Let M = {Mk : 1 ≤ k ≤ |M|} denote the set of physical
machines. Each physical machine, Mk has some compute resources (CPU, memory)
with capacity Pcap(Mk)
5 and some storage resources (disk) with capacity expressed
in number of data blocks and denoted by Scap(Mk). In the data center, the physical
machines are connected to each other by a local area network. Let dist(Ml,Mm)
denote the distance between the physical machines Ml and Mm – we use the number
of network hops as the dist measure.
Relationship Notation: Let Pi ∈ M be the set of servers used to store the dataset
Di and X
k
i be a Boolean variable indicating if the physical machine Mk is used to
store the dataset Di. Therefore, Mk ∈ Pi if Xki =1. Let N = {Ni : 1 ≤ i ≤ |N |}
4If the job is associated with multiple jobs of different job types, as mentioned earlier different
replicas are used to support each type.
5Though we present a scalar capacity value, compute resources may have multiple dimensions
like CPU and memory. To handle this, either our model can be extended to include a vector of
resources or compute dimensions can be captured in a scalar value, e.g. the volume metric presented
in [139].
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Within Pi, let Y
k
i,j be the boolean variable indicating if the specific block Bi,j is present
in the physical machine Mk ∈ M. Thus, in order to ensure that the blocks are evenly







Locality based Cost: To capture locality, we define a cost function that measures
the amount of data transfer during job execution. Consider a job, A on the dataset,
Di. Let V (A) be the set of physical machines that host the VMs for job A. The total
cost of a MapReduce application is the sum of map and reduce costs that represent
the overhead involved in the data transfers during the map and reduce phases.
Cost(A,Di) = Mcost(A,Di) +Rcost(A,Di)
If Snode(Bi,j) ∈ Pi is the physical machine storing the data block, Bi,j, and its map




This cost definition captures the amount of data and the distance it travels over the
network. Similarly, the reduce cost can be computed as the overhead involved in
transferring the map outputs to the servers where the reducers are executed. As each
reducer needs to see the output of all the map tasks, assuming the number of reducers
is greater than the number of VMs used (as recommended by MapReduce) and each
VM runs atleast one reducer, the map outputs need to be transferred to every physical






where mout(A,Bi,j) is the amount of output data generated by the map task on the
data block, Bi,j. To improve locality, the goal is to minimize Mcost and Rcost,




Y ki,j ≤ Scap(Mk)
Minimizing Map Cost: To minimize map cost, the computations should get placed
on the same physical machines storing the map-input blocks (dist is zero). The data
placement technique, in turn, should try to maximize the probability of such co-
location. This is achieved by upper-bounding the expected resource load on the
servers for hosting the VMs at any given time. By placing data blocks such that
every server has a low expected utilization, there is higher probability that the server
will be available to host a VM when a request for a job on the datasets arrives.
Concretely, we model each physical machine, Mk as a M/M/1 single server queue.
Let a dataset, Di have a service time distribution with mean, µi, where µi is the mean
time to process the blocks by each VM and ρi =
λi
µi
. Therefore the expected number









W ki × CRes(Di)
where CRes(Di) denotes the computational resource required by each VM of the job
on Di, given by the type of VM chosen by the user (e.g. Amazon EC2’s small VM
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instance that uses 1.7 GB memory and 1 vCPU). We upper-bound the expected load
on any physical machine based on the load parameter, α.
∀k,Ek ≤ α× Pcap(Mk)
Here, a low value of α would indicate a conservative data placement where the ex-
pected load on the physical machines is less and therefore there is a high probability
for a job on a data chunk on a physical machine to get executed locally.
Minimizing Reduce Cost: With the above method for minimizing map cost, now
the key optimization is to improve reduce locality. At the time of data placement, the
node used to host the VM that processes the data, Cnode(Bi,j) is not fixed. Hence
Rcost can not be obtained precisely during data placement. Instead, we compute
an estimated reduce cost during data placement – we assume that at the time of job
execution, the VMs get placed on the physical machines storing the data block, which









mapoutput(Di) is the mean size of the expected map output of each block of dataset,
Di. While being an estimate, this definition serves as a useful guideline for placement
decisions, which as our evaluations show provides significant benefits.
It is easy to see that an optimal solution for this problem is NP-Hard – both
data and VM placement involve bin-packing, which is known to be NP-Hard [62].
Therefore, we use a heuristics based approach, which is described next.
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3.4 Purlieus: Placement Techniques
Next, we describe Purlieus’s data and VM placement techniques for various classes
of MapReduce jobs. The goal of these placements is to minimize the total Cost by
reducing the dist function for map (when input data, Qi is large) and/or reduce (when
intermediate data, mout is large).
3.4.1 Map-input heavy jobs
Map-input heavy jobs read large amounts of input data for map but generate only
small map-outputs that is input to the reducers. For placement, mappers of these
jobs should be placed close to input data blocks so that they can read data locally,
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Figure 15: Placing Map-input heavy jobs
3.4.1.1 Placing Map-input heavy data
As map-input heavy jobs do not require reducers to be executed close to each other,
the VMs of the MapReduce cluster can be placed anywhere in the data center. Thus,
physical machines to place the data are chosen only based on the storage utilization
and the expected load, Ek on the machines. As discussed in the cost model, E
k
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W ki × CRes(Di)
To store map-input heavy data chunks, Purlieus chooses machines that have the least
expected load. This ensures that when MapReduce VMs are placed, there is likely to
be capacity available on machines storing the input data.
3.4.1.2 VM placement for Map-input heavy jobs
The VM placement algorithm attempts to place VMs on the physical machines that
contain the input data chunks for the map phase. This results in lower MCost
– the dominant component for map-input heavy jobs. Since data placement had
placed blocks on machines that have lower expected computational load, it is less
likely, though possible that at the time of job execution, some machine containing
the data chunks does not have the available capacity. For such a case, the VM
may be placed close to the node that stores the actual data chunk. Specifically, the
VM placement algorithm iteratively searches for a physical machine having enough
resources in increasing order of network distance from the physical machine storing
the input data chunk. Among the physical machines at a given network distance, the
one having the least load is chosen.
3.4.2 Map-and-Reduce-input heavy jobs
Map-and-reduce-input heavy jobs process large amounts of input data and also gen-
erate large intermediate data. Optimizing cost for such jobs requires reducing the
dist function during both their map and reduce phases.
3.4.2.1 Placing Map-and-Reduce-input heavy data
To achieve high map-locality, data should be placed on physical machines that can
host VMs locally. Additionally, this data placement should support reduce-locality
– for which the VMs should be hosted on machines close to each other (preferably
66


























= 2 F2=0 
F
3













= 1 F11= 1 F12= 1
F
13
= 1 F14=2 F15= 1 F16= 1
F
17
= 1 F18= 0
H



















































M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
M7 M8 M9 M10 M11
M12
M13 M14 M15 M16 M17
M18
F1= 2 F2=0 
F3= 0 F4= 1 F5= 1 F6= 0
F7= 0 F8=1 F9= 0 F10= 1 F11= 1 F12= 1
F13= 1 F14=2 F15= 1 F16= 1
F17= 1 F18= 0
H7 A5 B1 B2 A6 B3 B4 L1 B5 B6 B7 B8 K2 B9 B10 L2 G1 G2 G3A4 H8 H9 I3 K1
L3 K4 D1 D2 C1 C2 D3 D4 C3 C4 C5 C6
C7 C8 D5 D6 E1 E2 E5 E6 E3 E4 E7 E8
A1 G3 G4 K1G1 G2
















Figure 16: Data and VM placement for Map and Reduce-input heavy jobs.
Ideally, a subgraph structure that is densely connected, similar to a clique, where
every node is connected to every other node in 1-hop would be a good candidate for
placing the VMs. However, it may not always be possible to find cliques of a given size
as the physical network may not have a clique or even if it does, some of the machines
may not have enough resources to hold the data or their expected computational load
may be high to not allow VM placement later. An alternate approach would be to
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find subgraph structures similar to cliques. A number of clique relaxations have been
proposed, one of which is k-club [99]. A k-club of a graph G is defined as a maximal
subgraph of G of diameter k. While finding k-club is NP-Complete for a general
graph, data center networks are typically hierarchical (e.g. fat-tree topologies) and
this allows finding a k-club in polynomial time. In a data center tree topology, the leaf
nodes represent the physical machines and the non-leaf nodes represent the network
switches. To find a k-club containing n leaf nodes, the algorithm simply finds the
sub-tree of height k
2
containing n or more leaf nodes.
For map-and-reduce-input heavy jobs, data blocks get placed in a set of closely
connected physical machines that form a k-club of least possible k (least possible
height of the subtree) given the available storage resources in them. If several subtrees
exists with the same height, then the one having the maximum available resource is
chosen. As an illustration, in Figure 16(a), the input data blocks, I1, I2, and I3 are
stored in a closely connected set of nodes M13, M14 and M15 that form a k-club of
least possible k in the cluster.
3.4.2.2 VM placement for Map and Reduce-input heavy jobs
As data placement had done an optimized placement by placing data blocks in a
set of closely connected nodes, VM placement algorithm only needs to ensure that
VMs get placed on either the physical machines storing the input data or the close-
by ones. This reduces the distance on the network that the reduce traffic needs to
go over, speeding up job execution while simultaneously reducing cumulative data
center network traffic. In the example shown in Figure 16, VMs for job on dataset I
get placed on the physical machines storing input data. As a result, map tasks use
local reads (Figure 16(a)) and reduce tasks also read within the same rack, thereby
maximizing reduce locality (Figure 16(b)). In case node M15 did not have available
resources to host the VM, then the next candidates to host the VM would be M16,
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M17 andM18, all of which can access the input data block I3 by traversing one network
switch and are close to the other reducers executing in M13 and M14. If any of M16,
M17 and M18 did not have available resources to host a new VM, then the algorithm
would iteratively proceed to the next rack (M7, M8, M9, M10, M11 and M12) and look
for a physical machine to host the VM. Thus the algorithm tries to maximize locality
even if the physical machines containing input data blocks are unavailable to host the
VMs.
3.4.3 Reduce-input heavy Applications
Jobs that are reduce-input heavy read small sized map-inputs and generate large
map-outputs that serve as the input to the reduce phase. For these type of jobs,
reduce locality is more important than map-locality.
3.4.3.1 Placing Reduce-input heavy data
As map-input to these jobs is light, the map-locality of the data is not as important.
Therefore, the map-input data can be placed anywhere within the cluster as it can
be easily transferred to the corresponding VMs during map execution. The data
placement algorithm chooses the physical machine with maximum free storage. The
example in Figure 16(a) shows the placement of input data blocks for dataset L
consisting of L1, L2 and L3 on M3, M6 and M7 which are chosen only based on
storage availability, even though they are not closely connected.
3.4.3.2 VM placement for Reduce-input heavy jobs
Network traffic for transferring intermediate data among MapReduce VMs is intense
in reduce-input heavy jobs and hence the set of VMs for the job should be placed
close to each other. For an example job using the dataset, L, containing L1, L2, and
L3 in Figure 16(a), the VMs can be hosted on any set of closely connected physical
machines, for instance, M10, M11 and M12. These machines are within a single rack
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and form a 2-club (diameter of 2 with a single network switch). Although the map
phase requires remote reads from the nodes storing the input data, M3, M6 and M7, it
does not impact job performance much as the major chunk of data transfer happens
only during the reduce phase. In the reduce phase, as VMs are placed in a set of
densely connected nodes, the locality of the reads is maximized, leading to faster job
execution.
3.4.4 Complexity of Techniques
There are two key operations used in our algorithms – (1) finding a k-club of a given
size with available resources and (2) finding a node close to another node in the
physical cluster. As noted before, with typical data center hierarchical topologies,
both of these operations are very efficient to compute. As a result our techniques
scale well with increasing sizes of datasets or the cloud data center.
3.5 Experimental Evaluation
We divide the experimental evaluation of Purlieus into two – first, we provide detailed
micro-benchmarking on effectiveness of our data and VM placement techniques for
each MapReduce job class on a real cluster testbed of 20 physical machines. Then,
we present an extensive macro analysis with mix of job types and evaluate scalability
of our approach on a large cloud scale data center topology through a simulator
which is validated based with experiments on the real cluster. We first start with our
experimental setup.
3.5.1 Experimental setup
Metrics: We evaluate our techniques on two key metrics with the goal of measur-
ing the impact of data locality on the MapReduce cloud service – (1) job execution
time: techniques that allow jobs to read data locally result in faster execution; thus
this metric measures the per-job benefit of data locality, and (2) Cross-rack traffic:
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techniques that read a lot of data across racks result in poorer throughput [24]; this
metric captures such characteristics of the network traffic.
Data Placement Techniques: We compare two data placement schemes – our
proposed locality and load-aware data placement (LLADP) accounts for MapReduce
specific job characteristics and estimated loads on servers while placing data as de-
scribed in Section 3.4. In contrast, the random data placement (RDP) scheme does not
differentiate between job categories and places data blocks in a set of randomly chosen
physical machines that have available storage capacity. It also has no knowledge of
the server loads (analogous to conventional MapReduce data placement). Note that
both the locality-aware and random data placement schemes are rack-aware [15]; no
two replicas of a given data block are placed on the same cluster rack for reliability
purposes.
VM Placement Techniques: We compare five techniques:
• Locality-unaware VM Placement(LUAVP): LUAVP places VMs on the physi-
cal machines without taking into consideration the locations of the input data
blocks for the job. The LUAVP scheme does try to pick a set of least loaded
physical machines for placing the VMs.
• Map-locality aware VM placement (MLVP): MLVP considers locality of only
the input-data blocks for the map phase and considers the current load and
resource utilization levels of the machines while placing the VMs (load-aware).
• Reduce-locality aware VM placement (RLVP): RLVP does not consider map
locality, but it tries to improve reduce locality by packing VMs in a set of
closely connected machines. It is also load aware.
• Map and Reduce-locality aware VM placement (MRLVP): MRLVP is aware of
both map and reduce locality and is also load aware.
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• Hybrid locality-aware VM placement (HLVP): Our proposed HLVP technique
adaptively picks the placement strategy based on type of the input job. It uses
MLVP for map-input heavy, RLVP for reduce-input heavy jobs and MRLVP
for map and reduce-input heavy jobs.
Key Comparison: The important comparison is between the combination of LLADP
+ HLVP (Purlieus proposal) with RDP + MLVP – analogous to traditional MapRe-
duce. The other techniques help us understand the benefits of individual map or
reduce locality as well as benefits gained from data vs. VM placement.
Cluster Setup: Our cluster consists of 20 CentOS 5.5 physical machines (KVM as
the hypervisor) with 16 core 2.53GHz Intel processors. The machines are organized in
two racks, each rack containing 10 physical machines. The network is 1 Gbps and the
nodes within a rack are connected through a single switch. Each job uses a cluster of
20 VMs with each VM configured with 4 GB memory and 4 2GHz vCPUs. A descrip-
tion of the various job types and the dataset sizes is shown in Table 8. Each workload
uses 320 map tasks. The Grep workload uses only one reducer since it requires lit-
tle reduce computation while the Sort and Permutation Generator workloads use 80
reducers. The Hadoop parameter, mapred.tasktracker.map.tasks.maximum that con-
trols the maximum number of map tasks run simultaneously by a task tracker is set
as 5. Similarly, the mapred.tasktracker.reduce.tasks.maximum parameter is set as 5.
Similar to typical data center topologies, the inter-rack link between the two switches
becomes the most contentious resource as all the VMs hosted on a rack transfer data
across this link to the VMs hosted on the other rack. For example, with 10 physical
machines on each rack, and each physical machine hosting a nominal 8 VMs, 80 VMs
(and thus, Hadoop nodes) on each rack will contend for the inter-rack link bandwidth
of 1 Gbps. To simulate this contention in a more controlled environment that lets
us accurately measure per-job improvements, we set the bandwidth of the inter-rack
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Figure 17: Map and Reduce-input heavy workload
to run multiple jobs at the same time on the cluster, however, that would have made
micro analysis on a per-job type basis tougher to evaluate.




Map-input heavy Grep: word
Search
20 GB 2.43 MB
Reduce-input heavy Permutation
Generator
2 GB 20 GB
Map and Reduce-input heavy Sort 10 GB 10 GB
Table 8: Workload types
3.5.2 Micro-benchmarking Results
We first present evaluation of our proposed techniques for various MapReduce job
types.
3.5.2.1 Map and Reduce-input heavy workload
In Figure 17, we study the performance for jobs that are both Map and Reduce-input
heavy using the Sort workload on a dataset generated using Hadoop’s RandomWriter.
The job execution time in Figure 17(a) for map-and-reduce VM placement with local-
ity and load-aware data placement (LLADP + MRLVP) shows the least value among
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Figure 18: Map-input heavy workload
placement, MRLVP with RDP performs poorly indicating that without a locality-
aware data placement, it is hard to achieve high locality during VM placement and
therefore leads to higher job execution time. This justifies our coupled data placement
and VM scheduling technique.
Also, RLVP does not perform well as it tries to consider only reduce locality. The
LUAVP scheme places the VMs randomly without considering locality and therefore
does not perform well either. An interesting trend here is that MLVP performs well
with LLADP as the locality-awareness in data placement tried to place the data in
a set of closely connected physical machines and hence, when the map-locality aware
VM placement tries to place the VMs close to the input data, the reduce-locality is
implicitly accounted for. These benefits can be explained by the trend in cross-rack
traffic (normalized with respect to RDP + LUAVP) in Figure 17(b), showing 68%
lesser cross rack reads when using LLADP + MRLVP compared to RDP + MLVP.
3.5.2.2 Map-input heavy workload
Next we evaluate data and VM placement for map-input heavy jobs using the Grep
workload. Figure 18 compares our metrics with various schemes. In Figure 18(a), first
notice that the job execution time for the locality-unaware VM placement (LUAVP)
and reduce-locality aware VM placement (RLVP) schemes is much higher than that
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of map-locality aware (MLVP) and map-and-reduce locality aware (MRLVP) VM
placements for both the random (RDP) and locality and load-aware data placement
(LLADP) schemes. As map-input heavy jobs generate only small map-outputs and
have little reduce traffic, the techniques that optimize for map locality – MLVP and
MRLVP perform much better than the reduce-locality only technique (RLVP) (up to
88% reduction in job execution time). The job execution time difference can be
explained by cross-rack network traffic (Figure 18(b)), normalized with respect to
RDP + LUAVP, shows that map-locality awareness has a big impact. Lower cross-
rack network traffic suggests that the data reads are more local to the rack, avoiding
more than 95% of cross-rack traffic.
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Figure 19: Reduce-input heavy workload
Figure 19 shows the performance for reduce-input heavy workload using a per-
mutation generator job that generates and sorts the first 10 permutations of each
record of a dataset generated by Hadoop’s RandomWriter. We find in Figure 19(a)
that RLVP and MRLVP have lower execution time for both the random (RDP) and
locality-aware data placement (LLADP), having up to 32% faster execution time when
compared to RDP + MLVP. Reduce-locality awareness in VM placement ensures that
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the reducers are packed close to each other and reduce traffic does not traverse a long
distance on the network. Here, the underlying data placement scheme makes little
impact as these jobs do not have large input data, so violating map locality does not
cost much.
The LUAVP and MLVP schemes perform poorly since they do not capture reduce
locality which is key for this reduce-intensive workload. A similar trend is seen for the
ratio of cross-rack reads in Figure 19(b), where the (LLADP + MRVLP) technique
has 10x+ higher number of reads within racks as compared to RDP + MLVP.
Summary: This micro-analysis demonstrates that data and VM placement tech-
niques when applied judiciously to MapReduce jobs can have a significant impact on
the job execution time as well as total datacenter traffic. To realize these benefits,
the right technique needs to be applied for each MapReduce job type. Our Purlieus
technique (LLADP + HLVP) identifies and uses the right strategy for each type of
workload.
3.5.3 Macro Analysis: Mix of workloads, Scalability and Efficiency
Following the per-job-type analysis, next we consider a mix of workloads and evaluate
the scalability of the techniques with respect to the size of data center network and
number of VMs in virtual MapReduce clusters using a mix of workload types.
For a thorough analysis at scales of 100s and 1000s of machines and with vary-
ing job, workload and physical cloud characteristics, we implemented a MapReduce
simulator, called PurSim, similar to the existing NS-2 based MRPerf simulator [134].
However, unlike MRPerf, PurSim does not perform a packet-level simulation of the
underlying network. Per-packet approach simulates every single packet over the net-
work which makes it difficult to scale for even reasonably large workloads and cluster
sizes. For instance, a per-packet simulator for a cluster size of 1000 hosts send-
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Figure 20: Simulator Validation
simulating a million packets per second would take 71 hours to simulate just that
one case [23]. Instead we use a network flow level simulation. Our discrete event
simulator simulates the MapReduce execution semantics similar to the Hadoop im-
plementation. The inter-node traffic is simulated in terms of network flows between
the source-destination pairs. The simulation framework uses a data center of 1000
compute nodes with 1 Gbps network configured in the typical tree topology for the
default setting. The performance metrics were averaged over the jobs executed during
a 2 hour simulation period. By default, we use a mixed workload of jobs consisting
of equal proportions of all MapReduce job types in Table 8. We use a 30 GB dataset
for both the Grep and Sort workloads and a 2 GB dataset for Permutation workload.
For the default setting, a total of 150 datasets were used, 50 for each of the job types
and 3 replicas were created by default. The arrival rate of the jobs on the datasets is
uniformly distributed from 200 to 2000 seconds.
3.5.3.1 Simulator Validation
Before presenting our simulation experiments, we provide a validation of the simulator
based on the experiments on our real 20 node cluster. To bootstrap the simulator,
we used measurements obtained from the cluster experiments to configure simulator
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parameters, e.g. map and reduce compute times. We used the same settings from
our cluster setup including the cluster network topology and workload characteristics
in Table 8. As the key comparison is between the (RDP + MLVP) and Purlieus
(LLADP + HLVP) schemes, we compare these two techniques for various job types.
In figure 20(a), we compare the job execution time of the two schemes for the
three workloads. We find that for most cases, the execution time produced by the
simulator is within 10% of the execution time obtained in our cluster experiments.
The cross-rack transfer in Figure 20(b) shows that the simulator estimated cross-
rack transfer matches closely with that of our cluster experiments, having less than
5% error in the cross-rack transfer estimated by the simulator. While not validated
against large scale clusters, these low error rates when compared to our 20-node
cluster experiments, provide good confidence in the quality of the simulator.
3.5.3.2 Mixed workload
For our first macro analysis, we study the performance with a composite workload
that consists of an equal mix of all MapReduce job categories with the default setting
of 150 datasets and jobs using 20 VMs per job. Recall that Purlieus’s HLVP decides
on the placement policy based on the type of MapReduce job. For example, it uses
RLVP for reduce-input heavy jobs and MRLVP for jobs that are both map and
reduce heavy. The execution time in Figure 21(a) shows that HLVP works best for a
mixed workload compared to all other VM placement policies. As discussed earlier,
a reduce-locality aware VM placement would lose map locality for map-input heavy
jobs and a map-locality VM placement might lose reduce-locality while trying to
achieve map-locality. While the map and reduce locality-aware VM placement could
be a conservative policy for all types of jobs, it may not be needed in all cases and in
fact may use valuable dense-collection of machines for jobs that do not need it. This
explains the difference between HLVP and MRLVP. – HLVP uses the right kind of
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resources for each job type. Overall, HLVP with LLADP shows 2x faster execution
time when compared to RDP + MLVP schemes and a 9.1% improvement with most
conservative policy of LLADP + MRVLP. Figure 21(b) shows the same trend with the
normalized cross-rack traffic – LLADP + HLVP shows a lower cross-rack traffic (only
30.1%) compared to the RDP + MLVP. Overall, it is vivid that with random data
placement, it is hard to achieve a higher ratio of rack-local reads no matter what VM
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Figure 21: Mixed workload
3.5.3.3 Impact of number of VMs
We study the impact of varying the number of VMs used for a given job in Figure 22
using the default PurSim setting. In figure 22(a), the number of VMs is varied from
10 to 200 and the average job execution time is compared. The job execution time
decreases with increasing number of VMs but that decrease almost stops beyond a
certain number of VMs (100 VMs in this case). The initial increase in number of
VMs increases the computational parallelism and improves execution time. But as
the number of VMs exceed a certain value, the reduce tasks get distributed across the
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(c) CDF of Traffic with RDP and MLVP
Figure 22: Varying number of Virtual Machines
(racks get exhausted). This reduction in data locality and increased network trans-
mission time counters the improved parallelism. This also shrinks the advantage of
Purlieus approach over RDP + MLVP. For instance, there is a performance gain of
2.3x in execution time while using 20 VMs and it drops down to a gain of 1.7x when
100 VMs are used. This is expected since when a large virtual cluster is provisioned,
it is tough to provide both map and reduce locality. This impact can be further
analyzed by visualizing the CDFs of number of network hops in both schemes with
varying number of VMs in Figures 22(b) and 22(c). When number of VMs increase,
there are more reads over longer network paths. However, we always find higher
percentage of closer reads with (LLADP + HLVP) compared to (RDP + MLVP).
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Overall, there are two key take-aways. First, Purlieus approach outperforms other
approaches for varying sizes of virtual MapReduce clusters per job. Secondly, we
notice that for a given job and cloud topology, there is a sweet-spot in the size of the
virtual MapReduce cluster which gives the most bang for the buck. A tool that helps
customers identify this would be very valuable.
3.5.3.4 Varying Network Size
In this experiment, we measure the job execution time and cross-rack traffic for various
sizes of the cloud topology using 50 VMs for each job. The other parameters are based
on PurSim’s default setting. The job execution time in figure 23(a) is fairly constant
for various network sizes with LLADP + HLVP. However, with RDP + MLVP, the
data blocks gets distributed all over the network and with bigger clusters, the VMs are
spread across the network and hence the reduce phase obtains poor locality leading
to longer execution times. The normalized cross-rack traffic in Figure 23(b) is also
indicative of the same trend. Thus, Purlieus techniques work well with varying size of
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Figure 23: Varying Network Size
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3.5.3.5 Impact of Load-aware Data Placement
Our next experiment evaluates the effectiveness of load-awareness in data placement.
The experiments use the workload in the default PurSim setting using 20 VMs for each
job. A good load-aware technique should make good decisions even with reasonably
accurate estimates. We study the locality and load aware data placement (LLADP)
with only locality-aware data placement (LADP) and random data placement (RDP).
Figure 24 compares the LADP scheme with RDP and LLADP scheme for several
load estimation error values, e. The estimation error, e directly corresponds to the





























































Figure 24: Load Aware Data placement
24(a), we find that without any load estimation error, LLADP (e = 0%) performs
better than the load-unaware (LADP) and random placement (RDP) schemes. Also,
we find that even with an estimation error of 20 % or 40%, the LLADP scheme
performs better than the random and load-unaware (LADP) schemes. A similar
trend is seen in Figure 24(b) for the cross-rack traffic normalized with respect to
(RDP + HLVP). It suggests that even an approximate estimate of the arrival rate of




To the best of our knowledge, Purlieus, with its coupled data and VM placement, is
unique in exploiting both map and reduce locality for MapReduce in a cloud. We
briefly review some of the related work in this area. There have been several efforts
that investigate efficient resource sharing while considering fairness constraints [13].
For example, Yahoo’s capacity scheduler uses different job queues, so each job queue
gets a fair share of the cluster resources. Facebook’s fairness scheduler aims at im-
proving the response times of small jobs in a shared Hadoop cluster. Sandholm
et al [115] presented a resource allocation system using regulated and user-assigned
priorities to offer different service levels to jobs over time. Zaharia et al. [142] de-
veloped a scheduling algorithm called LATE that attempts to improve the response
time of short jobs by executing duplicates of some tasks in a heterogenous system.
Herodotou et al. propose Starfish that improves MapReduce performance by auto-
matically tuning Hadoop configuration parameters [73]. The techniques in Purlieus
are complementary to these above mentioned optimizations. Recent work, Mantri,
tries to minimize outliers by making network-aware task placement, task restarting
and protecting the output of valuable tasks [24]. It also identifies that cross-rack traf-
fic during the reduce phase is a crucial factor for MapReduce performance. However,
without a locality-aware data placement scheme in Mantri, there are only limited op-
portunities for optimizations during task placement. Purlieus solves the fundamental
problem of optimizing data placement so as to obtain a highly local execution of the
jobs during scheduling, minimizing the cross-rack traffic during both map and reduce
phases. As seen in evaluations, Purlieus benefits from its locality-aware data as well
as computation placement.
A large body of work has explored the placement of applications in a virtual-
ized data center to minimize energy consumption [132], perform load balancing [121]
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or perform server consolidation [83]. These approaches primarily focus on the bin-
packing aspect and place applications (VMs) independent of the underlying data
placement. Purlieus differs from these in terms of its consideration of both input
and intermediate data locality for MapReduce. Recently, motivated by MapReduce,
there has been work on resource allocation for data intensive application, especially in
the cloud context [85, 68]. Gunarathne et al.[68] present a new MapReduce runtime
for scientific applications built using Microsoft Azure cloud infrastructure services.
Tashi [85] identifies the importance of location awareness but does not propose a com-
plete solution. Tara [88] presents an architecture for optimized resource allocation
using a genetic algorithm. Quincy [78] is a resource allocation system for scheduling
concurrent jobs on clusters, but it considers only input data locality and does not
optimize for locality of any intermediate data generated during job execution which
is a key factor to scaling MapReduce in large data centers. Purlieus differentiates
from these through its locality optimizations achieved for both input and interme-
diate data. Also, as discussed in Section 3.4, without an efficient underlying data
placement, even a sophisticated locality-aware compute placement may not be able
to achieve high data locality.
3.7 Summary
In this chapter, we illustrated how locality-awareness in data and virtual machine
placement impact on the performance of the jobs and on the total network traffic
in the data center. We presented a coupled compute-storage cloud architecture for
MapReduce and developed a suite of data and VM placement techniques that achieves
high data locality. Our detailed evaluation showed significant performance gains
with some scenarios showing close to 50% reduction in execution time and upto 70%
reduction in the cross-rack network traffic.
In the next chapter, we investigate locality optimizations for MapReduce when
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data and compute can not be collocated in a cloud datacenter such as when the cloud
consumer has privacy concerns in processing the stored data within the cloud.
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CHAPTER IV
VNCACHE: MAPREDUCE ANALYSIS FOR
CLOUD-ARCHIVED DATA
4.1 Introduction
Data Storage requirements have seen an unprecedented growth owing to more strin-
gent retention requirements and longer term mining potential of data. Enterprises
have adopted various techniques such as tiering, archiving [112], Deduplication [38]
and remote cloud storage to combat data growth with varying degrees of success.
For certain classes of enterprise data - application and infrastructure logs, enterprises
are increasingly resorting to cloud storage solutions mainly due to lower cost and
expandable on demand nature of solutions.
Logs often contain sensitive information like IP addresses, login credentials, etc.
which necessitate encrypting the data before it leaves the enterprise premises. Tempo-
ral mining of archived data is gaining increased importance in a variety of domains for
multitude of use cases such as fault isolation, performance trending, pattern identifi-
cation,etc. After securely archiving data in the storage cloud, extracting any business
value for the above mentioned use cases from this data using any analytics platforms
such as MapReduce[57] or Hadoop[4] is non trivial. Exploiting compute resources in
the public cloud for such analytics is often not an option due to security concerns.
Most state-of-the-art cloud solutions today are highly sub-optimal for such use-cases.
All (encrypted) data sets need to be first transferred to the enterprise cluster from
remote storage clouds, decrypted, and then loaded into the Hadoop Distributed File
System (HDFS)[16]. It is only after these steps complete that the job will start ex-
ecuting. Secondly, this results in extremely inefficient storage utilization. While the
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job is executing, the same dataset will reside in both the public storage cloud and the
enterprise cluster and is in fact replicated multiple times at both of these places for
resiliency purposes, resulting in higher costs. For example, Hadoop by default will
replicate the data 3 times within the enterprise Hadoop cluster. This is on top of the
storage replication cost incurred at the public storage cloud.
In this chapter, we propose a unique hybrid cloud platform called VNcache that
alleviates the above mentioned concerns. Our solution is based on developing a virtual
HDFS namespace for the encrypted data stored in the public storage cloud that
becomes immediately addressable in the enterprise compute cluster. Then using a
seamless streaming and decryption model, we are able to interleave compute with
network transfer and decryption resulting in efficient resource utilization. Further by
exploiting the data processing order of Hadoop, we are able to accurately prefetch
and decrypt data blocks from the storage clouds and use the enterprise site storage
only as a cache. This results in predominantly local reads for data processing without
the need for replicating the whole dataset in the enterprise cluster.
Uniquely we accomplish this without modifying any component of Hadoop. By
integrating VNCache into the filesystem under HDFS, we are able to create a new
control point which allows greater flexibility for integrating security capabilities like
encryption and storage capabilities like use of SSDs. Our experimental evaluation
shows that VNCache achieves up to 55% reduction in job execution time while en-
abling private data to be archived and managed in public clouds.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides the background
and the use-case scenario for supporting MapReduce analysis for Cloud-archived. In
Section 4.3, we present the design of VNCache and its optimization techniques. We
discuss our experimental results in Section 4.4 and we present a discussion of alternate
solutions and design choices for VNCache in Section 4.5. In Section 4.6, we discuss
related work and we summarize in Section 4.7.
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4.2 Background
We consider enterprise applications that perform MapReduce analysis over log data
that get generated at the enterprise site and archived in a public cloud infrastructure.
For example, an application that monitors the status of other application software
and hardware typically generates enormous amounts of log data. Such log data is
often associated with a timestamp and data analysis needs to performed on them
periodically.
With current cloud storage solutions, the logical method to perform analysis of
archived data would be as follows. Log data generated at the enterprises would be
encrypted and archived at a possibly nearest public storage cloud. Upon a need to
execute a Hadoop analytics job, the enterprise cluster would download all relevant
input data from the public clouds (time for which depends on WAN latencies). It
will then create a virtual Hadoop cluster by starting a number of VMs. Data is then
decrypted locally (time for which depends on CPU/Memory availability on local nodes
and denoted by Decryption Time) and then ingested into HDFS of the Hadoop cluster
(HDFS Ingestion Time) and then the job can start executing (Hadoop Job Execution
Time). Upon finishing the job, local copy of the data and the virtual Hadoop cluster
can be destroyed.
Figure 25 shows the breakdown of execution time for running a grep hadoop job
on a 5GB dataset using the conventional execution model mentioned above. The
network latencies 45, 90 and 150 milliseconds represent various degrees of geographic
separation such as co-located datacenters, same coast data centers, and geographically
well-separated data centers. Results show that WAN copy time and HDFS load
time can have significant impact on overall execution time, thus making this model
inefficient.
Further, depending upon the amount of data required to be loaded and connec-
tivity between the enterprise cluster and the remote storage cloud infrastructure, this
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step adversely impacts performance, and while the job is running (often for long
durations) the dataset is duplicated in both the public storage cloud as well as the
local enterprise cluster– along with the storage cloud original, there is a copy in the
enterprise cluster, leading to higher costs for the enterprise.
Figure 25: Breakdown of Fullcopy Runtime: 5 GB dataset with varying
network latency
In contrast to this conventional model, VNCache aims at minimizing the impact
of apriori data ingestion and decryption steps by intelligent pipelining of compute
with those steps; specifically, by creating a virtual HDFS namespace which lays out
the HDFS data blocks across the compute cluster. Whenever the job needs to access
any data block, VNCache streams it on-demand from the appropriate storage clouds,
decrypting it on-the-fly, and making it available to the job. As an additional perfor-
mance optimization, VNCache prefetches data ahead of processing so that the map
tasks read the data from local storage.
We next present the design overview of VNCache and describe its various compo-
nents.
4.3 Design Overview
We start with a brief overview of HDFS and its interaction with the underlying
filesystem.
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4.3.1 HDFS and underlying filesystem
Hadoop Distributed Filesystem (HDFS) is a distributed user-space filesystem used as
the primary storage by Hadoop applications. A HDFS cluster consists of a Namenode
that manages filesystem metadata and several Datanodes that store the actual data
as HDFS blocks. HDFS is designed to be platform independent and can be placed on
top of any existing underlying filesystem (like Linux ext3) on each node of the cluster.
It follows a master/slave architecture. HDFS exposes a file system namespace and
allows user data to be stored in files. The HDFS Namenode manages the file system
namespace and regulates access to files by clients. The individual Datanodes manage
storage attached to the nodes that they run on. When a client writes a file into
HDFS, the file is split into several smaller sized data blocks (default size is 64 MB)
and stored on the storage attached to the Datanodes.
Figure 26: HDFS Architecture
Within the cluster, the Namenode stores the HDFS filesystem image as a file
called fsimage in its underlying filesystem. The entire HDFS filesystem namespace,
including the mapping of HDFS files to their constituent blocks, is contained in this
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file. Each Datanode in the cluster stores a set of HDFS blocks as separate files in
their respective underlying filesystem1. As the Namenode maintains all the filesystem
namespace information, the Datanodes have no knowledge about the files and the
namespace. As a HDFS cluster starts up, each Datanode scans its underlying
filesystem and sends a Block report to the Namenode. The Block report contains the
list of all HDFS blocks that correspond to each of these local files.
When an application reads a file in HDFS, the HDFS client contacts the Namenode
for the list of Datanodes that host replicas of the blocks of the file and then contacts
the individual Datanodes directly and reads the blocks from them. We refer the
interested readers to [16] for a detailed documentation on the design and architecture









Figure 27: System Model
4.3.2 VNCache overview
VNCache is a FUSE based filesystem [19] used as the underlying filesystem on the
1Location in the underlying filesystem is determined by the dfs.data.dir configuration setting
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Namenode and Datanodes of the HDFS cluster. It is a virtual filesystem (similar to
/proc [18] on Linux) and simulates various files and directories to the HDFS layer
placed on it. For the Namenode, VNCache exposes a virtual HDFS namespace with
an artificially constructed fsimage file and for Datanodes, it exposes a list of data
files corresponding to the HDFS blocks placed on that datanode. Figure-27 shows
the overall framework which is composed of the following key components.
4.3.2.1 Data Archiving Process
In our approach, we pre-process the log data created at the enterprise cluster to
encrypt and make it HDFS friendly before archiving them in a public cloud. Specifi-
cally, large log data gets chunked into several small files of HDFS block size (64 MB
default), gets encrypt it, and we label them with the timestamp information (e.g.
1-1-2013.to.2-1-2013.data) before uploading to the public storage cloud. The enter-
prise site can use a symmetric key encryption scheme to encrypt the dataset before
archiving in the cloud.
When log data belonging to a given time window needs to be analyzed later on,
VNCache can identify all blocks stored in the storage cloud that contain data relevant
to that analysis. Next, we describe how these data blocks are presented to the HDFS
layer at the enterprise cluster so that jobs can begin execution right away. We note
that archiving the data in this manner does not preclude the data being accessed in
a non-HDFS filesystem when needed. In such cases when there is a need to download
the data in a non-HDFS filesystem, VNCache can download it through a normal
Hadoop dfs -get command.
4.3.2.2 Virtual HDFS Creation
When a Hadoop job at the enterprise cluster needs to process an archived dataset,
a virtual cluster is created by starting a number of VMs including one designated
to be the primary Namenode. Before starting Hadoop in the VMs, a virtual HDFS
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namespace is created on the Namenode. It starts by generating a list of relevant HDFS
blocks Bjob for the job based on the input dataset. For example, for an analysis of
1 month of log data archived in the cloud, all blocks stored in the storage cloud
that contains any data for the chosen time window would become part of the virtual
filesystem2. A virtual file Fjob is then created to contain |Bjob| HDFS blocks, where
each block is given a unique HDFS identifier while maintaining its mapping to the
filename in the remote cloud. Similar to HDFS Namenode filesystem formatting,
a fsimage (filesystem image) file is generated and the virtual file is inserted into




Figure 28: HDFS: FileSystem Image
The HDFS virtualization in VNCache initially creates a HDFS filesystem image
and inserts an inode corresponding to the new file to be added into the virtual HDFS.
The fsimage file is a binary file and its organization in shown in Tables 9 - 12. The
2Any unaligned time boundaries are handled in a special manner, details of which are omitted
due to space constraints.
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spatial layout of the HDFS filesystem is shown in Figure 28. The fsimage begins
with the image version, Namespace identifier and number of Inodes stored as Integers
and Generation stamp stored as Long. The Generation stamp is generated by the
Namenode to identify different versions of the Filesystem image. Here the INode
represents the HDFS datastructure used to represent the metadata of each HDFS file.
For inserting a Virtual file into the virtualized HDFS, VNCache creates a new INode
entry corresponding to the INode organization described in Table 10. The first field
in the INode structure is the INode path stored as a String, followed by replication
factor, modification and access times for the file. It also contains other fields such as
the HDFS block size used by the file, number of HDFS blocks, namespace and disk
space quotas, user name and group names and permission. The INode structure is
followed by the information of each of the individual blocks of the file. As shown in
Table 11, each block representation consists of a block identifier, number of bytes and
generation stamp. The block generation stamp is a monotonically increasing number
assigned by the Namenode to keep track of the consistency of the block replicas. Since
these are assigned by the Namenode, no two HDFS blocks can ever have the same
Generation Timestamp. The HDFS filesystem image also has a list of INodes under
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construction (INodesUC) whose description is shown in Table 12.
An example HDFS Filesystem image is shown in Figure 29 where we find that
there is an Inode created for the file /input/perf svc volumes.csv with a replication
factor of 3 and it has the listing of the block ids of the 2 HDFS blocks present in
this file. While the fsimage file is a binary file, for simplicity, it is shown in an XML
format converted using the Hadoop Offline Image viewer Utility [17]. We find that the
INode corresponding to the archived file /input/perf svc volumes.csv is added with a
replication factor of 3 and similarly, the individual blocks of the file with randomly
generated block ID is added with the generation stamp information.
At the enterprise cluster, the namenode is started using the virtual HDFS filesys-
tem image which enables Hadoop to understand that the required file and its indi-
vidual blocks are present in the HDFS.
Next, we determine the virtual data layout of these HDFS blocks on the Datan-
odes. It is done similar to Hadoop’s default data placement policy with its default
replication factor of 3. Once Hadoop is started on the cluster, Datanodes report these
blocks in the Block report to the Namenode, which assumes all HDFS blocks in the
HDFS filesystem namespace are present even though initially the data still resides in





































Figure 29: fsimage file converted to XML format
4.3.2.3 On-demand Data Streaming
VNCache enables on-demand streaming and on-the-fly decryption of HDFS data
blocks. Once the read request for a HDFS block reaches the Datanode that (vir-
tually) stores the block, VNCache on the Datanode looks up the mapping to its
public cloud storage location and begins fetching the data from the public storage
cloud. Once the block has been downloaded, it is decrypted before returning the data
to the call. The enterprise site uses a symmetric key encryption scheme to encrypt
the dataset before archiving in the cloud and therefore for decryption, we use the
same key to decrypt the blocks prior to passing them to HDFS. Please note that the










Figure 30: VNCache: Data Flow
block (e.g. Hadoop often does multiple 128k byte reads while reading a complete 64
MB block). For our implementation, we have chosen to start downloading the block
when an open call is received and corresponding read requests are served from that
downloaded and decrypted block.
Overall, from the HDFS standpoint, the HDFS data blocks - stored as files on
the VNCache filesystem - are seamlessly accessible so Hadoop works transparently
without the interference of streaming and decryption happening along this process.
4.3.2.4 Caching and Pre-fetching
The performance of the VNCache approach can be significantly improved if HDFS
block read requests can be served from the disks of the enterprise cluster as opposed to
streaming for each access. The goal of the caching algorithm is to maximize the reads
from the local disks on the VMs and minimize streaming requests from the storage
server in order to minimize the read latency for the jobs. Additionally, a good caching
algorithm is expected to yield high cache hit ratios even for reasonable size of the
cache on the disks of the VMs and should aim at minimizing the cache space used.
VNCache incorporates a distributed cache prefetching algorithm that understands
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the processing order of the blocks by the MapReduce workflows and prefetches the
blocks prior to processing. For subsequent open and HDFS block read operations,
the data from the disk cache in the enterprise cluster is used for reading. In case of a
cache miss, VNCache still streams the data block from the remote storage clouds as
explained above.
The cache manager follows a master/slave architecture where a dynamic workflow-
aware prefetch controller monitors the job progress of the individual jobs in the work-
flow and determines which blocks need to be prefetched next and sends instructions
to the slave prefetchers running on individual Hadoop nodes. Each slave prefetcher is
multi-threaded and follows a worker model where each worker thread processes from
a queue of prefetch requests. Each worker thread prefetches one HDFS data block
file from the storage cloud and replicates the block within the Hadoop cluster based
on the replication factor.
As mentioned earlier, the cache prefetcher logic needs to be capable of predict-
ing the processing orders of the individual HDFS blocks by the MapReduce jobs so
that the order of accesses corresponds to the prefetch order. Secondly, the caching
algorithm needs to be dynamically adaptive to the progress of the jobs in terms of
the map tasks that have been already launched and the ones that are to be launched
next, thereby it does not attempt to prefetch data for tasks that have already com-
pleted. In addition, the prefetcher should also be aware of the rate of processing the
job in terms of the average task execution time and as well as on the current network
throughput available between the storage Clouds and the enterprise site.
Prefetching order: The cache prefetcher logic in VNCache is capable of predict-
ing the processing order of the individual HDFS blocks. From the Hadoop design, we
note that the default processing order of the blocks in a Hadoop job is based on the
decreasing order of the size of the files in the input dataset and within each individ-
ual file, the order of data processed is based on the order of the blocks in the HDFS
98
filesystem image file - fsimage. While this ordering is followed in the default FIFO
scheduler in Hadoop, some other sophisticated task placement algorithms ([143], [24])
may violate this ordering to achieve other goals such as higher fairness and locality.
One direction of our ongoing work is focused on developing cache-aware task place-
ment algorithms that achieve the goals of these sophisticated scheduling algorithms
in addition to being aware of the blocks that are already cached.
Dynamic rate adaptive prefetching: We have designed the pre-fetching al-
gorithm to be adaptive to the progress of the jobs so that it does not attempt to
prefetch data for tasks that have already completed or likely to start before prefetch-
ing is complete. The algorithm constantly monitors the job progress information from
log files generated in the logs/history directory of the master Hadoop node. It parses
the execution log file to obtain the Job SUBMIT TIME and Job LAUNCH TIME
and looks for task updates related to map task launching and completion. Based on
the differences in the speed of job progress (primarily dictated by the type of job)
and the time being taken to prefetch a block (dependent on connectivity between
the enterprise site and the public storage cloud), the algorithm aims to pick the right
offset for fetching a block. For example, if a job is progressing quickly and is currently
processing block-4, the prefetcher may choose to prefetch blocks from an offset 20; in
contrast, it may start from an offset 5 for a slow job.
To further react dynamically to the prefetching requests, the prefetch controller
obtains the list of all tasks that are launched since the beginning of the job and
the set of tasks that have already completed. Thus, based on the task start time
and completion time, the caching algorithm understands the distribution of the task
execution times of the current job.
In a similar manner, the slave prefetchers periodically report the average time to
prefetch and replicate an HDFS block and the bandwidth observed by them from
the Storage cloud to the enterprise site. Based on these reports, the cache controller
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understands the average time for a block prefetch operation and accordingly makes
the prefetching decision. If map task is launched for an input split whose block is
not prefetched, the prefetch controller understands that the prefetchers are unable
to prefetch at a rate similar to the rate of processing the blocks and hence makes
an intelligent decision to skip prefetching the next few blocks and start prefetching
blocks that are n blocks after the currently processing block in the prefetch ordering.
Concretely, if mtimeavg represents the average map execution time of a job running
on a cluster with M map slots on each task tracker and if ptimeavg represents the
average time to prefetch a block, then upon encountering a task launch for a map
task t whose data block Bi is not prefetched, the cache controller skips the next few





Cache eviction: Additionally, VNCache implements a cache eviction logic that
closely monitors the job log and evicts the blocks corresponding to tasks that have
already completed execution. It thus minimizes the total storage footprint resulting
in a fraction of local storage used as compared to the conventional model in which
the entire data set has to be stored in the enterprise cluster. Similar to the cache
prefetching, the cache manager sends direction to the slave daemons for evicting a
data block upon encountering a task completion status in the job execution files. The
daemons on the VMs evict the replicas of the block from the cache creating space in
the cache for prefetching the next data block.
Workflow-awareness: When dealing with workflows (multiple back-to-back jobs
processing a set of data), the cache manager understands the input and output data
of the individual jobs and makes prefetch and eviction decisions based on the flow
of data within the workflows. If a workflow has multiple jobs each processing the
same input dataset, the cache prefetch logic recognizes it and prefetches the data
blocks only once from the storage cloud and subsequent accesses to the data is served
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from the disk cache. Thus, the workflow-aware cache eviction policy makes its best
effort to retain a data block in the cache if the workflow is processing that data block
through another job in the future.
4.4 Experimental Evaluation
We present the experimental evaluation of VNCache based on three key metrics: (1)
job execution time: this metric captures the response time of the jobs. It includes data
transfer time, data loading and decryption time, and job processing time. (2) cache
hit-ratio: this metric captures the effectiveness of the VNCache’s caching algorithm.
It measures the amount of data read from the local disks of the enterprise site as
compared to streaming from the public storage cloud. (3) Cache size: this metric
captures the total storage footprint required at the enterprise site for processing a
remotely archived dataset. It thus indirectly captures the storage equipment cost at
the enterprise cluster.
We compare three techniques primarily:
• Full copy + Decrypt Model: This technique downloads the entire dataset prior
to processing and decrypts it and loads it onto the HDFS of the enterprise
cluster. Therefore it incurs higher delay in starting the job.
• VNCache: Streaming: This technique incorporates the HDFS virtualization
feature of VNCache and enables Hadoop jobs to begin execution immediately.
It streams all data from the public storage cloud as blocks need to be accessed.
• VNCache: Streaming + Prefetching: It incorporates both the HDFS virtu-
alization and streaming feature of VNCache and in addition, incorporates the
VNCache prefetching and workflow-aware persistent caching mechanisms to im-
prove job performance.
We begin our discussion with our experimental setup.
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4.4.1 Experimental setup
Our cluster setup consists of 20 CentOS 5.5 physical machines (KVM as the hy-
pervisor) with 16 core 2.53GHz Intel processors and 16 GB RAM. Out of these 20
servers, we considered 10 of them as the secure enterprise cluster nodes and used 5
other servers for functioning as public storage cloud servers. Our enterprise cluster
had VMs having 2 2 GHz VCPUs and 4 GB RAM and by default we artificially in-
jected a network latency of 90 msec (using the tc Linux command) between the public
storage cloud and the enterprise cluster nodes to mimic the geographically separated
scenario. Based on our cross-datacenter measurement experiments on Amazon EC2
and S3 (details explained in Section 4.4.2.1), this latency setting mimics the scenario
where the public storage cloud and the enterprise cluster are present within the same
coast (Oregon and Northern California datacenters) but physically separated.
The FUSE-based VNCache filesystem is implemented in C using FUSE 2.7.3.
Our Virtual HDFS and VNCache cache manager are implemented in Java. We use
DES symmetric key encryption scheme for encrypting the blocks. We use four kinds
of workloads in our study including a data-intensive workload using grep and the
Facebook workload generated using the Swim MapReduce workload generator [44]
that richly represent the characteristics of the production MapReduce traces in the
Facebook cluster. The workload generator uses a real MapReduce trace from the
Facebook production cluster and generates jobs with similar characteristics as ob-
served in the Facebook cluster. The trace consists of thousands of jobs depending
upon the trace duration. Out of these, we randomly pick up 5 jobs and use that as a
representative sample. Each job processes 5 GB of data by default and uses 5 VMS,
each having 2 2 GHz VCPUs and 4 GB RAM. For a compute-intensive workload, we
use the sort workload. In addition we consider two workflow-based workloads namely
(i) tf-idf workflow and (ii) a workflow created as a combination of the jobs in the
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Figure 31: Performance of Grep Workload
the facebook workflow is more data-intensive.
4.4.2 Experimental Results
Our experimental results are organized in the following way. We first present the
comparison of VNCache Streaming + Prefetching model with the basic full copy +
decrypt model and the VNCache streaming model for the single job workloads. We
analyze the job performance enhancements of VNCache under a number of experi-
mental setting by varying the network latency between the public storage cloud and
enterprise site, the size of the archived dataset, the size of the disk cache present in
the enterprise site. We show the impact of both the HDFS virtualization and stream-
ing techniques in VNCache as well as its caching and prefetching mechanisms on the
overall job performance. We then present a performance study of our techniques by
considering workflow-based workloads and show that VNCache performs better than
the full copy + decrypt model even in such cases.
4.4.2.1 Impact of Network Latency
We study the performance of the VNCache approach for several network latencies
representing various geographical distance of separation between the public storage
cloud and the enterprise site. In order to simulate the scenarios of various degrees of
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geographic separation, we did cross-datacenter measurement experiments on Amazon
EC2 and S3. As Amazon blocks ICMP packets and does not allow Ping based net-
work measurements, we measured the average transfer time for transferring a file of
HDFS block size (64 MB) between the datacenters and used that measurement to set
our network latencies to obtain the similar block transfer times. For example, with
S3 server in Oregon and EC2 in Northern California, a 64 MB HDFS block file takes
11 seconds to get transferred. Here, the 90 msec network latency scenario represents
the public storage cloud and enterprise site located within the same coast (Northern
California and Oregon datacenters corresponding to 11 second transfer time in our
measurements) and a 250 msec scenario would represent another extreme scenario
where the public storage cloud at the west coast (Oregon site) and the compute site
at the east coast (Virginia datacenter). Therefore, we use the 150 msec setting to
represent a geographic separation that is in between these two extremes. In Figure
31(a), we present the execution time of the Grep workload at various latencies. We
find that with increase in network latency, the execution time of the jobs increase
for both the Fullcopy + decrypt model and the VNCache approaches. Here, VN-
Cache: Streaming consistently performs better than the Fullcopy + decrypt model
at various latencies showing an average reduction of 42% in execution time. Further,
the execution time of the streaming approach is reduced by more than 30% by the
prefetch optimization. As evident from the figure, this improvement comes from both
the Virtual HDFS based streaming model as well as through VNCache’s intelligent
prefetching. The cache hit ratios shown in Figure 31(b) illustrate that a significant
amount of the input data (more than 45 %) were prefetched and read locally from
the enterprise cluster.
While the Grep workload represents an I/O intensive workload, we next consider
a more compute-intensive workload namely Sort. Figure 32 shows the execution time
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Figure 32: Performance of Sort workload - Execution time
a reasonable improvement of 25% for even a compute-intense workload such as Sort.
4.4.2.2 Performance of Facebook workload
Our next set of experiments analyze the performance of VNCache for the Facebook
workload. Figure 33(a) shows the comparison of the execution time of 5 randomly
picked jobs from the Facebook workload for streaming and streaming + prefetching
techniques in VNCache and the basic Full copy + decrypt model. Here each job
processes 5 GB of data and the network latency between the public storage cloud
and enterprise cluster is 90 msec. We note that since the basic Full copy + decrypt
model copies the entire (encrypted) dataset from the public storage cloud, decrypts
and loads it into HDFS of the enterprise cluster, the jobs take longer time to execute.
VNCache streaming technique on the other hand uses its Virtual HDFS to start
the job immediately while streaming the required data on demand. We find that the
streaming approach consistently achieves higher performance than the Fullcopy + de-
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(b) Cache hit ratio
Figure 33: Performance of Facebook workload
Additionally, the VNCache prefetching techniques give further performance benefits
to the jobs achieving an average reduction of 25.8% in execution time compared the
VNCache streaming approach.
We present the obtained cache hit ratios for the VNCache: streaming + prefetch-
ing technique in Figure 33(b). We find that the prefetching optimization achieves an
average cache hit ratio of 43.5% and thus serves 43.5% of the data from the local
disks at the enterprise site as compared to streaming from the public storage clouds.
These local reads contribute to the reduction in job execution times shown in Figure
33(a). We also notice that FB4 job has a higher cache hit ratio compared to the other
jobs as its running time (excluding the data loading and loading time) is longer which
gives more opportunity to interleave its compute and data prefetching resulting in
higher local reads from prefetched data.
4.4.2.3 Performance of Job Workflows
Next, we study the performance of VNCache for job workflows that constitutes sev-
eral individual MapReduce jobs. We first study the performance for a I/O intensive
workflow composed of three randomly picked facebook jobs that process the same
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VNCache: Streaming + Prefetching
(b) Cache hit ratio
Figure 34: Performance of workflow (facebook jobs)
we notice in Figure 34(a) that the VNCache:Streaming model is not too significantly
better than the full copy model especially at some higher latency such as 150 msec.
Here, since three individual jobs of the workflow use the same input dataset, just
merely streaming the data blocks for each of the three jobs becomes less efficient.
Instead, the workflow-aware persistent caching approach in VNCache: Streaming +
Prefetching caches the prefetched data at the enterprise site for the future jobs in the
workflow and thereby achieves more than 42.2% reduction in execution time com-
pared to the Full copy model. The cache hit ratios shown in Figure 34(b) shows that
VNCache enables more than 88.8% of data to be read locally from the enterprise
cluster for this workflow. Thus,the workflow-aware persistent caching avoids multi-
ple streaming of the same block and helps the individual jobs read data within the
enterprise cluster.
For a compute-intensive workflow, we use the tfidf workflow which computes the
term frequency - inverse document frequency (tf-idf) for the various words in the given
dataset. It consists of three jobs, the first two of which read the input dataset while
the third job reads the output of the first two jobs. In Figure 35(a), we find that
the job execution time for this workflow is again significantly reduced (by more than
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VNCache: Streaming + Prefetching
(b) Cache hit ratio
Figure 35: Performance of Tfidf workflow
VNCache is able to prefetch a significant fraction (more than 70%) of the data.
4.4.2.4 Impact of Data size
Our next set of experiments vary the input dataset size for the jobs and study the
performance of the individual jobs as well as the workflows. We present the execution
time of Grep workload in Figure 36(a) for different input dataset size. We find that
the techniques perform effectively for various datasets achieving an average reduction
of 50.6% in execution time. We also find a good average cache hit ratio of 47% in
Figure 36(b).
Similarly, for a compute-intensive workflow, we present the tfidf workflow perfor-
mance for different dataset size. We find in Figure 37(a) that the VNCache techniques
continue to perform well at even bigger dataset size with an average reduction of 35.9%
in execution time. The performance improvement is further explained by the high
average cache hit ratio (61.2 %) in Figure 37(b).
4.4.2.5 Impact of Cache Size
Next we study the impact of cache size at the enterprise cluster on the running time
of the jobs. We vary the disk cache size on each VM in terms of the number of HDFS
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VNCache: Streaming + Prefetching
(b) Cache hit ratio
Figure 37: Performance of Tf-idf workflow with different data size
the cache size on the VMs from 10 to 100 blocks representing a per-VM cache of 640
MB to 6400 MB. We first study the performance of the Grep workload with cache
sizes 10, 40, 100 blocks in Figure 38(a) and we find that the execution time of the
VNCache:Streaming + Prefetching approach decreases with increase in cache size as
a larger cache gives enough opportunity to hold the prefetched data blocks. Here the
cache size of 0 blocks refers to the VNCache pure streaming approach. We find that
even with a cache size of 10 blocks, VNCache achieves significantly lower execution
time (Figure 38(a)) compared to the Fullcopy + decrypt model with a reasonable
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Figure 39: Impact of Cache size - Tfidf workflow
The performance tradeoffs with cache size for the tfidf workflow shown in Figure
39(a) also shows that with a reasonable cache, the privacy-conscious enterprise can
tradeoff job performance to save storage cost at the local cluster.
4.4.2.6 Effect of number of VMs
Our next set of experiments studies the performance of VNCache under different
number of VMs in the Hadoop cluster. In Figure 40 We vary the Hadoop cluster
size from 5 VMs to 10 VMs and compare the performance of VNCache (streaming
+ prefetching model) with the full copy + decrypt model. We find that VNCache
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Figure 40: Effect of number of VMs
51%.
4.5 Discussions
VNCache is developed with the goals of providing on-demand streaming and prefetch-
ing of encrypted data stored in public clouds. Here we discuss some of the merits of
the design choice of implementing VNCache streaming and prefetching techniques at
the Filesystem layer. We note that as an alternate solution, the Hadoop Distributed
Filesystem (HDFS) can be modified to add the caching and prefetching techniques
of VNCache. In a similar manner, HDFS can be also modified to implement addi-
tional functionalities such as encryption support for handling privacy-sensitive data.
However, we argue that such an implementation suffers from two drawbacks. First, it
can not seamlessly operate with Hadoop as it requires changes to the Hadoop stack.
Also, it makes it difficult to implement any changes to caching and prefetching policies
as it requires modifying the Hadoop source each time. Additionally, implementing
the HDFS virtualization and caching techniques at the Filesystem layer provides a
seamless control point to introduce further optimizations such as dealing with storage
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hierarchies. For instance, VNCache can be easily extended to deal with in-memory
processing of blocks by caching the blocks in a memory location and using a memory
cache in addition to the disk cache. In a similar way, VNCache can also provide
support to optimize for introducing SSDs into the solution where the data blocks
can be moved between memory, SSDs and disks based on a prefetch/evict plan. One
direction of our future research is focused on extending VNCache to optimize job
latency through in-memory computations.
4.6 Related Work
Hybrid Cloud solutions for MapReduce: There is some recent work on hy-
brid cloud architectures for security-conscious MapReduce applications [144, 84] that
use public clouds for storing and processing non-private data while using a secure
enterprise site for storing and processing private data. VNCache on the other hand
addresses the challenge of processing archived (encrypted) data stored in public clouds
in a privacy-conscious manner by providing a seamless interface for Hadoop to process
the data within the enterprise site. Heintz et. al. [71] propose a solution to process
geographically distributed data by scheduling map tasks close to their data. We note
that such solutions are not suitable for security-conscious applications that prohibit
the use of public clouds for data processing.
Caching Solutions: Recently, caching techniques have been shown to improve
the performance of MapReduce jobs for various workloads [25, 97]. The PACMan
framework [25] provides support for in-memory caching and the MixApart system
[97] provides support for disk based caching when the data is stored in an enter-
prise storage server within the same site. VNCache differentiates from these systems
through its ability to seamlessly integrate data archived in a public cloud into the
enterprise cluster in a security-conscious manner and through its seamless integration
with Hadoop requiring no modifications to the Hadoop stack. Furthermore, VNCache
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provides a flexible control point to seamlessly introduce additional security-related
functionality and other performance optimizations for storage hierarchies.
Locality Optimizations: In the past, there have been several efforts that in-
vestigate locality optimizations for MapReduce. Zaharia et al. [143] developed delay
scheduler that attempts to improve job performance through increased task locality.
Mantri [24] identifies that cross-rack traffic during the reduce phase of MapReduce
jobs is a crucial factor for MapReduce performance and optimizes task placement.
Quincy [78] is a resource allocation system for scheduling concurrent jobs on clusters
considering input data locality. Purlieus [103] solves the problem of optimizing data
placement so as to obtain a highly local execution of the jobs during both map and
reduce phases. These above mentioned systems assume that the data is collocated
with compute within the same Hadoop cluster and thus do not provide solutions for
decoupled storage and compute clouds.
Resource Allocation and Scheduling: There have been several efforts that
investigate efficient resource sharing while considering fairness constraints [13]. For
example, Yahoo’s capacity scheduler uses different job queues, so each job queue
gets a fair share of the cluster resources. Facebook’s fairness scheduler aims at im-
proving the response times of small jobs in a shared Hadoop cluster. Sandholm
et al [115] presented a resource allocation system using regulated and user-assigned
priorities to offer different service levels to jobs over time. Zaharia et al. [142] de-
veloped a scheduling algorithm called LATE that attempts to improve the response
time of short jobs by executing duplicates of some tasks in a heterogeneous system.
Herodotou et al. propose Starfish that improves MapReduce performance by auto-
matically tuning Hadoop configuration parameters [73]. The techniques in VNCache
are complementary to these above mentioned optimizations.
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4.7 Summary
In this chapter, we presented an efficient solution for privacy-conscious enterprises
that deal with cloud-archived log data. We showed that current solutions are highly
inefficient as they require large encrypted datasets to be first transferred to the se-
cure enterprise site, decrypted, and loaded into a local Hadoop cluster before they
can be processed. We presented our filesystem layer called VNcache that dynami-
cally integrates data stored at public storage clouds into a virtual namespace at the
enterprise site. VNCache provides a seamless data streaming and decryption model
and optimizes Hadoop jobs to start without requiring apriori data transfer, decryp-
tion, and loading. Our experimental evaluation shows that VNCache achieves up to
55% reduction in job execution time while enabling private data to be archived and
managed in public clouds
In the next chapter, we extend our cloud service provisioning framework to support
ubiquitous access to data and compute services in the cloud without compromising
user privacy when accessing services over a mobile device. Concretely, we will dis-
cuss the privacy risks involved in accessing location-based cloud services over mobile
devices and present a suite of mix-zone based location anonymization schemes to
support anonymous cloud services to mobile users on the move.
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CHAPTER V
PROTECTING LOCATION PRIVACY OF MOBILE
USERS IN A CLOUD
5.1 Introduction
We are entering a world where people and vehicles are being connected and tracked
automatically on an ongoing basis. Such location tracking, on one hand, can offer
useful and continuous services to mobile users, and on the other hand, generates
enormous amount of potentially sensitive information. Location-based services (LBS)
are becoming increasingly popular due to the advancement in wireless communication
and the availability of low-cost mobile positioning devices. Such services require
the mobile clients to report their location information to the Location-based Service
running in an untrusted infrastructure such as a Cloud datacenter. Examples of
Location-based services include searching nearest points of interest (”Where is the
nearest gas station to my current location?”), spatial alerts (”Remind me when I
drive close to the ATM, I need to deposit a check”), location-based social networking
(”Where is my friend, Tom?”). Although LBS applications provide a lot of interesting
and convenient services to users, it opens up new security risks that can endanger
the location privacy of the mobile clients [81, 21]. Location privacy is a system-
level capability of location systems, which controls the access to this information at
different spatial granularity and different temporal and continuity scale, rather than
stopping all access to location information. Provisioning efficient location-based cloud
services to mobile users while strictly guarding and meeting their location privacy
requirements is the focus of this chapter.
Several strategies have been suggested to protect personal location information.
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The first strategy is to restrict access. Users who do not want location based services
should be provided an option to refuse being tracked [72]. The second category
of strategies is using spatial cloaking of locations, often referred to as location k-
anonymization. This approach degrades the spatial resolution of location information
in a controlled fashion before releasing it through location k-anonymity guarantee.
A subject is considered k-anonymous if its location is indistinguishable from that of
k − 1 other users [33, 64, 67, 98, 135]. Location k − anonymization approaches are
targeted at applications that can operate completely anonymously and thus do not
require true identity of users, such as finding nearby gas-stations or restaurants, and
notifying the sale price of items of interest when we pass a shopping mall. However,
the use of spatially cloaked resolution instead of exact position of users does not
prevent continuous exposure of location information and thus may lead to breaches
of location privacy due to statistics-based inference attacks [86]. The third category
of strategies is the use of mix-zone model that anonymizes user identity by restricting
the positions where users can be located [35] and by introducing methods to break
the continuity of location exposure.
Mix-zones are regions in space where no applications can trace user movements.
This is guaranteed by enforcing that a set of users enter, change pseudonyms and exit
a mix-zone in a way such that the mapping between their old and new pseudonym
is not revealed [35, 60, 61, 39]. However, most of the existing mix-zone proposals
fail to provide attack resilient mix-zone construction algorithms that are effective for
mobile users traveling on road networks and yet robust against timing and transition
attacks. Concretely, theoretic mix-zones [35] are constructed independently of the
spatially constrained road networks and thus limit their applicability to real world
situations that people travel in spatially constrained networks or walk-paths. For
instance, an adversary can utilize the timing information of users’ entry into and
exit from a mix-zone and the non-uniformity in the transitions taken at the road
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intersections to guess the mapping between the old and new pseudonyms [60].
In this chapter, we present MobiMix, a road network based Mix-Zone framework
to protect location privacy of mobile users. Compared to the existing approaches, the
MobiMix mix-zones have a number of unique features.
First, the MobiMix mix-zones are developed based on a formal study of the as-
sumptions of the theoretic mix-zone model and the detrimental impact on its obtained
anonymity when certain assumptions are violated when taking into consideration of
road network characteristics and motion behavior of mobile users (Section 5.2).
Second, we present the adversary model, including goals and types of attacks, and
formally describe the MobiMix road network mix-zone model and the evaluation met-
rics in the presence of this adversary model (Section 5.3). Third but not the least,
we develop a suite of attack resilient mix-zone construction techniques in terms of
unlinkability between the old and new pseudonyms (Section 5.5.1). Our algorithms
take into account of the constraints and limitations imposed by the road networks,
the timing of users entering and exiting a mix-zone, and the transitioning probability
of users in terms of their movement trajectory. We also present a detailed analysis of
our mix-zone construction algorithms against the timing and transition attacks. We
discuss mix-zone placement in Section 5.6 and evaluate the MobiMix approach and
algorithms through extensive experiments conducted on traces produced by GTMo-
biSim [108] using different scales of geographic maps (Section 5.7). Our experiments
show that MobiMix provides significantly higher level of resilience to timing and tran-
sition attacks compared to existing mix-zone approaches and yet efficient and scalable
with respect to different types of road networks (maps) and different number of mo-
bile users with different mobility patterns. We discuss related work in Section 5.8
and summarize in Section 5.9.
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5.2 Analysis of Theoretical Mix-zones
In this section, we review the concept of theoretical mix-zone and the implications of
its assumptions on the level of anonymity it provides.
Figure 41: Mix Zone Model
A mix-zone of k participants refers to a k-anonymization region in which users
can change their pseudonyms such that the mapping between their old and new
pseudonyms is not revealed. In a mix-zone, a set of k users enter in some order
and change pseudonyms but none leave before all users enter the mix-zone. These
k users exit the mix-zone in an order different from their order of arrival, providing
unlinkability between their entering and exiting events. Figure 41 shows a mix-zone
of three participants, a, b and c exiting with new pseudonyms p, q and r. We formally
present the theoretic model of a mix-zone and illustrate the strong assumptions used
by the model to ensure high privacy guarantee.
Definition 1 A mix-zone Z is said to offer k-anonymity for a set A of users iff
1. The set A has k or more members, i.e., |A| ≥ k.
2. All users in A must enter the mix-zone Z before any user i ∈ A exits. Thus,
there exists a point in time where all k users of A are inside the zone.
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3. Each user i ∈ A, entering the mix-zone Z through an entry point ei ∈ E and
leaving at an exit point oi ∈ O, spends a completely random duration of time
inside.
4. The probability of transition between any point of entry to any point of exit
follows a uniform distribution. i.e., an user entering through an entry point,
e ∈ E, is equally likely to exit in any of the exit points, o ∈ O.
Inside the mix-zone, the location of users cannot be tracked.
In the theoretical mix-zone model, the anonymity is measured in terms of the
unlinkability between the old and new pseudonyms. For user i, exiting with a new
pseudonym, i′, let pi′→j denote the probability of mapping i
′ to j, where j ∈ A.
According to Definition 1, the theoretical mix-zone ensures an equi-probable distri-
bution of mapping i′ to j ∈ A. In other words, for every outgoing user, i′, it is equally
probable for i′ to be any of the k users in the anonymity set A, having pi′→j =
1
|A| .
Therefore, the entropy, H(i′) of each outgoing user i′ is computed according to the





The Entropy is a measure of the amount of information required to break the anonymity
provided by the system. In other words, the new pseudonym of user, i is indistin-
guishable from that of |Ai| other users. We refer to this as pseudonym anonymity.
Additionally, if each outgoing user exits in a uniquely different direction, then as an
effect, the users would also obtain transition anonymity that ensures that the direc-
tions taken by an user, i during the exit is indistinguishable from that of |A| users.
In the theoretical model, although users take uniform transitions while exiting, there
is no guarantee that all users exit in a unique direction and hence it can not make
guarantees on the transition anonymity.
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Next, we discuss the significance of the two important assumptions in the mix-zone
model namely (1) users stay random time inside. (2) users follow uniform transition
probability when entering and exiting a mix-zone.
When the users inside the mix-zone spend random time, it ensures a random
reordering between the entry and exit orders providing a strong unlinkability between
their old and new pseudonyms. However, a mix-zone that does not ensure random
duration of time inside for its users usually leaks information [35, 60]. Such leakage
may aid attackers to infer the mapping between the old and new pseudonyms of users.
For example, when all users spend a constant time inside, the system would simply
function in a FIFO (first-in-first-out) style, with the first exit event corresponding
to the first entry event and so on. In that case, even though the users might have
changed pseudonyms inside, their mapping from the old and new pseudonyms can
still be inferred. A good mix-zone should therefore ensure sufficient randomness in
the time spent inside it in order to obtain a high anonymity in terms of unlinkability
after the pseudonym change process.
Similarly in a theoretical mix-zone, the probability of transition between an entry
point and an exit point follows a uniform distribution. By relaxing this assumption,
some transitions between entry and exit points may be more probable than the others.
The attacker can use such knowledge to infer the mapping between the old and new
pseudonyms. For example, if some transitions are less probable, the attacker may
eliminate the pseudonym mappings corresponding to those transitions and thereby
improve the success rate of his inference.
5.3 MobiMix: Overview
In this section, we present an overview of the MobiMix framework. We begin by
introducing the challenges imposed by road networks for the construction of mix-
zones and then present the associated attack models and anonymity metrics.
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Theoretical mix-zones assume mobile users move in an Euclidian space without
any spatial constraints. In real world, mobile users always move on a spatially con-
strained space, such as road networks or walk paths. Each road network mix-zone
corresponds to a road intersection on a road network. Mix-zones constructed at road
intersections have a limited number of ingress and egress points corresponding to
the incoming and outgoing road segments of the intersection. Furthermore, users in a
road network mix-zone are also constrained by the limited trajectory paths and speed
of travel that are limited by the underlying road segments and the travel speed desig-
nated by their road class category [20]. Thus, users are not able to stay random time
inside a road network mix-zone and no longer follow uniform transition probability
when entering and exiting the mix-zone.
Figure 42: Road Network Mix Zone
For example, in figure 42, users a and b enter the road intersection from segment
2 and turn on to segment 4. Users c and d enter from segment 1 and leave on segment
2. When user a and b exit the mix-zone on segment 1 with their new pseudonyms,
say α and β, the attacker tries to map their new pseudonyms α and β to some of
the old pseudonyms a,b, c, and d of the same users. The new pseudonym α is more
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likely to be mapped to two of the old pseudonyms, a or b, than the other pseudonyms
because users a and b entered the mix-zone well ahead of users c and d and it is thus
less probable for c and d to leave the mix-zone before users a and b given the speed
and trajectory of travel. Here, the limited randomness on the time spent inside a
road network mix-zone introduces more challenges to construct efficient mix-zones.
Similarly, in figure 42, in order for the attacker to map α and β to c and d, the
old pseudonyms, users c and d should have taken a left turn from segment 1 to
segment 4 and users a and b should have taken an U -turn on segment 2. Based on
common knowledge of inference, the attacker knows that the transition probability
of an U − turn is small and the mapping of α and β to c and d is very less probable.
Hence, an efficient road network mix-zone should be resilient to such transition and
timing attacks. Next, we introduce the attack models and the anonymity measures
for road network mix-zones.
5.3.1 Adversary Model
The MobiMix development requires only the MobiMix engine that performs the
pseudonym change for users inside a mix-zone to be trusted. Thus location based ser-
vice providers are untrusted. For an adversary associated with an untrusted location
based service provider, he may obtain a time series of locations and can partition such
location data into subsequences by pseudonyms. By sorting different subsequences of
locations, each corresponding to a different pseudonym, in terms of timing and road
network location, the adversary is knowledgeable about mix-zones. Even though no
true user identity is available in the location service requests received, the adversary
is considered successful if he can utilize timing and transition based inference to infer
the correct linkage between a pseudonym observed from the service requests received
before a mix-zone and a pseudonym observed after a mix-zone. Similarly, an attacker
can also be external observers of mobile users and traffics on the road networks and
can intercept messages in the selected spatial and temporal space. The overall goal
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of an adversary (curious or malicious) is to track the where about of certain users
by linking a sequence of pseudonyms and by associating a user’s pseudonym to the
actual user’s identity through establishing one to one mapping between the set of
observed pseudonyms, combined with the association of a sequence of locations to a
sensitive location such as home address or office building of a specific user or a loca-
tion of special interest to a given user at a given time window. Also we assume that
attackers in the adversary model can be semi-honest in the sense that they can be
curious rather than completely malicious when launching an inference attack. Upon
the success of an attack, an adversary is able to infer the where about of a user based
on the correct mapping between a pseudonym and the true identity of a user and the
linkage among a time series of pseudonyms. By intruding location privacy of a user,
the adversary associated with a location service provider may further track location
queries of the user associated with the set of her pseudonyms, leading to intrusion of
user’s content privacy.
The design of MobiMix aims at protecting location privacy of users by preventing
timing and transition attacks to the road network mix-zones. We below describe three
types of attacks based on the characteristics of road networks: (1) Timing Attack,
(2) Transition Attack and (3) Combined Timing and Transition Attack.
Timing Attack: In timing attack, the attacker observes the time of entry, tin(i)
and time of exit tout(i) for each user entering and exiting the mix-zone. When the
attacker sees an user i′ exiting, he tries to map i′ to one of the users of the anonymity
set, Ai. The attacker assigns a probability, pi′→j that corresponds to the probability
of mapping i′ to j, where j ∈ A. The mapping probabilities are computed through
inference based on the likelihoods of the rest of the users to exit at the exit time of
i′, denoted by tout(i
′). Once the mapping probabilities are computed, the attacker
can utilize the skewness in the distribution of the mapping probabilities to eliminate
some low probable mappings from consideration and narrow down his inference to
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only the high probable mappings. Such timing attack can be detrimental if not han-
dled appropriately in the mix-zone construction and usage model.
Transition Attack: In transition attack, the attacker estimates the transition prob-
ability for each possible turn in the intersection based on previous observations. On
seeing an exiting user, i′, the attacker assigns the mapping probability pi′→j for each
j ∈ A based on the conditional transitional probabilities T ((ingress(j), egress(i′)).
Recall, T ((ingress(j), egress(i′)) denotes the conditional probability of an user i′ en-
tering through the entry point, ingress(j) given that the user exited at the exit point,
egress(i′). Transition attack can equally affect the effectiveness of road network mix-
zones as timing attack if not handled with care.
Combined Timing and Transition Attack: In the combined timing and tran-
sition attack model, the attacker is aware of both the entry and exit timing of the
users and as well the transition probabilities at the road intersection for a given road
network mix-zone. The attacker can estimate the mapping probabilities pi′→j for each
j ∈ A based on both the likelihoods of every user j exiting at time tout(i′) and the
conditional transition probabilities T (ingress(j), egress(i′)). This combined attack
is often more powerful than the timing and transition attacks in isolation.
5.4 MobiMix System Architecture
The system architecture of MobiMix consists of following components (1) MobiMix
Anonymizer, (2) Road Network Monitor, (3) Mix-zone construction modules, (4)
Mix-zone placement and (5) Computing Infrastructure. We describe each of them
below:
5.4.0.1 Mix-zone Anonymizer
The Mix-zone anonymizer is responsible for anonymizing the raw location updates
received from the mobile clients before releasing it to the Location Based Service
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provider for processing. The anonymizer stores two important information: (1) Mix-
zone-junctions Map that stores which junctions are presently functioning as mix-
zones and (2) User-pseudonyms Map that stores the mapping between the user’s real
identity and their current pseudonyms. Upon arrival of a location update from a
client, the anonymizer checks to see if the present location of the client corresponds
to a mix-zone region. If so, the anonymizer drops the location update from being
sent to the Location-based service (LBS) provider and denies service to the mobile
client. Also, the mobile user is assigned a new pseudonym and the corresponding
entry is updated in the User-pseudonym Map. If the mobile user is not currently
inside a mix-zone, then the anonymizer passes the location update to the LBS server
by replacing the real identity of the user its the current pseudonym.
5.4.0.2 Road Network Monitor
The road network monitor works closely with the mix-zone anonymizer. It examines
each location update of the mobile client and monitors the current behaviour of the
road network in terms of the user speeds and their arrival patterns. It consists of the
following sub-components:
Arrival Rate Monitor: The arrival rate monitor observes the user arrivals in
each road junction along each road segment and identifies the user arrival process
and the associated parameters. It provides the arrival rate parameter to the mix-
zone construction module.
Transition Monitor The transition monitor observes the transitions taken by
the users in each road junction and computes the transition probabilities for all pos-
sible transitions in the road intersections. This information is used to compute the
conditional transition probability in the attack-resilient mix-zone construction phase.
Road Speed Monitor Based on the location updates received from the clients,
the road speed monitor computes the current speed of the road segments in terms of
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the mean speed and standard deviation. Also, it is aware of the speed limits of the

























Figure 43: MobiMix System Architecture
5.4.0.3 Mix-zone Construction
The mix-zone construction module consists of the implementation of the MobiMix
attack-resilient mix-zone techniques. It has information about the user arrival rate,
transition probability in the junctions and speed distribution in the road segments
through the road network monitor. The mix-zone construction takes into account the
effect of both timing and transition attacks and ensures an expected number of users
in the mix-zone that directly corresponds to the level of anonymity obtained. The
construction module outputs the mix-zone size and shape for each mix-zone and also
assists the mix-zone placement module to determine the best set of road intersections
to function as mix-zones based on the user arrival rate, the transition probabilities at
the junctions and the speed characteristics of the road segments.
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5.4.0.4 Mix-zone Placement
The mix-zone placement component is responsible for deploying the mix-zones in the
road network. In a huge road network of several tens of thousands of road junctions,
the critical decision of which road junctions function as mix-zones can significantly
impact the anonymity of the users. Improper selection of road junctions may result in
unacceptably large size of mix-zones due to low user arrival rate or skewed transition
probability distribution in the junctions. The placement module has knowledge of the
road network topology, road characteristics in terms of road segment speed and arrival
rate and also the mobility profiles of the users in terms of the transitioning probabili-
ties at the road junction. MobiMix implements three mix-zone placement techniques
namely (i) Naive Placement, (ii) Road characteristics aware (top-n) placement and
(iii) Quadtree based (Grid) Network-aware placement.
5.4.0.5 Computing Infrastructure
The anonymizer with its monitoring sub-components run in a computing infrastruc-
ture. This computing infrastructure can be a dedicated infrastructure within the
anonymizer’s organization. Here, a set of servers would be responsible for anonymiz-
ing users in one geographical area and each server gets to receive only the location
updates corresponding to its geographic area thereby balancing the overall load in
the system.
5.4.1 Evaluation Metrics
In this subsection, we discuss the evaluation and anonymity metrics for measuring
the level of anonymity provided by road network mix-zones.
The goal of mix-zone construction in MobiMix is to provide a guarantee by means
of a lower bound on the anonymity obtained in them. We first review various existing
metrics and discuss their inapplicability for the design of mobimix mix-zones and then
present the metrics used in MobiMix.
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Anonymity set size: The size of anonymity set is the most straight forward measure
of anonymity. However, this metric alone is insufficient given the mapping probabil-
ities may not be uniform in a road network mix-zone. Unlike an ideal mix-zone, in
a road network mix-zone the attacker can identify which members are low-probable.
Here, the low probable mappings do not effectively count for the anonymity. When
the mapping probability distribution is not uniform, there can be attacks based on
probability analysis [59, 117, 130]. In other words, we can not say that a road inter-
section performs as a good mix-zone just by the mere fact that the anonymity set is
greater than k. A number of users in the anonymity set can become low probable
under timing and transition attacks and will not effective count towards anonymity.
Entropy: An alternate measure of anonymity would be based on Entropy that cap-
tures the attacker’s uncertainty in guessing the mapping between a new and old
pseudonym [131, 55, 59, 117, 130]. However, entropy of a user is a measure over all
members of the anonymity set. Therefore it may not effectively capture the cases
where there is a few skewed mapping probabilities and a large number of non-skewed
mapping probabilities. In such cases, a few high probable mappings can signifi-
cantly increase the attacker’s success of guessing the correct pseudonym mapping
even though the entropy value may be high. In such cases, a significant part of the
entropy could be contributed by a large number of non-skewed mapping probabili-
ties leading to a high value of entropy. Hence, we cannot consider that a mix-zone
provides good anonymity for a user if its entropy is greater than a certain value. To il-
lustrate this, two systems can be shown to have the same entropy but however provide
different levels of anonymity [130]. Let us consider two mix-zone based anonymity




the other with a non-uniform distribution D2 among n users, which is given by:
D2 : pu =
 0.5 for the actual subject0.5
n−1 otherwise
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Table 13: Two example systems yielding the same Entropy
We set different values ofm and n as shown in Table 13 in order to obtain the same
value of entropy. Whenm= 10, the first system gives only 10% chance for the attacker
to guess the actual subject (according to D1). However, the attacker has 50% chance
(according to D2) to guess the actual subject in the second system although both
systems have the same entropy of 3.3219. This example suggests that entropy is not a
sufficient measure to guarantee anonymity when the mapping probability distribution
is non-uniform. As shown in the example, even one bad mapping probability can
significantly break the anonymity of the user although there may be other users in
the anonymity set with a probability similar to that of an uniform distribution. In
summary, the entropy measure may not be used as an accurate estimation of the
privacy when the mapping probabilities are non-uniform [130] as in our road network
mix-zone case.
Normalized Entropy: Normalized entropy, also called Degree of Entropy, is defined
as the ratio of the entropy obtained from the road network mix-zone to the entropy
obtained from a theoretical mix-zone with the same anonymity set. In other words,
it is a measure of how close is the entropy of the roadnet mix-zone as compared
to a theoretical mix-zone. As entropy itself is a measure over all members of the
anonymity set, comparing the entropy of the realistic mix-zone with the theoretical
mix-zone also may not accurately capture the non-uniformity in the mapping prob-
ability distribution in all cases. It can be shown that there are still cases, such as
when the normalized entropy is close to 1 but the mapping probabilities significantly
deviate from the others [130].
We next present our proposed anonymity metric, Pairwise Entropy and explain
our anonymity model based on Pairwise Entropy and the anonymity set size.
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Pairwise Entropy: In order to ensure that the distribution of the mapping prob-
abilities does not deviate much from the uniform distribution, we argue that it is
important to measure the deviation of the mapping probabilities in a pairwise fash-
ion. Pairwise entropy between two users i and j is the entropy obtained by considering
i and j to be the only members of the anonymity set. In that case, we have two events:
the event of i exiting as i′ and the event of j exiting as j′. For the first event, we have
only two mapping probabilities: pi′→i and pi′→j. If the probabilities pi′→i and pi′→j
are equal, then i′ is equally likely to be i or j. The attacker has the lowest certainty
of linking the outgoing user i′ to i or j (50%). However, if one of the probabilities is
much larger than the other, then the new pseudonym i′ is more likely to be associated
with one of the two old pseudonyms with high certainty (> 50%) by eliminating the
low probable one. In comparison, by Definition 1, a theoretical mix-zone ensures a
uniform distribution for all possible mappings between old and new pseudonyms and
a high pairwise entropy of 1.0 for all pairs of users in the anonymity set. If the pair-
wise entropy, H(i, j) between users i and j when i exits as i′ is close to 1, it means
that the attacker will have a high uncertainty similar to that of an ideal mix-zone
in guessing the old pseudonym of i′. However, the attacker also has another event
namely the exit of j as j′. If this event leaks information, with a low pairwise entropy,
H(j, i), for instance if one of the mapping probabilities, pj′→i and pj′→j is significantly
different from the other, the attacker will be able to identify the old pseudonym of
j′. Consequently the attacker can also guess the old pseudonym of i′ as i′ and j′ are
mutually exclusive events. Therefore, both the pairwise entropies, H(i, j) and H(j, i)
need to be close to 1. Hence, the effective pairwise entropy between users i and j can
be assumed as the minimum of the two pairwise entropies H(i, j) and H(j, i).
We argue that an effective mix-zone should provide a pairwise entropy close to
1.0 for all possible pairs of the anonymity set. In general if there are k members
in the anonymity set, then it requires that the pairwise entropy for all k2 possible
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pairs of users in the anonymity set is close to 1.0. For example, with three users, i,
j, and k, in order for the anonymity set of i to contain {i, j, k}, we require that all
pairwise entropies, H(i, j), H(j, i), H(i, k), H(k, i), H(j, k) and H(k, j) are high and
close to 1. Only when the pairwise entropy of all possible pairs in {i, j, k} is high and
greater than the predefined threshold, α, they can belong to the effective anonymity
set of i, Ai. Here, the lower bound pairwise entropy α decides the level of allowable
variations in the levels of anonymity being offered. Higher value of α will restrict
the variation of the likelihood probabilities and make them more closely resemble a
uniform distribution. Here we would also like to note that the constraint of high
pairwise entropy between all pairs of users in the anonymity set ensures that any low
pairwise entropy between one pair of users gets propagated to affect the anonymity
of the other users. For instance, in the above example let us assume H(i, j) = 0 and
other pairwise entropies, H(j, i), H(i, k), H(k, j), H(j, k) and H(k, j) are greater
than α. Here, we can find that for user k, both H(j, k) and H(k, j) are greater than
α and hence the anonymity set of k contains {j, k}. We also find that both H(i, k)
and H(k, i) are greater than α, however it does not mean that user i belongs to the
anonymity set of k. This is because, if the anonymity set of k contains {i, j, k} then
we require all pairs of users to have high pairwise entropy. This contradicts with the
given fact that H(i, j) = 0. Thus, the low pairwise entropy H(i, j) gets propagated to
impact the anonymity of k even though user k has high pairwise entropy individually
with users i and j.
As the pairwise entropy only measures how much uncertainty each member pro-
vides to the other, we also need to measure for a given user i, how many members
belong to the effective anonymity set, Ai such that all pairs of users in Ai have high
pairwise entropy with each other. Those members would form the effective anonymity
set of i. In MobiMix, we use the pairwise entropy metric in combination with the
effective anonymity set size to measure the anonymity.
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Next, we describe the relative anonymity and success rate metrics used for evalu-
ating MobiMix mix-zones.
Relative Anonymity: The relative anonymity level is a measure of the level of
anonymity provided by the mix-zones, normalized by the level of anonymity required
by the users. Higher relative anonymity levels mean that, on the average, users get
anonymized with larger k values than the system-specified minimum k-anonymity
levels.
Success Rate: The success rate measures the ratio of the number of times users
obtain anonymity equal or greater than the system-specified minimum k-anonymity
levels. A good mix-zone should provide anonymization with a success rate close to
100%.
5.4.2 Road Network Mix-zone Model
In this section, we present the MobiMix model for road network mix-zones and discuss
the level of anonymity offered in terms of pairwise entropy and the anonymity set size,
k. We model the road network as a directed graph G = (VG, EG) where the node
set VG represent the road junctions and the edge set EG represent the road segments
connecting the junctions. In this work, we consider only the road junctions that
connect three or more road segments as candidate junctions for mix-zones. Consider
a mix-zone constructed at a road intersection v as shown in Figure 44. Assume that
each user i enters the mix-zone at time tin(i) and exits at time tout(i) with a new
pseudonym i′. Let iseg(i) denote the incoming segment of user i through which
i enters the mix-zone, oseg(i) denote the outgoing road segment of user i through
which i leaves the mix-zone. The speed followed by the users in a road segment is
assumed to follow a Gaussian distribution with a mean µ and standard deviation σ,
where µ and σ are specific to each road class category. For user i, the set of all other
users who had entered the mix-zone during the time window defined by tin(i)− τ to
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tin(i) + τ , forms the anonymity set of i, denoted as Ai where τ is a small value.
Figure 44: Road Network Model
We first derive the pairwise entropy corresponding to user i and its anonymity set
Ai under timing attack. Then, we discuss the anonymity obtained under transition
attack. We define di(i) as the distance travelled by i inside the mix-zone. It is the sum
of the lengths of the mix-zone regions on the incoming and exiting segments ,iseg(i)
and oseg(i). di(j) is defined as the distance that j needs to travel inside the mix-zone
if it were to exit on the outgoing segment of i namely oseg(i) instead of its actual
outgoing segment, oseg(j). di(j) is the sum of the lengths of the mix-zone regions on
the segments, iseg(j) and oseg(i). If liseg(i) and loseg(i) represent the lengths of the
mix-zone on the incoming and outgoing segments of i, then di(i) is given by
di(i) = liseg(i) + loseg(i)
Similarly,
di(j) = liseg(j) + loseg(i)
Let speedi and speedj denote the random variables of the speed of users i and j.
As the speed is assumed to follow a Gaussian distribution, the variables speedi and
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speedj become Normal variables. We also assume that time is slotted and let t be
the time of exit of user i, that is tout(i). Let pi′→j be the probability that the exiting
user i′ is j and pi′→i be the probability that the exiting user is i. Users i and j
become anonymous from each other if the probability, pi′→j is exactly equal to the
probability, pi′→i which happens when users i and j enter the mix-zone at the same
time and travel the same distance to exit the mix-zone. In short, the more one of
these probabilities differs from the other, the higher confidence the attacker will have
in linking the old and new pseudonyms.
Let P (j, t) denote the likelihood that user j exits the mix-zone in the time interval,
t to t+ 1. P (j, t) numerically equals to the probability that user j takes time in the
interval (t− tin(j)) to (t+1− tin(j)) to travel the distance di(j). Accordingly, j needs
to travel with an average speed in the range s1 =
di(j)
(t−tin(j)) to s2 =
di(j)
(t+1−tin(j)) in order
to exit during the time interval between t to t+ 1. Therefore, we have











(t−tin(i)) to s2 =
di(i)
(t+1−tin(i))
If P (i′, t) represents the likelihood that some user i′ exits at time t to t+ 1, where i′
can be either of i or j, we have
P (i′, t) = P (i, t) + P (j, t)
Therefore, applying Baye’s Theorem, the probability of i′ being j when i′ exits at
time t, denoted as pi′→j(t) is given by
pi′→j(t) = P ((j, t)/(i
′, t)) =
P ((i′, t)/(j, t))× P ((j, t)
(i′, t))
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Similarly, the probability of i′ being i, pi′→i(t) is given by




The pair-wise entropy between users i and j when i exits as i′ is given by
Hpair(i, j, t) = −(pi′→i(t)logpi′→i(t) + pi′→j(t)logpi′→j(t))
Similarly, the pair-wise entropy between users i and j when j exits as j′ is given by
Hpair(j, i, t) = −(pj′→i(t)logpj′→i(t) + pj′→j(t)logpj′→j(t))
Here, we notice that even though when i′ exits, it might resemble both i and j with a
closely equal probability and a high pairwise entropy, Hpair(i, j, t), when user j
′ exits,
it might reveal that j′ is more likely to be one of i and j than the other as these are
mutually exclusive events. Therefore, although the pair-wise entropy between i and j,
Hpair(i, j, t) may be close to 1 when i
′ exits, it may happen that the pair-wise entropy
of j, Hpair(j, i, tout(j′)) when j
′ exits is well below 1. Hence, it is important that both
of the two pair-wise entropies are high enough to make the attacker harder to guess
the mapping. Therefore, the effective pairwise entropy of users i and j is given by
the minimum of the two pairwise entropies, Hpair(i, j, tout(i′)) and Hpair(j, i, tout(j′))
Hpair(i, j) = min{Hpair(i, j, tout(i′)), Hpair(j, i, tout(j′))}
Also, we find that the pairwise entropy is a function of the exit time, t of i′. As the exit
time depends on the time spent inside the mix-zone which is inversely proportional to
the speed of the user inside the mix-zone, the pairwise entropy becomes a function of
the speed of the user inside the mix-zone. A good mix-zone should offer high pairwise
entropy for a wide range of user speeds, for example, say 0 to 90 mph on a highway
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road and 0 to 40 mph on a residential road. The lowest pairwise entropy offered by
the mix-zone within this speed range would define the lowerbound pairwise entropy
of the mix-zone. A good mix-zone should therefore offer a high lowerbound, α on the
pairwise entropy for a wide range of user speeds.
We now extend our discussion with the pairwise entropy under transition attack.
Based on the transition probabilities of the road junction, let T (segl, segm) be the
conditional transition probability computed by the attacker on exit of i′. T (segl, segm)
represents the conditional probability of user i′ entering through an incoming segment
segl given that i
′ exited on the outgoing segment segm. The mapping probabilities,
pi′→i and pi′→j under the transition attack are therefore given by
pi′→i =
T (iseg(i), oseg(i′))




T (iseg(i), oseg(i′)) + T (iseg(j), oseg(i′))
Hence, the pairwise entropy under transition attack will be
Hpair(i, j) = −(pi′→ilogpi′→i + pi′→jlogpi′→j)
In order for the mix-zone to be resilient to transition attacks, the mix-zone should
offer a high lowerbound, β on the pairwise entropy after transition attack for all pairs
of users in the anonymity set.
Next, we define the criteria for a roadnet mix-zone to function as an effective
mix-zone based on the lowerbounds α and β on the pairwise entropies after timing
and transition attacks.
Definition 2 A road network mix-zone offers k-anonymity to a set A of users if and
only if the following conditions are met:
1. There are k or more users in the anonymity set A.
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2. Given any two users i, j ∈ A and assuming i exiting at time t, the pairwise
entropy after timing attack should satisfy the condition: Hpair(i, j, t) ≥ α.
3. For any two users i, j ∈ A, the pairwise entropy after transition attack should
meet the condition: Hpair(i, j) ≥ β.
In the next section, we present our proposed techniques and approaches to construct
road network mix-zones that effectively satisfy the above conditions.
5.5 Mix-zone Construction
In this section, we present the MobiMix techniques to construct road network mix-
zones. We compare and analyze their effectiveness against timing and transition
attacks.


























Figure 45: Mix-zone Shapes
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5.5.1 Construction Approaches
We first describe the weaknesses of the naive rectangular mix-zone approach and
then propose three MobiMix mix-zone construction techniques taking into consid-
eration the geometry of the zones and their impact on the resilience to timing at-
tack. We propose: (i) Time Window Bounded(TWB) Rectangular, (ii) Time Window
Bounded(TWB) Shifted Rectangular and (iii) Time Window Bounded(TWB) Non-
rectangular mix-zones. All perform better than the naive Rectangular mix-zones
under timing attack.
5.5.1.1 Naive Rectangular Mix-zones
A straight forward approach to construct mix-zones around the road junction is to
define a rectangular region centered at the road junction as shown in figure 45(a).
The rectangle is defined based on some default size. For each exiting user i′, the set of
users that were inside the mix-zone at any given time during user i′’s presence in the
mix-zone forms its anonymity set, Ai. Here, any two users that were present together
at any same given time, become members of each other’s anonymity sets.
5.5.1.2 TWB Rectangular Mix-zones
In the time window bounded approach, the rectangle is constructed in the same
way as in naive rectangular mix-zone, however, the anonymity set for each user, i is
assumed to comprise of users who had entered within a time window in the interval,
|tin(i)− τ1| to |tin(i) + τ2|. Here, tin(i) is the arrival time of user i and τ1 and τ2 are
chosen to be small values so that the time window ensures that the anonymity set
of i comprises only of the users entering the mix-zone with a closely similar arrival
time as that of i. The goal of the mix-zone construction is to ensure high pairwise
entropy for every pair of users entering within the time window. We would like to
note that the anonymity guarantee made by the mix-zone is by design a lower bound
on the anonymity observed by the adversary for two reasons. First, we argue that a
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good anonymity system should anonymize users in such a way that there is similar
probability of mapping the actual subject to all the other users in the anonymity
set. Thus, by discarding the low probable mappings and the corresponding users
from the guaranteed anonymity set, we get an estimate of the number of users whose
mapping probability distribution closely resembles a uniform distribution. Thus we
get a measure of the number of users to belong to the anonymity set in such a way
that they get anonymized in a way very similar to that of an ideal system. For road
intersections that have segments with the same speed distribution, we can precisely
guarantee a lowerbound on the pairwise entropy for the members of the anonymity
set by constructing the anonymity set with the right value of time window based on
our MobiMix road network model. Although, the notion of mix-zone time window
has been adopted in existing mix-zone proposals [60, 39] where a default value of time
window is assumed for the junctions, the TWB rectangular approach decides the right
size of the time window based on the arrival rate of users so that k or more users
enter within the time window. Also as mentioned earlier, for road intersections that
have road segments with same speed distribution, we can guarantee a lowerbound
pairwise entropy based on the Mobimix model for each pair of users entering with the
time bound window.
5.5.1.3 TWB Shifted Rectangular Mix-zones
In the Time window bounded shifted rectangular approach, the rectangle is not cen-
tered at the center of the junction, instead it is shifted in such a way that from any
point of entry into the mix-zone, it takes the same amount of time to reach the center
of the road junction when travelled at the mean speed as shown in figure 45(b). In
the same way, from the center of the junction, it takes the same time to reach any
exit point when travelling at the mean speed of the road segments. Here, a set of
users entering within the short time window, |tin(i) − τ1| to |tin(i) + τ2| are likely
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to exit the mix-zone at the same time. Hence, when user i exits as i′ the attacker
would find that i′ is likely to be any of the members of the anonymity set, Ai. If t
represents the average time to reach the center of the road junction from an entry
point which is the same as the average time to reach an exit point from the junction
center, then the mix-zone lengths on the segments would be given by the product
of their mean speed, say v and the average time, t as shown in 45(b). Compared
to naive rectangular and time window bounded rectangular mix-zones, shifted rect-
angular mix-zones provide good pairwise entropy for many cases, however, they do
leak information when the speed of the users deviate from the mean speed resulting
in a weaker anonymity system [59, 117, 130]. Another limitation of this approach
is that it may not be possible to satisfy the shifted rectangle property if the road
segments are not orthogonal. Hence, this approach is limited to only road junctions
with orthogonal segments.
5.5.1.4 TWB Non-Rectangular mix-zones
A more effective way to construct mix-zones would be to have the mix-zone region
start from the center of the junction only on the outgoing road segments as shown
in figure 45(c). We refer to this technique as non-rectangular approach. The non-
rectangular approach is free from timing attacks caused by the heterogeneity in the
speed distribution on the road segments. As in the rectangular approaches, the
anonymity set for each user, i comprises of users who had entered the mix-zone within
a time window in the interval, |tin(i)− τ1| to |tin(i) + τ2|. The length of the mix-zone
along each outgoing segment is chosen based on the mean speed of the road segment,
the size of the chosen time window and the minimum pairwise entropy required. We
discuss details on computing the mix-zone size and time window in section 5.5.4.
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5.5.2 Timing Attack Analysis
In this sub-section, we analyze the privacy strengths of the proposed mix-zone ap-
proaches under timing attack and compare their attack-resilience.
5.5.2.1 Naive Rectangular Mix-zones
Timing attack is highly effective in Naive rectangular Mix-zones. In Naive Rectan-
gular mix-zones, although the anonymity set size is typically large, a large number
of members of the anonymity set become low probable under the timing attack. For
instance, in figure 45(a), consider two users i and j entering from the segments a
into the mix-zone. Let user i exit with a new pseudonym i′ on segment c and let us
assume the four road segments in the mix-zone, a, b, c and d have the same speed
distribution. If the arrival times of i and j differ by a large value, then although users
i and j might have been present together in the mix-zone for some amount of time,
the attacker might infer that the user who entered first is more likely to exit first and
that it is unlikely for j to have overtaken i before i exits the mix-zone. Therefore,
the pairwise entropy of the naive rectangular mix-zones is low under timing attack,
leaking more information to aid the attacker.
5.5.2.2 TWB Rectangular Mix-zones
TWB rectangular mix-zones have high resilience to timing attack in road junctions
that have segments with the same speed distribution as the members of its anonymity
set have similar time of arrival into the mix-zone. However, when the segments of the
road intersection have different mean speeds, for instance if they belong to different
road classes, the attacker may be able to eliminate some mappings based on the
timing information. For example, in figure 45(a), let us assume a mix-zone of size 0.5
miles × 0.5 miles with segments a and c of residential road category having a mean
speed of 20 mph and segments b and d of highway roads with a mean speed 60 mph.
Consider two users i and j entering the mix-zone at the same time. Let user i enter
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through the highway segment b and exit through the highway segment d and let user
j enter though the residential segment a and exit through the residential segment c.
If both i and j travel around the mean speed of their respective road segments, then i
and j would exit approximately in 30 seconds and 90 seconds respectively. When user
i exits out with a changed pseudonym i′ in 30 seconds, the attacker can infer that i′
is more likely to be i than j. Thus, even though the anonymity set consists of users
entering with closely similar arrival time, the differences in the speed distribution on
the roads leaks information to aid the timing attack.
5.5.2.3 TWB Shifted Rectangular Mix-zones
TWB shifted rectangular mix-zone are resilient to timing attacks even on road junc-
tions that have segments with different mean speeds if the users travel at the mean
speed of the segments. However, they are also prone to timing attack when the speed
of the users deviate from the mean speed of the road segments. For example, in
figure 45(b), consider a mix-zone of size 0.5 miles X 0.5 miles in a road intersection
with a slow residential road segment, a having mean speed 20 mph and three other
highway segments, b, c, and d having mean speed 60 mph. Let all road segments
have a standard deviation of 10 mph from their mean speed. The computation would
yield va.t = 0.375 miles and vb.t = vc.t = vd.t = 0.125 miles. Let users i and j enter
the mix-zone at the same time. Let user i enter through the highway segment, b
and exit through the highway segment, d and let j enter through the residential road
segment, a and exit through the highway segment, c. Let us assume user j travels
with a speed of 10 mph on segment a and travels at 60 mph on segment, c. In this
case, the attacker would see j′ exiting in 2 minutes, 32.5 seconds. With this timing
information, the attacker can find that j′ is more likely to be mapped to j than i
because if j′ is i, then i should have travelled really slow on the highway segments b
and c, with an average speed of 5.9 mph in order to exit after 2 minutes, 32.5 seconds.
However, if j′ is j, then j needs to have travelled only at 10 mph on the residential
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road segment, a which is more likely to happen. Thus, the attacker can guess that
j′ is j with high confidence. In general, the shifted rectangular approach performs
badly when the user’s speed deviate from the mean speed of the road segments.
5.5.2.4 TWB Non-rectangular Mix-zones
The TWB non-rectangular mix-zone is most resilient to timing attacks as it does
not encounter any disparity in the speed distributions. Here, as long as a pair of
users enter within each other’s time window, the attacker can not infer the correct
pseudonym mappings if the length of the mix-zone is sufficiently large for the chosen
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Figure 46: Effectiveness of Mix-zones against timing attack.
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5.5.2.5 Pairwise Analysis
In order to better understand the effect of timing attack on guessing the mapping
between the old and new pseudonyms, we perform a pairwise analysis considering only
two users in the mix-zones. We compare the effectiveness of the different approaches
in figure 46. As an example, we consider a mix-zone of length 400 meter in a road
junction that has two highway road segments where the speed is normally distributed
with 60 mph mean and 20 mph standard deviation and 2 residential road segments
where the speed is distributed with 25 mph mean and 10 mph standard deviation.
For a rectangular and shifted rectangular mix-zone, the mix-zone length corresponds
to the longer side of the rectangle and for the non-rectangular mix-zone, the mix-
zone length refers to the length of the longest mix-zone region on the outgoing road
segments. In this pairwise analysis, for the rectangular mix-zones, the breadth is also
taken as 400 meter. We consider two users i and j and measure the worst case and
average case pairwise entropies. User i travels on the fast highway segments and user
j travels on the slow residential segments. The worst case typically represents the
arrival times of i and j separated by the maximum possible value defined by the mix-
zone time window. Here the mix-zone time window is taken as 4 sec for the example
mix-zone considered. The average case represents the case where the arrival times of i
and j are separated by half the size of the time window, namely 2 sec. User i changes
its pseudonym to i′ and the X-axis shows the average speed followed by the exiting
user, i′ inside the mix-zone and the Y-axis shows the worst case and average case
pairwise entropies. We find that both the naive rectangular approach and the time
window bounded rectangular approach have low pairwise entropy for both the worst
case and average case for speeds even close to 60 mph, the mean speed of the highway
segments that i travelled. Interestingly, the TWB rectangular approach shows higher
pairwise entropy when user i′ travels slow on its highway segments. This is because,
if i′ travels slow on the highway segments, then it’s exit time would resemble that of
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j much better as j is travelling on a slow residential segment. Similarly, the shifted
rectangular approach shows good pairwise entropy when the speed of i′ is close to
the mean speed, 60 mph. However, its pairwise entropy drops when the speed of i′
deviates from its mean speed. Outperforming all these approaches, the TWB non-
rectangular approach has a very steady high pairwise entropy for a wide range of
speeds of i′. This is because, in this mix-zone geometry, users travel only on one
segment in the mix-zone and thereby do not encounter any disparity in the speed
distributions and therefore it is the most resilient geometry for timing attack.
5.5.3 Transition Attack Analysis
We now analyse the impact of transition attack that can be launched to guess the
mapping between the pseudonyms. For each exiting user, i′ the attacker observes
the exiting segment of i′ and tries to maps i′ to one of the users, j in the anonymity
set based on the conditional transitional probability of exiting in the outgoing seg-
ment, oseg(i′) given that j entered from the incoming segment, iseg(j). We study
the significance of protecting mix-zones against transition attack by measuring the
distribution of the pairwise entropy among the road junctions based on the skewness
in their transition probabilities. We show the distribution of worst case and average
pairwise entropies after transition attack in table 14 for the Northwest Atlanta map of
Georgia. The worst case refers to the least possible pairwise entropy obtained in the
junction. We notice that most junctions have only reasonably high average pairwise
entropy after transition attack, suggesting that the transition probabilities at these
junction do not follow an uniform distribution. We find that only less than 12 % of
the junctions have a high pairwise entropy in the range 0.9 to 1.0 after the transition
attack. Also, the worst case entropy of many junctions (more than 90%) have a low
value of 0, corresponding to the mappings that indicate an U -turn. Clearly, in these
cases of low pairwise entropy, the attacker would able to eliminate the mappings if
transition attack is not handled properly in the mix-zone construction.
145
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Table 14: Pairwise Entropy with Transition attack
In order to protect against transition attack in cases where the transition proba-
bility is skewed, the mix-zone time window should be chosen in such a way that for
each outgoing segment, l, there are enough number of users (k or more) entering the
mix-zone from the road segments that have similar transitioning probability to the
outgoing segment, l, and hence have a higher pairwise entropy, say greater than or
equal to β. Therefore, the attacker will have at least k users in the anonymity set
that he cannot ignore from consideration.
Figure 47 shows a TWB non-rectangular mix-zone with 3 incoming segments,
u, v, w and three outgoing segments, r, y, z. Let T (u, y) be the conditional proba-
bility of an user entering the junction through segment u given that the user ex-
ited on segment y. The attacker assigns probability pi′→j to each of the users
{a1, a2, a3, ...ak1, b1, b2, b3, ...bk2, c1, c2, c3, ...ck3} based on the conditional transition prob-
abilities T (u, y), T (v, y), t(w, y). Assume the conditional transition probability T (u, y)
is too small compared to T (v, y) and T (w, y) and let the probabilities T (v, y) and
T (w, y) be similar. Let us assume an user i enters from segment w and exits in
segment y as i′. Here, the attacker may be able to ignore {c1, c2, c3, ...ck3} from
the anonymity set of i′. However, i′ would have a higher pairwise entropy with













Figure 47: Countering Transition Attack
there are always k or more users entering from the segments v and w, then for any
user, i′ exiting on segment y, the attacker would be confused to differentiate i′ from
at least k other users that forms the effective anonymity set, A′i. Here it should be
also noted that even though the exit of i′ on segment y does not leak information, the
exit of some user, say a2 along segment z may leak some information if the transition
probability, T (v, z) is much smaller than T (w, z). Therefore, the effective anonymity
should not contain those members that exit in a segment where user i’s probability
of exiting is lower as these are mutually exclusive events.
In the next sub-section, we discuss how to determine the time window and size of
the mix-zone so as to make it resilient to both timing and transition attacks, yielding
a high lowerbound, α and β on the pairwise entropies after timing and transition
attacks respectively.
5.5.4 Combination of Timing and Transition attacks
The mix-zone time window directly impacts the number of users arriving from the
various segments and therefore decides the mix-zone’s resilience to transition attack.
Once the right size of the mix-zone time window is determined for a specified level
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of resilience to transition attack in terms of a high lowerbound, β on the pairwise
entropy after transition attack, we need to determine the length of the mix-zone for
the given time window so as to ensure a high lowerbound on the pairwise entropy
after timing attack.
We assume that the user arrival on the road segments follows a poisson process.
Given the mean arrival rate, λl on each incoming segment, l, let λ
x,y
L represent the
cumulative mean arrival rate of the users that effectively count towards the anonymity
set of an user, i′ exiting along segment y that entered through segment, x. If Mx,y is







<β T (l, z) × λl). It is the sum of the arrival rate of the segments
such that the members have high pairwise entropy with each other and with i′ during
the exit of i′ in segment y. Note that it excludes among the users who entered from
segment, l, those that would exit in some segment, z where the conditional probability
of exiting in z is significantly different. Here Mx,y is chosen as that subset of the road
segments that maximizes λx,yL . If N(t) represents the number of users who had entered
the mix-zone at time t since the beginning, then the probability of having n users
enter during a short time window, τx,y is given by






N(t+ τx,y)−N(t) would represent the number of users arrived within the short time
interval, τx,y. The probability that k or more users enter the mix-zone in the time
window, τx,y is










By adjusting the size of the time window, τx,y, we can lowerbound the number of
users arriving from the segments whose conditional probability of exiting in segment
y is similar to that of users from segment x. For instance, we may choose the time
window, τx,y such that there are k = 5 or more users entering with a high probability,
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say p = 0.9. The overall time window, τ of the mix-zone is given by the maximum




Once the value of τ is decided, we determine the length of the mix-zone so that
the mix-zone provides a high lowerbound, α on the pairwise entropy after timing
attack for a wide range of user speeds. For example, we might want a lowerbound
pairwise entropy of α = 0.9 for a wide range of users’ speed, say 0 mph to 90 mph.
Our algorithm iteratively increments the length of the mix-zone till the expected
lowerbound on the pairwise entropy is met for the chosen time window, τ . In this
context, we note that except for the TWB non-rectangular mix-zones, the other
approaches suffer from timing attacks and hence it is not possible to have a time
window and mix-zone length for them to ensure a high lowerbound on the pairwise
entropy. However, the TWB non-rectangular mix-zones offer high lowerbounds even
for small mix-zone lengths. As we have a lower bound on the pair-wise entropy and
a lower bound on k, the number of users, the mix-zone can now make probabilistic
guarantees on the anonymity provided.
In addition to pseudonym anonymity k, the number of outgoing segments used
by the k users differentiates the trajectories of the users. We discuss in Section 5.6
that we can maximize the trajectory anonymity through careful placement of the
mix-zones on those road junctions where there is minimal skew in the transition
probability distribution. Here, we would like to point out that in some extreme cases,
it can happen that even though there is a guaranteed pseudonym anonymity of k in
each mix-zone, the trajectories followed by the users may be the same. We believe
that it is extremely rare in real life that all of the following three assumptions are
true at the same time for such a case to happen: (1) All k users of the anonymity
set travel together with the same velocity using the same trajectory right from their
starting point such as home or office. (2) The trajectory of these k users is reserved
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solely for themselves. No other users can enter these road junctions and mix-zones
during the time when these K users are going through. (3) The destination of the
trajectory can uniquely identify a privacy sensitive location such as cancer clinic or
AIDs Clinic. If any of the above assumptions is not true, the MobiMix model will
guard the location privacy of the user. It is obvious that the second assumption
above is false for public road networks operational in most of countries today. Thus,
we believe that the MobiMix development is original and beneficial for protecting
location privacy of moving objects on road networks.
5.6 Mix-zone placement
In this section, we present the mix-zone placement algorithms that find the best set
of road intersections to function as mix-zones based on the user arrival rates, statis-
tics of user movements, road network topology and road characteristics in terms of
mean user speeds and the temporal and spatial resolution of location exposure. Al-
though individual mix-zones are efficient with respect to providing the required level
of anonymity, careful deployment on the road is crucial to ensure good cumulative
anonymity for users as they traverse through multiple mix-zones on their trajecto-
ries. Mix-zones placed too far from each other may lead to longer distances between
adjacent mix-zones in users’ trajectories. On the other hand, if there are too closer
mix-zones, users may need to often go through mix-zones although they might have
already gained the anonymity they wanted. An optimal solution to the mix-zone
placement problem is NP-complete for even small road networks [61]. Thus we use
a heuristic-based placement approach in MobiMix. A good placement algorithm
should (i) provide sufficient anonymity in each of the mix-zones (ii) ensure that users
go through sufficient number of mix-zones along their path to the destination and
(iii) minimize the total number of mix-zones in the system, thereby minimizing the
overall cost of the privacy protection.
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An optimal solution to the mix-zone placement problem may be obtained using
a formulation similar to that discussed in [14], however such optimal solutions to the
placement problem become NP-complete for even small road networks. We present
three heuristic-based strategies for mix-zone placement. A naive placement strategy
is to randomly select a subset of road junctions with three or more road segments. A
better strategy is to place mix-zones at intersections that have high density of traf-
fic and low skewness in the transition probability distribution. While high density
of traffic yields higher pseudonym anonymity, low skewness in transition probability
helps maximize segment l-diversity obtained. We call this approach the road-aware
top n placement. An alternative approach is the grid-based quadtree placement strat-
egy, which divides a road-network into grid cells using quadtree index partition and
maximizes the average distance between any pair of mix-zones within each quadrant
(grid cell). The mix-zone placement algorithms find the best set of road intersections
to function as mix-zones based on the user arrival rates, statistics of user movements,
road network topology and road characteristics in terms of mean user speeds and the
temporal and spatial resolution of location exposure. We know that the anonymity
strength of the mix-zone is directly proportional to the anonymity set size and the
attack resilience of the mix-zone, however, for a given value of anonymity set size,
k, the size of the mix-zone is directly proportional to the arrival rate of the users
form various road segments connected to the road junction and the skewness in the
transition probability distribution. Therefore, the cost of a mix-zone is directly pro-
portional to the size of the mix-zone as it directly impacts the limits on the usage
of the location based service. A good placement algorithm should provide sufficient
anonymity in each of the mix-zones, should also ensure that users go through suffi-
cient number of mix-zones along their path to the destination, while minimizing the
total number of mix-zones maintained in the system.
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5.6.1 Naive Placement
In the naive placement scheme, the mix-zones are chosen based on only the structure
of the intersections, considering only those that connect to three or more road seg-
ments. This set of road intersections forms the candidate set of mix-zones. Among
the candidate set of road intersections, the mix-zones are placed by choosing a random
subset of the candidate set of mix-zones. Although this straight-forward approach
of mix-zone placement is aware of the road intersection topology, the approach lacks
knowledge of the user arrival rate and user travel characteristics and hence it does
not make careful decisions to minimize the cost of the constructed mix-zones. For
example, even road intersections having low user arrival rates and skewed transition
probability distributions may get chosen for placing mix-zones. However, construct-
ing mix-zones at them would lead to huge mix-zone sizes in order for them to be
sufficiently resilient to timing and transition attacks. Hence, the overall cost of the
mix-zone placement in the naive approach may not be minimal.
5.6.2 Road-aware top -n Placement
In this placement methodology, the mix-zones are placed at intersections that have
high density of traffic and low skewness in the transition probability distribution.
The mix-zones constructed at such intersections are small in size, incurring minimal
cost in terms of limiting the service inside the mix-zones. All the mix-zones are
constructed to yield a certain lower-bounded anonymity in terms of the anonymity
set size, k, and resilience to timing and transition attacks. This is done by carefully
choosing the time window, τ to ensure that sufficient number of vehicles arrive in
the anonymizing time window and the size of the mix-zone in such a way that every
member of the anonymity set has a high pairwise entropy after transition and timing
attacks. In this approach, the top-n mix-zones are selected based on their average
estimated anonymity levels of the road intersections, precisely in terms of the cost of
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the mix-zones. If C(v) is the cost of the mix-zone constructed at road junction v for
the privacy guarantees Hmin. The selection algorithm sorts the road junctions in the
increasing order of the cost of the mix-zones C(v) and chooses the top-n candidates
for the placement. Although, this approach minimizes the overall cost of the mix-
zones in the road network, the distribution of the mix-zones may not be uniform
across the road network. For example, while some parts of the network may be
densely populated with mix-zones, some other parts may be very scarce in mix-zones.
As a result, users following some trajectories will pass through unnecessarily more
mix-zones, while some users may not be able to find sufficient mix-zones in their
trajectories.
5.6.3 Quadtree/Grid Network-aware Placement
In the quadtree-based network-aware approach, the placement algorithm considers
the topology of the road map in addition to the user and road characteristics. Similar
to the top-n placement approach, this approach also considers only road intersections
having low skewness in transition probability and high traffic arrival rates. However
in order to ensure a uniform distribution of the mix-zones, the placement decision
is made by closely considering the underlying road network topology. For instance,
the placement of the mix-zones should ensure that the trajectories followed by the
users have sufficient number of mix-zones at evenly separated distances. Hence, the
mix-zone deployment in the road network has to ensure saptial uniformity while
minimizing the overall cost of the mix-zones in terms of their size.
The Quadtree-based network-aware placement is a two phase algorithm. The
first phase of the algorithm recursively divides the entire road map to construct a
quadtree index. The quadtree construction divides the area based on the number
of road junctions in it, the overall geographical area and the total length of the
road segments and the number of candidate junctions for mix-zones. The algorithm
dynamically decides and partitions if it needs to recursively partition the space further
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Figure 48: Grid-based Placement
into four quadrants. At the end of the quadtree construction, each quadrant roughly
consists of the same number of road junctions, total segment length and number of
candidate mix-zones as shown in figure 48.
The second phase of the algorithm deploys the mix-zones on a quadrant by quad-
rant basis. In each quadrant, the algorithm attempts to deploy the same number
of mix-zones, however, the decision of which road junctions function as mix-zones is
done to minimize the overall mix-zone cost while maximizing the average distance
between any pair of mix-zones in a given quadrant. The objective is to maximize the
pairwise distance between the mix-zones while not exceeding a certain specified max-
imum cost. This ensures that the mix-zones are uniformly distributed within each
quadrant achieving higher spatial uniformity. Let Q represent the set of quadrants in
the road network and let each quadrant, q have m mix-zones. If Vq and Mq respec-
tively represent the set of all intersections in quadrant q and the set of intersections













C(v)xv ≤ Cmax ×m
where xv is a boolean variable indicating if vertex v ∈ Vq is a mix-zone and vertex v
belongs to Mq if xv = 1.
5.7 Experimental Evaluation
We divide the experimental evaluation of MobiMix into three components: (i) the
effectiveness of our mix-zone construction approaches in terms of their resilience to
timing and transition attacks (ii) their performance in terms of success rate and rela-
tive anonymity levels and (iii) the effectiveness of the mix-zone placement algorithms
in terms of overall cumulative anonymity, mix-zone size and spatial uniformity of
placement. Before reporting our experimental results, we first briefly describe the
experimental setup.
5.7.1 Experimental setup
We use the GT Mobile simulator [108] to generate a trace of 10000 cars moving on
a real-world road network, obtained from maps available at the National Mapping
Division of the USGS [20]. By default we use the map of Northwest Atlanta region
of Georgia that has 6831 road intersections with 10000 mobile users. The GTMo-
biSim mobile simulator extracts the road network based on three types of roads −
expressway, arterial and collector roads. Our experimentation uses maps from three
geographic regions namely that of Chamblee and Northwest Atlanta regions of Geor-
gia and San Jose West region of California to generate traces for a two hour duration.
We generate a set of 10,000 cars on the road network that are randomly placed on
the road network according to a uniform distribution. The speed of the cars are
distributed based on the road class categories as shown in Table 15. We use the
Random Router mobility model in GTMobiSim where Cars generate random trips
with source and destination chosen randomly and shortest path routing is used to
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route the cars for the random trips. This captures more realistic scenarios than the
random walk model. For instance, unlike the random walk model, the highway roads
and expressways are more populated than the small residential roads as these roads
share more parts of the shortest paths used by the users. Also, the random router
model gives more realistic transition probabilities at the junctions which is essential
to our evaluation.
Road type Expressway Arterial Collector
Mean speed(mph) 60 50 25
Std. dev.(mph) 20 15 10
Speed Distribution Gaussian Gaussian Gaussian
Table 15: Motion Parameters
Parameter Value
Map Northwest Atlanta region
Mobility Model Random Roadnet Router
Total number of vehicles 10000
Number of Road junctions 6831
Number of Road segments 9187
Table 16: Simulation Parameters and Setting
5.7.2 Experimental results
Our experimental evaluation consists of three parts. First, we evaluate the effective-
ness of the mix-zone construction algorithms by measuring their attack resilience to
timing and transition attacks. We then evaluate the effectiveness of the mix-zones
in terms of the success rate in providing the desired value of k and study the rela-
tive anonymity level which is defined as the ratio of the obtained value of k to the
expected value of k. We observe how these parameters behave when we vary the
settings of a number of parameters, such as the expected value of k, the expected
probability of success, p. Our final set of experiments evaluates the performance of
the mix-zone placement algorithms in terms of the overall cumulative anonymity of
the users, average mix-zone size and spatial uniformity of mix-zone placement. Our
results show that the MobiMix construction techniques are effective, fast and scalable
and outperform the basic construction methods by a large extent.
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Timing + Transition Attack
(d) TWB non-rectangular
Figure 49: Average Pairwise Entropy after Attacks
In our first set of experiments, we analyse the effectiveness of the mix-zones against
timing, transition and combined attacks. Out of the 6831 road junctions in the
Northwest Atlanta region map, more than 2000 candidate junctions were chosen to
build mix-zones based on their user arrival rate and the number of road segments that
connect to them. Figure 49 shows the average pairwise entropy of the mix-zones for
various values of k, the size of the anonymity set. We observe that the pairwise entropy
after transition attack is low in the naive rectangular mix-zone compared to the other
MobiMix approaches as the MobiMix mix-zones are protected for transition attack
with their anonymity sets consisting of only members that have high pairwise entropy
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to each other. The effect of timing attack is different across various approaches: we
find that the TWB non-rectangular mix-zones perform the best under timing attack
with the average pairwise entropy close to 1.0. Here, the length of the non-rectangular
mix-zone is computed so as to ensure a lowerbound pairwise entropy of α = 0.9 for
the chosen time window size, τ which is computed based on the user arrival rate
in the road junction to ensure the expected value of k with a high probability of
p = 0.9. However, as discussed in section 5.5.2.5, it is not possible to lowerbound
the pairwise entropy for the other mix-zone approaches. Hence, in order to compare
the effectiveness of these approaches with the TWB non-rectangular approach, we
construct the TWB rectangular and TWB shifted rectangular mix-zones with the
same length and time window as used by the non-rectangular mix-zone. Similarly,
the size of the naive rectangular mix-zone is fixed in such a way that the mean time
to cross the mix-zone equals the time window of the TWB non-rectangular mix-
zone. In figure 49, we also find that the naive rectangular and time window bounded
rectangular mix-zones have low pairwise entropies after timing attack but the pairwise
entropy of the TWB shifted rectangular approach is relatively higher, close to 0.8 as
it’s geometry is more resilient to timing attack. However, a high pairwise entropy
of 0.9 or higher may be often required to ensure strong anonymity. In such cases,
the time window bounded rectangular approach becomes the most efficient approach.
Additionally, in the figure, we find that the effect of combined timing and transition
attack is at least as severe as either of these attacks in isolation and it gets worse
in naive rectangular mix-zones which is least resilient to both timing and transition
attacks.
Similarly, figure 50 shows the comparison of the worst case pairwise entropy after
timing attack for various mix-zones. The worst case pairwise entropy represents the
lowest possible pairwise entropy obtained by the users after timing attack. Here also,



























Figure 50: Worst-case Pairwise Entropy
entropy. The other approaches in their bad cases leak a lot information to aid the
attacker. We also compare the overall entropy under attacks for various values of
k in figure 51 for the same experimental setting. The overall entropy is computed
by assigning the probability distribution, Pi′−>j for each user j ∈ Ai based on the
likelihood of user j to exit at the exit time of i. The line showing the theoretical
value of entropy corresponds to the actual entropy obtained from an ideal mix-zone
for the same anonymity set as the realistic mix-zones. We find that the TWB non-
rectangular approach has the highest overall entropy after timing, transition and
combined attacks closely resembling that of a theoretical mix-zone.
5.7.2.2 Success Rate and Relative Anonymity
In order to measure the effectiveness of the mix-zones, we study the success rate
of them in providing the expected value of k. Here, the expected probability of
getting k or more users, p is taken to be 0.9 and the value of k is varied from 2
to 11. Figure 52(a) shows the comparison of the success rate among the mix-zone
approaches. A mix-zone is considered successful for an user if the user has at least k
other users in its anonymity set with pairwise entropies greater than 0.9 under both
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(d) TWB non-rectangular
Figure 51: Comparison of Entropy after attacks
mix-zones have the highest success rate, the other mix-zones have low success rate
due to their lack of resilience to timing attack. In order to compare the level of
anonymity offered by the mix-zones with the anonymity expected from them, we
measure relative anonymity which is defined as the ratio of the value of obtained k to
the value of expected k. Figure 52(b) shows the variation of relative-k of TWB non-
rectangular mix-zones with respect to the expected value of k for different geographic
maps. The expected success rate is set to 90%. The graphs show that the value of
relative k lies within the range of 2 to 3, meaning that the mix-zone on an average














































Figure 52: Success rate and Relative-k
5.7.2.3 Performance of Placement Techniques
We now study the performance of the various mix-zone placement algorithms in
terms of the mix-zone size, spatial uniformity of placement, the average number of
mix-zones traversed by the mobile clients and the entropy obtained during user’s
travel with the three mix-zone placement algorithms namely (i) Naive placement
(ii) top-n (user and road characteristics-aware) placement and (iii) Grid (Quadree)
based network-aware placement. The experiment uses the NW atlanta region map
that contains 6831 road junctions, out of which the placement algorithms chooses
7% of the road intersections for deploying mix-zones that corresponds to 478 road
junctions. The experiment uses a 10 minute simulation period. Figure 53(a) shows
the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the users in percentage for various
number of mix-zones traversed during their trip. We find that users traverse less
number of mix-zones in the naive mix-zone deployment scheme. We find more than
60% of the users traverse less than 10 mix-zones during their entire 10 minute travel.
The top-n (user and road characteristics-aware) placement scheme enables users to
pass through higher number of mix-zones as it basically finds all the intersections that
have dense traffic. Here, users go through more number of mix-zones in short intervals
of distance which may not be necessary. Such unnecessary traversal of mix-zones may
deteriorate the quality of service for the mobile clients. In figure 53(a), we also find
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that there is a significant percentage of users traversing less number of mix-zones.
For example, more than 9% of the users traverse only less than 10 mix-zones during
the 10 minute trajectory. This is due to the non-uniformity in the spatial distribution
of the mix-zones. Hence, users traversing some part of the road networks go through
few mix-zones while users travelling in other parts unnecessarily go through many
mix-zones. The Grid (Quadree-based network-aware) deployment ensures a higher
level of spatial uniformity in the distribution of mix-zones. In the Grid approach, we
find that almost all users traverse at least 10 mix-zones during the 10 minute interval.
Also, we find that users do not unnecessarily traverse many mix-zones, only few users













































































































Figure 53: Mix-zone Placement
Figure 53(b) shows the average size of the mix-zone in meters for values of k.
We find that the naive placement approach leads to larger mix-zone sizes for even
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small values of k as it lacks knowledge of the user arrival rate and user transition
probability. Such large mix-zone size would significantly impact the service quality
of the mobile users. The top-n scheme has the lowest mix-zone length among the
three approaches as it identifies the most densely populated road junctions where
even small mix-zone sizes yield higher k. However, the Grid placement scheme is also
able to achieve almost similar mix-zone lengths as the top-n placement as it considers
the road characteristics and user population factors in addition to the road network-
aware spatial uniformity. Figure 53(c) shows the time line of cumulative entropy. The
x-axis shows the time in seconds and the Y-axis represents the average cumulative
entropy obtained. The naive placement shows low cumulative entropy, particularly
in the beginning of the timeline (0 to 200 sec). Also, we find that both the top-n
and Grid placements show similar average cumulative entropy in the beginning of
the timeline although the top-n scheme has higher cumulative entropy at the later
part of the timeline as users go through a large number of mix-zones with the top-n
placement. In order to better understand the impact of the spatial uniformity of
the mix-zone deployment on the cumulative entropy, in figure 53(d) we study the
cumulative distribution of the users in percentage for various values of average final
cumulative entropy at the end of the 10 minute interval. It shows a very similar trend
as in figure 53(a). We find the naive placement scheme does not achieve high final
cumulative entropy for all users. The top-n scheme has overall higher final cumulative
entropy but has a significantly higher percentage of users having low final cumulative
entropy. In the Grid approach, almost all users obtain higher final cumulative entropy
and therefore the distribution has low skewness. Thus, the Grid placement scheme
becomes the most effective choice in deploying mix-zones.
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5.8 Related work
Location Anonymization has been proposed in [67] and adopted by several others
[64], [98], [65], [33]. Some recent work on location anonymity had focused from the
road network perspective [135] and [96]. The XStar framework presented in [135]
performs location cloaking based on road-network-specific privacy and QoS require-
ments, striking a balance between the attack resilience of the performed protection
and the processing cost of the anonymous query. The Cachecloak algorithm proposed
in [96] uses cache prefetching to hide the exact location of the user by requesting the
location based data along an entire predicted path. While the approaches based on
location cloaking do not work for applications that require an exact point location of
the mobile user, the approach presented in [96] is not suitable when users ask different
queries as they move.
The concept of mix-zones to change pseudonyms for location privacy has been
introduced in [35] and the idea of building mix-zones at road intersections has been
proposed in [60] and [39]. A formulation for optimal placement of mix-zones in a road
map is discussed in [61], however such optimal solutions to the placement problem
become NP-complete for even small road networks. Almost all of these mix-zone
techniques follow a straight forward approach of using rectangular or circular shaped
zones and their construction methodologies do not take into account the effect of
timing and transition attacks in the construction process. The approaches presented
in MobiMix differ from these in two folds: firstly, the mix-zone construction process
of MobiMix tries to minimize the effect of timing and transition attacks based on the
characteristics of the underlying road network at the construction time and secondly,
the framework attempts to address the issue of guaranteeing an expected value of
anonymity by taking into consideration the statistics of user arrival users and other
factors in the road network.
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5.9 Summary
We have presented MobiMix, a framework for building attack resilient road network
mix-zones for protecting the location privacy of mobile clients accessing location-
based cloud services. We first provided a formal analysis of the theoretical mix-
zone model and the vulnerabilities of applying them to road networks where some
of the assumptions may be violated. We presented a suite of road network mix-
zone construction and placement techniques that consider number of factors such
as the mix-zone geometry, the statistics of the user population, and the spatial and
velocity constraints on the movement patterns of the users. We show analytically and
experimentally that the MobiMix construction and placement techniques are efficient
and more resilient to timing and transition attacks compared to the existing mix-zone
approaches.
The next chapter extends the MobiMix approach to support continuous privacy-
conscious location-based services in the cloud where the mobile client exposes con-







Continuous location-based queries are gaining growing interest and attention in both
mobile service industry as well as in mobile cloud computing. Examples of contin-
uous queries (CQs) include “informing me the nearest gas stations coming up along
the highway I-85 south every 1 minute in the next 30 minutes” or “show me the
restaurants within 2 miles every two minutes during the next hour”. Many consider
continuous spatial queries as a fundamental building block for continuous provisioning
of location services to mobile users traveling on the roads.
Continuous query attacks (CQ-attacks) refer to the query correlation attacks.
Concretely, a CQ represents a time series of query evaluations of the same query
within a given validity time window. For example, if Alice is traveling on I-85 south
and requested a CQ service: show me the restaurants within 2 miles every two minutes
during the next hour, then the CQ server will process this CQ as a standing query for
1 hour period upon its installation and it will consist of a sequence of 30 evaluations
along the trajectory of Alice. The CQ-attack refers to the risk that an adversary can
perform inference attacks by correlating the semantic continuity in the time series of
query evaluations of the same CQ and the inherent trajectory of locations. In this
chapter we show that such CQ-attacks can intrude location privacy of mobile users
(i.e., exposing the identity of Alice), even though the locations of mobile users are
anonymized through well-known location anonymization techniques.
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A fair amount of research efforts have been dedicated to protecting location pri-
vacy of mobile travelers. We can broadly classify the state of art research and de-
velopment results into two categories. The first category is represented by location
cloaking techniques [67, 33, 64, 98, 135]. Spatial location cloaking typically adds
uncertainty to the location information exposed to the location query services by
increasing the spatial resolution of a mobile user’s locations while meeting location
k-anonymity and/or location l-diversity [33]. More specifically, the spatially cloaked
region is constructed to ensure that at least k users (location k anonymity) are lo-
cated in the same region, which contains l different static sensitive objects (locations).
Spatial cloaking is effective for snapshot queries but vulnerable to CQ-attacks. The
second class of location anonymization techniques is represented by mix-zone de-
velopment [35, 60, 61, 39, 104]. Mix-zones are spatial regions where a set of users
enter, change pseudonyms in such a way that the mapping between their old and
new pseudonyms is not revealed. Also inside a mix-zone, no applications can track
user movements. Mix-zones break the continuity of location exposure by introduc-
ing uncertainty such that it is very hard to perform correlation attacks to link old
pseudonym with new pseudonym of mobile users. However, neither spatial cloak-
ing nor mix-zone techniques are resilient to CQ attacks as they are vulnerable to
query correlation. Concretely, with spatial cloaking, an adversary can infer user
movement by performing query correlation attacks over the adjacent or overlapped
cloaking boxes. Similarly, mobile users requesting CQ services are vulnerable un-
der CQ-attacks even though their movements on the road networks are protected by
mix-zone anonymization. With these problems in mind, in this chapter we present a
delay-tolerant mix-zone framework for protecting location privacy of mobile users with
continuous query services in a mobile environment. First, we describe and analyze
the continuous query correlation attacks (CQ-attacks) that perform query correlation
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based inference to break the anonymity of road network-aware mix-zones. We for-
mally study the privacy strengths of the mix-zone anonymization under the CQ-attack
model and identify that providing high initial anonymity in the mix-zone model is
the key to anonymizing continuous queries in a mix-zone framework. We argue that
spatial cloaking or temporal cloaking over road network mix-zones is ineffective and
susceptible to attacks that carry out inference by combining query correlation with
timing correlation (CQ-timing attack) and transition correlation (CQ-transition at-
tack) information.
Next, we introduce three types of delay-tolerant road network mix-zones (i.e., tem-
poral, spatial and spatio-temporal) that are free from CQ-timing and CQ-transition
attacks and in contrast to conventional mix-zones, perform a combination of both
location mixing and identity mixing of spatially and temporally perturbed user loca-
tions to achieve stronger anonymity under the CQ-attack model. In the delay-tolerant
mix-zone model, users expose spatially or temporally perturbed locations outside the
mix-zone area. However, on the exit of each temporal delay tolerant mix-zone, the
mix-zone changes their perturbed locations by introducing a random temporal shift
to their already perturbed locations. Similarly, the spatial delay tolerant mix-zones
introduce a random spatial shift to the spatially perturbed locations when the users
exit them. While conventional mix-zones only change pseudonyms inside them, the
additional ability of delay-tolerant mix-zones to change and mix user locations brings
greater opportunities for creating anonymity. Our third type of delay tolerant mix-
zones, namely spatio-temporal delay-tolerant mix-zones effectively combine temporal
delay-tolerant and spatial delay tolerant mix-zones to obtain the highest anonymity
for continuous queries while making acceptable tradeoff between anonymous query
processing cost and temporal delay incurred in anonymous query processing. We eval-
uate the proposed techniques through extensive experiments conducted using traces
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produced by GTMobiSim [108] on different scales of geographic maps. Our exper-
iments show that the delay-tolerant mix-zone techniques are efficient and offer the
desired level of anonymity for continuous queries.
6.2 Mix-zones and CQ-attacks
In this section, we introduce the basic mix-zone concepts, illustrate the vulnerabili-
ties of mix-zones to continuous query correlation attacks (CQ-attacks) and present a
formal analysis of the continuous query anonymization problem.
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Figure 54: Mix-zone anonymization and its risks under CQ-attack
6.2.1 Mix-zone concepts
A mix-zone of k participants refers to a k-anonymization region in which users
can change their pseudonyms such that the mapping between their old and new
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pseudonyms is not revealed. In a mix-zone, a set of k users enter in some order and
change pseudonyms but none leave before all users enter the mix-zone. Inside the
mix-zone, the users do not report their locations and they exit the mix-zone in an
order different from their order of arrival, thus, providing unlinkability between their
entering and exiting events. The properties of a mix-zone can be formally stated as
follows:
Definition 3 A mix-zone Z is said to provide k-anonymity to a set of users A iff
1. The set A has k or more members, i.e., |A| ≥ k.
2. All users in A must enter the mix-zone Z before any user i ∈ A exits. Thus,
there exists a point in time where all k users of A are inside the zone.
3. Each user i ∈ A, entering the mix-zone Z through an entry point ei ∈ E and
leaving at an exit point oi ∈ O, spends a completely random duration of time
inside.
4. The probability of transition between any point of entry to any point of exit
follows a uniform distribution. i.e., a user entering through an entry point,
e ∈ E, is equally likely to exit in any of the exit points, o ∈ O.
Figure 54(a) shows a mix-zone with three users entering with pseudonyms a, b
and c and exiting with new pseudonyms, p, q and r. Here, given any user exiting
with a new pseudonym, the adversary has equal probability of associating it with
each of the old pseudonyms a, b and c and thus the mix-zone provides an anonymity
of k = 3. Therefore, the uncertainty of an adversary to associate a new pseudonym
of an outgoing user i′ to its old pseudonym is captured by Entropy, H(i′) which is






where pi′→j denotes the probability of mapping the new pseudonym, i
′ to an old
pseudonym, j. Here note that when users change pseudonyms inside mix-zones along
their trajectories, an adversary observing them loses the ability to track their move-
ments.
Unlike the theoretical mix-zones, mix-zones constructed at road intersections (Fig-
ure 54(b)) may violate some conditions. For instance, in a road network mix-zone,
users do not stay random time inside while entering and exiting the mix-zone [60, 104]
and also violate the assumption of uniform transition probabilities in taking turns.
Such violations provide additional information to the adversary in inferring the map-
ping between the old and new pseudonyms. Precisely, the timing information of
users entry and exit in a road network mix-zone leads to timing attack and the non-
uniformity in the transition probabilities at the road intersection leads to transition
attack respectively. The MobiMix road network mix-zone model (Definition 4) and
the construction techniques [104] deal with the challenges of constructing road net-
work mix-zones that are resilient to such timing and transition attacks. Accordingly
a road network mix-zone is defined as:
Definition 4 A road network mix-zone offers k-anonymity to a set A of users if and
only if:
1. There are k or more users in the anonymity set A.
2. Given any two users i, j ∈ A and assuming i exiting at time t, the pairwise
entropy after timing attack should satisfy the condition: Hpair(i, j) ≥ α.
3. Given any two users i, j ∈ A, the pairwise entropy after transition attack should
satisfy the condition: Hpair(i, j) ≥ β.
Here the pairwise entropy, Hpair(i, j) between two users i and j represents the
entropy obtained by considering i and j to be the only members of the anonymity
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set. In comparison, a theoretical mix-zone offers a high pairwise entropy of 1 for
all pairs of users. Therefore, a good road network mix-zone would offer a pairwise
entropy close to 1 for all pairs of users in the anonymity set. The non-rectangular
road network mix-zone geometry (Figure 54(c)) proposed in [104] enables each user
to travel along only one road segment inside the mix-zone and thereby avoids timing
attack due to difference in speed distributions. Similarly, the MobiMix road network
mix-zone model discusses the necessary criteria to ensure transition attack resilience
in the mix-zone construction process. However as we discuss next, when users run
continuous queries, any type of mix-zone is prone to CQ-attacks.
6.2.2 CQ-attack
When a user is executing a continuous query, even though her pseudonym is changed
whenever she enters a road network mix-zone, an adversary may simply utilize the
consecutive snapshots of the query to reveal the correlation between the old and new
pseudonyms. Consider the example in Figure 54(a) where three users enter with
pseudonyms a, b and c and exit with new pseudonyms p, q and r. The attacker finds
that before entering the mix-zone, users a and b run continuous queries on obtaining
nearest drug store and shortest path driving directions to the airport respectively.
Upon their exits, the attacker again finds more instances of their corresponding con-
tinuous queries with different pseudonyms, q and r. Here, although users a and c
change their pseudonyms to q and r, the continuous exposure of their CQ informa-
tion breaks their anonymity. Similar attack can happen in a road network mix-zone
as shown in Figure 54(b) where three users with pseudonyms, a, b and c enter and
leave the mix-zone. As users a and b are running continuous queries, the attacker
finds an instance of a′s continuous query before entering the mix-zone and when user
a exits with a new pseudonym, say α and receives another instance of the same query,
the attacker infers that the new pseudonym α must correspond to the old pseudonym
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a. To the best of our knowledge, no existing road network mix-zone technique is
effective against CQ-attack. For instance, we find in Figure 54(c) that even the non-
rectangular mix-zone [104] that is most effective against road network timing attack
is also prone to the CQ-attack.
Anonymity under CQ-attack model: When a user executes a continuous
query, it induces a trajectory corresponding to the movement of the user even though
the user’s pseudonym is changed whenever she crosses a road network mix-zone.
When a mobile user starts a continuous query from a personal location like office
or home address, then the user’s trajectory induced by the continuous query can be
easily linked with the user’s personal location and hence to user’s real identity even
though the pseudonyms are changed time to time. Therefore, in the proposed mix-
zone anonymization model, any mobile user who wishes to obtain CQ service first
moves to the nearest mix-zone and starts to run the CQ service from the mix-zone.
Consider the user with pseudonym, a in Figure 55 who wants to start a CQ service for
obtaining k-nearest drug stores. User a first goes to the nearest mix-zone and starts
the first instance of the query after exiting the mix-zone with a new pseudonym e.
Here, the attacker becomes confused to associate this continuous query with the users
{a, b, c} who entered the mix-zone as each of them have equal likelihood of starting this
continuous query. Hence the continuous query obtains an initial anonymity of k = 3.
However, it should be noted that at the subsequent mix-zones, the query correlation
reveals the mapping between the old and new pseudonyms of the continuous query.
For example, in the second mix-zone the mapping between new pseudonym j and old
pseudonym e is revealed and similarly in the third mix-zone, the mapping between
new pseudonym m and old pseudonym j is revealed. Thus, the anonymity strengths
of the mix-zones is weakened under the continuous query correlation attack model.
In contrast, if users in the system ask only snapshot queries, then user a’s anonymity
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keeps on increasing as a traverses through more mix-zones as it does not run contin-
uous queries. For example, when user a changes its pseudonym from e to j in the
second mix-zone, its anonymity increases from k = 3 (corresponding to {a, b, c}) to
k = 5 (corresponding to {a, b, c, f, g}). Hence, even though the initial anonymity is
low (k = 3), in the snapshot query model, the anonymity gained in the intermediate





















Figure 55: CQ-induced trajectory
However for a continuous query, its initial anonymity forms the major compo-
nent and intermediate mix-zones add anonymity only when users in the intermediate
mix-zones ask the same query. For instance, if m out of the k users traversing an
intermediate mix-zone run continuous queries and if there are R number of unique
continuous queries run by the m users and if Ar is the set of users running the con-
tinuous query, Qr, 1 ≤ r ≤ R, then the entropy of each continuous query user, i







where pi′→j denotes the probability of mapping the user exiting with the new pseudonym,
i′ to an old pseudonym, j that runs the same continuous query. Therefore, for a user
starting to execute a CQ from mix-zone m1, if fi users out of the mi continuous
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query users in the ith mix-zone execute the same CQ, then the entropy X of the user
executing the continuous query is given by




where log|k1 − m1| represents the initial anonymity of the user while starting the
continuous query in mix-zone, m1.
The goal for designing CQ-attack resilient solutions is to increase the anonymity
strengths of the mix-zones by considering the fact that the attacker has the continuous
query correlation information at the intermediate mix-zones to infer and associate the
CQ induced trajectory with its user. Note that the initial anonymity forms the major
component of the anonymity under the CQ-attack model and therefore it is important
that the mix-zones provide high initial anonymity for the continuous queries so that
even when the attacker breaks the anonymity in the subsequent mix-zones, the initial
anonymity remains sufficient to meet the required privacy level. For instance, if
the first mix-zone in the above example provides a higher anonymity, say k = 100
instead of k = 3, then the initial anonymity may be sufficient to meet the privacy
requirements of the continuous query even though the attacker breaks the anonymity
obtained in the intermediate mix-zones under the CQ-attack model. In the next sub-
section, we discuss CQ-cloaking techniques (spatial cloaking or temporal cloaking of
CQs) over road network mix-zones as a candidate approach for achieving higher query
anonymity and show that it is ineffective and susceptible to attacks that combine CQ
information with timing correlation (CQ-timing attack) and transition correlation
(CQ-transition attack).
6.2.3 CQ-cloaking approach and its vulnerabilities
In the CQ-cloaking approach, the continuous queries are either temporally or spatially
perturbed while the snapshot queries continue to be unperturbed. In the CQ-cloaking
approach, the locations used by the CQ is perturbed such that a continuous query
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originating from a mix-zone is indistinguishable from at least k users traversing the
mix-zone. While this technique does not make changes to the mix-zone model, we
show that the location exposure of snapshot queries makes the CQ anonymization













































































Figure 56: Continuous Query: Timing and Transition attacks
Consider the example shown in Figure 56(a) where we have two CQs labeled as
star CQ and triangle CQ respectively. The square nodes represent road network
mix-zones. We observe two different CQ traces starting from the mix-zone at road
junction n6. The triangle trace crossed the junctions n6, n5 and n2 and the star trace
crossed the junctions n6, n5 and n9 respectively and each star or triangle represents
one snapshot execution of the corresponding CQ. Intuitively, if we delay the execution
of the individual CQ snapshots of CQ users starting at mix-zone n6 such that at least
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kc users leave the mix-zone within the temporal delay, it will make it harder for an
adversary to associate the CQ-induced trajectory with the corresponding CQ user.
For instance, in Figure 56(a), if the continuous query on the shortest path to the
airport (marked by stars) originating from the mix-zone n6 is perturbed temporally
in such a way that there are k or more users coming out of the mix-zone at road
junction n6 within the continuous query’s temporal cloaking window, then from the
attacker’s perspective, the query could have originated from any of the k users who
entered the mix-zone within the time window. CQ-spatial cloaking is similar to CQ-
temporal cloaking except that instead of delaying the snapshots of the continuous
queries, the CQ exposes a larger spatial region such that there are k or more users
within the spatial region.
CQ-timing Attack: As mentioned earlier, CQ-cloaking techniques are vulner-
able to CQ-timing attack when users in the anonymity set violate the steady motion
assumption, i.e., if all users do not travel at the imposed speed of the road segment.
In the example shown in Figure 56(b), we find that users with pseudonyms a, b, c, d,
e, f , g and h enter the mix-zone during the continuous query’s temporal cloaking win-
dow, dtmax. When the steady motion assumption fails, user a travels slowly and stays
on segment n5n6 while other users move ahead of the segment, n5n6. If user a is the
issuer of the continuous query, then the continuous query would stay on segment, n5n6
even though it is executed with a temporal delay while other users of the anonymity
set move ahead. By observing this, the attacker can eliminate the low probable mem-
bers and identify the issuer of the continuous query with high confidence. Concretely,
we assume the attacker has knowledge of the maximum temporal delay, dtmax used
by the users. Let AC(i) represents the anonymity set of the continuous query, Ci, for
each user, j ∈ AC(i) and let MCi,j be the likelihood that the continuous query orig-
inates from user j. Since only continuous query’s location is temporally perturbed,
the attacker observes the movement of the users through their location exposure for
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snapshot queries. Let loc(j, t) and loc(Ci, t) represent the location of user j and the
location of the temporally cloaked continuous query, Ci observed by the attacker at
time t. If X t−dtj (loc(Ci, t)) is a Boolean variable indicating if the attacker observed





q(Ci, dt)×X t−dtj (loc(Ci, t))
where q(Ci, dt) denotes the probability that the continuous query, Ci uses a temporal
lag dt. Based on the proportion of the likelihoods of the users, the attacker can assign





Based on the probabilities, the attacker may either ignore the low probable members
from consideration or narrow down the search to the high probable members. We
note that similar attack is also possible in the case of CQ-spatial cloaking when the
steady motion assumption fails.
CQ-transition Attack: Additionally, CQ-cloaking techniques are also prone to
CQ-transition attack. When the transitions taken by a subset of the users in the
anonymity set differ from that of the user executing the query, then those members
can be eliminated based on transition correlation. For example, in Figure 56(c), at
road intersection n5, users c and e and h take a left turn on to the road segment,
n2n5 whereas users b, f and g move straight on segment, n4n5 and users a and d turn
right on to segment, n5n9. When the continuous query uses CQ-temporal cloaking
or CQ-spatial cloaking and follows the querying user after a temporal delay or using
a spatial cloaking region, from the transition taken by the continuous query from
segment, n6n5 to n4n5, the adversary will be able to eliminate the users, c, e, h, b, f
and g from consideration as their transitions differ from that of the continuous query.
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Concretely, if Yj is a Boolean variable indicating if the path taken by user j is the
same as that of the continuous query, Ci, then the probability QCi,j of user j being






if Yj = 1
0 otherwise
In the next section, we introduce the concept of delay-tolerant mix-zones that use
a modified mix-zone model to perform both location mixing and identity mixing to
achieve higher anonymity for continuous queries as compared to only identity mixing
in the conventional mix-zone model. Delay -tolerant mix-zones perturb both contin-
uous queries and snapshot queries and are free from CQ-timing and CQ-transition
attacks.
6.3 Delay-tolerant Mix-zones
Delay-tolerant mix-zones combine mix-zone based identity privacy protection with
location mixing to achieve high anonymity that is otherwise not possible with con-
ventional mix-zones. In the delay-tolerant mix-zone model, users expose spatially
or temporally perturbed locations outside the mix-zone area. However, on the exit
of each delay tolerant mix-zone, the mix-zone changes their perturbed locations by
introducing a random temporal or spatial shift to their already perturbed locations.
While conventional mix-zones only change pseudonyms inside them, the additional
ability of delay-tolerant mix-zones to change and mix user locations brings greater
opportunities for creating anonymity.1 Therefore, the anonymity strength of delay-
tolerant mix-zones comes from a unique combination of both identity mixing and
location mixing.
1This model is analogous to anonymous delay-tolerant routing in mix networks where network
routers have the additional flexibility to create anonymity by delaying and reordering incoming
packets before forwarding them [120].
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Before presenting the detailed analysis of the privacy strengths of the delay-
tolerant mix-zones, we first illustrate the concept of delay-tolerant mix-zones with
an example temporal delay-tolerant mix-zone. Table 17 shows the entry and exit
time of users in a conventional rectangular road network mix-zone. We find that user
a enters the mix-zone as t = 100 and exits at time t = 104. Similarly the other users
enter and exit as shown in Table 17. Here the adversary may know that the average
time taken by the users to cross the mix-zone is 4 sec. Therefore when user a exits at
a′ at time t = 104, the attacker can eliminate users e and f from consideration as they
have not even entered the mix-zone by the time user a exits2. Similarly, the adversary
can eliminate users o and n from consideration based on timing inference that users
o and n have exited the mix-zone by the time a and b enter the mix-zone. Therefore
when a exits as a′, the attacker has uncertainty only among the users {a, b, c, d,m}.
Also, among the users {a, b, c, d,m}, the attacker can eliminate more users through
sophisticated reasoning based on timing inference described later.
User tin tinside tout
o 94 4 98
n 96 4 100
m 98 4 102
a 100 4 104
b 101 4 105
c 103 4 107
d 103 4 107
e 106 4 110
f 108 4 112
Table 17: Conventional Road Network Mix-zone
However, in the delay-tolerant mix-zone model, each user uses a temporal delay,
dt within some maximum tolerance, dtmax. Inside the mix-zone, the temporally per-
turbed location of each user is assigned a random temporal shift. In the delay-tolerant
mix-zone example shown in Table 18, we find that user a initially uses a temporal
delay, dtold of 4 sec and inside the mix-zone it is shifted randomly to 16 sec. Here
dtmax is assumed as 20 sec. Therefore when user a exits as a
′, it becomes possible that
2For the sake of example simplicity, we assume that the users take the average time of 4 sec to
cross the mix-zone, in a real road intersection, it could actually take slightly longer or shorter time
to cross based on the speed of travel.
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User Observed tin tinside dtold dtnew Observed
tout
w 81 4 4 20 105
v 84 4 7 20 108
u 84 4 7 20 108
s 87 4 10 20 111
r 89 4 12 20 113
q 90 4 13 20 114
p 92 4 15 20 116
o 94 4 18 20 118
n 96 4 19 20 120
m 98 4 20 18 120
a 100 4 4 16 120
b 101 4 4 15 120
c 103 4 7 13 120
d 103 4 7 13 120
e 106 4 10 10 120
f 108 4 12 8 120
g 109 4 13 7 120
h 111 4 15 5 120
i 113 4 18 3 120
j 115 4 19 1 120
k 117 4 20 0 120
l 118 4 20 0 121
Table 18: An example temporal Delay-tolerant mixing
many users can potentially exit in the exit time of user a. The example in Table 18
shows one possible assignment of new temporal delays, dtnew for other users in order
for them to exit at the same time as a′. Thus, during the exit of user a as a′, the at-
tacker is confused to associate the exiting user a′ with the members of the anonymity
set, {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k,m, n}. In principle, users’ new temporal delays, dtnew
are randomly shifted inside the mix-zone ensuring the possibility of each of the users
to exit at the exit time of each other and thus the delay-tolerant mix-zone model
provides significantly higher anonymity compared to conventional mix-zones. Such
high anonymity provides the initial anonymity required for the continuous queries
under the CQ-attack model.
Timing attack in delay-tolerant mix-zone: Before we proceed to analyze
the privacy strengths of the delay-tolerant mix-zone, we formally define the timing
attack described above. The attacker observes the time of entry, tin(i) and time
of exit tout(i) for each user entering and exiting the mix-zone. When the attacker
sees an user i′ exiting, he tries to map i′ to one of the users of the anonymity set,
Ai. The attacker assigns a probability, pi′→j that corresponds to the probability of
mapping i′ to j, where j ∈ A based on the likelihood of user j exiting at the exit
time of i′, denoted by tout(i
′). Once the mapping probabilities are computed, the
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attacker can utilize the skewness in the distribution of the mapping probabilities
to eliminate some low probable mappings from consideration and narrow down his
inference to only the high probable mappings. Consider the example shown in Table
17 for the conventional mix-zone case, when user a exits as a′, we have the anonymity
set, A = {a, b, c, d, e, f,o, n,m}. Clearly the probability of mapping a′ to the users
{e, f, o, n} is zero as they either enter the mix-zone after a′ exits or leave the mix-
zone before a even enters. However, between the users {a, b, c, d,m}, the attacker can
assign a non-zero likelihood of resembling a′ as they have been inside the mix-zone
while a was present. Let these likelihoods be 0.37, 0.35, 0.1, 0.1 and 0.12 respectively.
In this case, we show that it is easy to analyze the anonymity based on pairwise
entropy. The pairwise entropy, Hpair(a, b) between two users a and b during the exit
of a′ is the entropy obtained by considering a and b to be the only members of the
anonymity set. In this case, we have two mapping probabilities, pa′→a and pa′→b which
are computed as: : pa′→a =
0.37
0.37+0.35
= 0.513, pa′→b =
0.35
0.37+0.35
= 0.486. Hence the
pairwise entropy H(a, b) is given by
Hpair(a, b) = −(pa′→alogpa′→a + pa′→blogpa′→b)
Therefore, Hpair(a, b) = 0.99. In general, a mix-zone defines a short mix-zone time
window, τ such that a set of users entering within the short time window, τ have high
pairwise entropy with each other. In the above example, if we take τ = 1 sec, then
we find users a and b enter within 1 sec and hence they have high pairwise entropy
close to 1. However, users a and c do not enter within the mix-zone time window of 1
sec and therefore we find that their pairwise entropy is lower(Hpair(a, c) = 0.75 ). In
comparison, a theoretical mix-zone (recall Definition 1) ensures a uniform distribution
for all possible mappings between old and new pseudonyms and therefore ensures a
high pairwise entropy of 1.0 for all pairs of users in the anonymity set. Thus, the
effective anonymity set of a road network is assumed to comprise of only those users
that have high pairwise entropy with each other.
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Definition 5 A delay-tolerant road network mix-zone offers k-anonymity to a set A
of users if and only if:
1. There are k or more users in the anonymity set A.
2. Given any two users i, j ∈ A and assuming i exiting at time t, the pairwise
entropy after timing attack should satisfy the condition: Hpair(i, j) ≥ α.
3. Given any two users i, j ∈ A, the pairwise entropy after transition attack should
satisfy the condition: Hpair(i, j) ≥ β.
In the above example, only users {a, b} will belong to the effective anonymity set of a
under the conventional mix-zone model as only they have high pairwise Entropy with
each other. However as discussed earlier, under the delay-tolerant mix-zone model
more number of users ({a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k,m, n}) will have high pairwise entropy
with each other and belong to the anonymity set of user a. Here, in addition to the
pairwise entropy with respect to timing attack, the pairwise entropy with respect
to transition attack is also considered for cases where the road intersections do not
have uniform transition probabilities to different segments (Condition 3). In such
cases, the effective anonymity set will contain only those members who enter from
road segments such that their transition probability to the exit segment of user a
is similar to the transition probability of their exit segments. As the delay-tolerant
mix-zones primarily influence the impact of timing attack, we focus our discussion
based on timing attack. However, in our experiments using real road networks, we
take into account the fact that road intersections do not have uniform transition
probability and accordingly construct the anonymity set with only those members
which have similar transition probability as discussed in [104]. Next, we present
the design and formal analysis of three proposed delay-tolerant mix-zone techniques
namely (i)temporal delay-tolerant mix-zones, (ii) spatial delay-tolerant mix-zones and
(iii) spatio-temporal delay-tolerant mix-zones.
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6.3.1 Temporal Delay-tolerant Mix-zones
As discussed before, in a temporal delay tolerant mix-zone, every mobile user delays
the location exposure with a randomly chosen delay, dt within the maximum temporal
tolerance, dtmax. The temporal time window, dtmax is chosen based on the arrival rate
of the users in the road junction so as to ensure an expected number of users arriving
into the mix-zone within the temporal tolerance, dtmax. Note that the random delay
used by a mobile client does not change during its travel between mix-zones. Only
when the mobile client enters a new mix-zone, its temporal delay is randomly shifted
to a new value within the temporal window, dtmax. Based on the delayed exposure
of users’ location information, the attacker knows their current temporally cloaked
location.
Based on the temporally cloaked location exposed by the users, the adversary
observes each user i entering the mix-zone at a temporally cloaked time tcloakin(i) and
exiting at a temporally cloaked time tcloakout(i
′) with a new pseudonym i′. The speed
followed by the users in a road segment is assumed to follow a Gaussian distribution
with a mean µ and standard deviation σ, where µ and σ are specific to each road
class category. For user i, the set of all other users who had entered the mix-zone
during the time window defined by |tcloakin(i)− τ −dt| to |tcloakin(i)+ τ +dt|, forms
the anonymity set of i, denoted as Ai where τ is a small value and represents the
mix-zone time window. Let t be the temporally cloaked exit time of user i, which is
also tcloakout(i
′).
For each user, j in the anonymity set, Ai, we compute pi′→j, the probability
that the exiting user i′ at temporally cloaked time, tcloakout(i
′) is j and pi′→i be the
probability that the exiting user is i. Let P (j, t) define the probability that user
j exits the mix-zone at the cloaked time, t. Here, the observed movement of the
temporally cloaked user location in the mix-zone is controlled by two factors: the
speed of the user inside the mix-zone and the change in the temporal delay used by
184
the user. Let Pv(j, x) be numerically equal to the probability that user j takes x
units of time to traverse the mix-zone region. It is computed based on the speed
distribution on the road segments. Let Pt(j, t) be the probability that the temporal
delay of user j is shifted by t seconds after exiting the mix-zone. In order for user
j to exit at temporally cloaked time, tcloackout(i
′), it depends on both the temporal
shift introduced to user j in the mix-zone as well as the time j takes to cross the
mix-zone. Thus, P (j, t) is given by
P (j, t) =
∫ ∞
0
Pv(j, x)× Pt(j, t− tcloackin(j) + x)dx
Here we note that our temporal location mixing algorithm assigns a new temporal
delay, dtnew based on the current temporal delay, dt and the maximum temporal delay,
dtmax.
dtnew = |dtmax − dt|
and hence it ensures a uniform distribution of shift values, Pt(j, t) while also ensuring
that the temporal lags of the users are uniformly distributed. Similar to P (j, t), we
can also obtain P (i, t) based on the temporally cloaked arrival time of i, tcloackin(i).
We have
P (i′, t) = P (i, t) + P (j, t)
Here, P (i′, t) is the cumulative likelihood of both i or j exiting as i′ as i′ is either
of them. Therefore, the probability of i′ being j when i′ exits at time t, denoted as
pi′→j(t) is given by the following conditional probability
pi′→j(t) = P ((j, t)/(i
′, t))
Similarly, the probability of i′ being i, pi′→i(t) is given by
pi′→i(t) = P ((i, t)/(i
′, t))
and the pair-wise entropy after timing attack, Hpair(i, j) between users i and j when
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i exits as i′ can be obtained as
Hpair(i, j) = −(pi′→i(t)logpi′→i(t) + pi′→j(t)logpi′→j(t))
As it is intuitive, for an exiting user, i′, the number of users in the effective anonymity
set (i.e., those members that have high pairwise entropy with each other and with i′)
is directly proportional to the temporal tolerance, dtmax, ie., the greater the temporal
tolerance value, dtmax, the more the number of users that could possibly resemble i
during the exit of i′ with a high pairwise Entropy. Thus by varying the temporal
tolerance, dtmax the temporal delay tolerant-mix-zones can offer any desired level of
anonymity to the users.
6.3.2 Spatial Delay-tolerant Mix-zones
We now present our second class of delay-tolerant mix-zones namely spatial delay-
tolerant mix-zones. Unlike the temporal delay-tolerant mix-zones, in the spatial delay-
tolerant mix-zone approach, users’ locations are instantaneously sent out using a
spatial region instead of the exact point location. Here, the spatial region masks
the exact time of traversal of the user inside the mix-zone ensuring the possibility
that the user could be located at any point within the spatial region. This ensures
that the adversary can not infer the exact time of traversal of the user. The spatial
region is constructed by first identifying the temporal window size, dtmax based on
the arrival rate of the users in the mix-zone and by translating the user’s current
location into a spatial region based on the temporal window size, dtmax. A spatial
region corresponding to a temporal window size dtmax includes all road segments
that can be reached within dtmax units of time (i.e., the corresponding dl units of
length) from the center of the region when travelled at the mean speed of the road
segments. The delay-proportional spatial cloaking algorithm described in Algorithm
2 computes the spatial region in such a way that the distance from the center of the
spatial region and the location of the mobile user exactly corresponds to the spatial
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distance, dl proportional to the temporal delay, dt of the user in the temporal delay-
tolerant approach. Inside the delay-tolerant mix-zone, the spatial regions of the users
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(b) After spatial location-mixing
Figure 57: Illustration of Delay-tolerant mix-zones
We illustrate the principle of spatial delay-tolerant mix-zone through an example
in Figure 57(a) and Figure 57(b). Figure 57(a) shows the entry of the spatial regions
of users a, b, c and d into the mix-zone and Figure 57(b) illustrates the spatial location
mixing process. We find that the location mixing process changes the spatial regions
of the users, a, b, c and d in such a way that the distance of the users from the center
of their spatial region is randomly shifted (Notice changed distance in the spatial
regions in Figure 57(b)). Therefore, after the spatial location mixing process, the
spatial regions of users a, b, c and d all have similar probability to exit at a given
time. Note that without this spatial mixing, the attacker would still infer that the
regions of a and b entered well ahead of c and d and hence a and b will exit before c
and d.
Here we assume that each user, i’s spatial region enter the mix-zone at time,
tin(region(i)) and exits at time tout(region(i)) with a new pseudonym, i
′. For each
user, i, the set of other users whose spatial regions entered the mix-zone during the
time window defined by |tin(region(i))−τ | to |tin(region(i))+τ | forms the anonymity
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Algorithm 2 Delay-proportional Spatial Cloaking
1: dtmax: continuous query temporal window
2: v: vertex v corresponds to the road junction v
3: pathtimev: mean travel time to vertex v from starting mix-zone, if v is the mix-zone
junction, then pathtimev = 0
4: region: is a global list of road segments representing the cloaking region. It is empty
at beginning and represents the cloaking region when the algorithm terminates
5: procedure FindCloakRegion(dtmax, pathtimev, v)
6: for all segments(v, u) ∈ segs(v) do
7: pathtimeu = pathtimev +
length(v,u)
speed(v,u)
8: if (pathtimeu < dtmax) then
9: if (region.contains(v, u) == false) then
10: region.add(v, u)





set of i, denoted by Ai. The anonymity obtained in the mix-zone is dependent on the
pairwise mapping probabilities, pi′→i and pi′→j where j ∈ Ai and pi′→j denotes the
probability that the exiting user i′ at time, tout(region(i
′)) is j and pi′→i represents
the probability that the exiting user is i.
The movement of a user’s spatial region is governed by two factors in a spatial
delay-tolerant mix-zone namely the randomness of the user movement in terms of
its velocity inside the mix-zone and the spatial shift introduced in the spatial region
after exiting the mix-zone. Let us assume that user j takes x units of time in the
mix-zone and let Pv(j, x, l) be the probability that user j travels with a velocity such
that it takes x units of time to cross l units of distance of the mix-zone region. Let
lmix be the distance to cross the mix-zone and let us assume that j’s spatial region
is shifted by y units of length in the location mixing process. Let Ps(j, y) denote
the probability that the spatial shift introduced in the mix-zone is y units of length.
Therefore, for user j to exit at time, tout(region(i
′)), it should travel a distance of
lmix + y in the mix-zone instead of the usual distance lmix. Therefore, we have
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P (j, t) =
∫ ∞
0
Pv(j, x, lmix + y)× Ps(j, y)dx
where x = t − tin(region(j)). Here, the spatial location mixing process assigns a
new spatial region to each user ensuring a uniform distribution of spatial shift values,
Ps(j, y). i.e., inside the mix-zone, every user’s distance from the center of its spatial
region is shifted by a random length, y.
Similar to P (j, t), we can obtain P (i, t) and hence pi′→j(t), the probability of i
′
being j when i′ exits at time t can be obtained from the conditional probability,
pi′→j(t) = P ((j, t)/(i
′, t)). Similarly, as discussed in section 6.3.1, the probability of i′
being i, pi′→i(t) can be computed and thus the pair-wise entropy, Hpair(i, j, t) between
users i and j when i exits as i′ can be obtained.
We note that the spatial delay-tolerant mix-zone approach does not incur temporal
delays, however they lead to higher query processing cost that is directly proportional
to the size of the spatial regions. In the next subsection, we discuss spatio-temporal
delay-tolerant mix-zones that yield suitable tradeoffs between the incurred delay and
the cost of query processing.
6.3.3 Spatio-temporal delay-tolerant Mix-zones
In the spatio-temporal delay-tolerant mix-zone approach, user locations are perturbed
using both a temporal delay as well as a spatial region instead of the exact point
location and the mix-zone introduces both random temporal and spatial shifts to
the spatio-temporally perturbed user locations. Therefore, to an adversary observing
an user, the user could have been located at any point in the spatial region at any
instance of time during the temporal time window.
The anonymity strength of this model is analyzed as follows. We assume that each
user uses a temporal time window of dtmax and a spatial cloaking region of length,
dlmax. Based on the delayed exposure of the spatial regions, the attacker estimates
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the current temporally perturbed position of the spatial region of each user’s location.
Here we assume that each user, i’s spatial region, region(i), enters the mix-zone at a
temporally cloaked time, tcloakin(region(i)) and exits at a temporally cloaked time,
tcloakout(region(i)) with a new pseudonym, i
′. For user i, the set of all other users
whose spatial regions entered the mix-zone during the mix-zone time window defined
by |tcloakin(region(i))− τ −dt| to |tcloakin(region(i))+ τ +dt|, forms the anonymity
set of i, namely Ai.
In a spatio-temporal delay-tolerant mix-zone, the movement of a user’s spatio-
temporally perturbed location is governed by three factors: (i) the randomness of
user’s movement inside the mix-zone determined by velocity, (ii) the random temporal
shift introduced inside the mix-zone and (iii) the random spatial shift introduced
inside the mix-zone. For all j ∈ Ai, let us assume that user j’s spatial region, region(j)
takes x units of time to cross the mix-zone and let Pv(j, x, l) be the probability that
user j travels with a velocity such that it takes x units of time to cross l units of
distance of the mix-zone region and let j’s spatial region be shifted by y units of
length and its temporal delay be shifted by z units of time. Let Ps(j, y) denote the
probability that the spatial shift introduced in the mix-zone is x units of length and
Pt(j, z) be the probability that the temporal delay of user j is shifted by z seconds
after exiting the mix-zone. Therefore, for user j’s spatial region, region(j) to exit at
temporally cloaked time, tout(region(i
′)), it should travel a distance of lmix+ y in the
mix-zone instead of the usual lmix where lmix is the length of the mix-zone region.
Therefore,
P (j, t) =
∫ ∞
0
Pv(j, x, lmix + y)
×Ps(j, y)× Pt(j, t− tcloackin(j) + x)dxdy
Here we note that the spatio-temporal delay-tolerant mix-zone introduces both
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random temporal and spatial shifts inside and thus it ensures a uniform random
distribution of Ps(j, y) and Pt(j, t− tcloackin(j) + x) in the above equation.
Thus, the pair-wise entropy between users i and j when i exits as i′ can be obtained
after knowing the probabilities pi′→i(t) and pi′→j(t) which are deduced from P (i, t)
and P (j, t) similar to the analysis on temporal delay-tolerant mix-zones in section
6.3.1
6.4 Experimental Evaluation
We divide the experimental evaluation of our techniques into three components: (i)
the effectiveness of the proposed techniques under the CQ-attack model, (ii) perfor-
mance in terms of query processing cost, incurred temporal delays and success rate of
anonymization and (iii) evaluation of the spatio-temporal tradeoffs between incurred
temporal delays and query processing cost. Before reporting our experimental results,
we first describe the experimental setup, including the road-network mobile object
simulator used in the experiments.
6.4.1 Experimental setup
We use the GT Mobile simulator [108] to generate a trace of cars moving on a real-
world road network, obtained from maps available at the National Mapping Division
of the USGS [20]. The simulator extracts the road network based on three types of
roads − expressway, arterial and collector roads. Our experimentation uses maps
from three geographic regions namely that of Chamblee and Northwest Atlanta re-
gions of Georgia and San Jose West region of California to generate traces for a two
hour duration. We generate a set of 10,000 cars on the road network that are ran-
domly placed on the road network according to a uniform distribution. Cars generate
random trips with source and destination chosen randomly and shortest path routing
is used to route the cars for the random trips. The speed of the cars are distributed
based on the road class categories as shown in Table 19.
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Road type Expressway Arterial Collector
Mean speed(mph) 60 50 25
Std. dev.(mph) 20 15 10
Speed Distribution Gaussian Gaussian Gaussian
Table 19: Motion Parameters
Parameter Value
Map Northwest Atlanta region
Mobility Model Random Roadnet Router
Total number of vehicles 10000
Number of Road junctions 6831
Number of Road segments 9187
Table 20: Simulation Parameters and Setting
6.4.2 Experimental results
Our experimental evaluation consists of three parts. First, we evaluate the effective-
ness of the proposed techniques in terms of their anonymization effectiveness. We
compare the delay-tolerant mix-zone techniques with CQ-cloaking techniques and
conventional road network mix-zones in terms of the obtained entropy that captures
the amount of information required to break the anonymity and then compare the
various delay-tolerant mix-zones in terms of the average temporal delays incurred and
the cost of query processing in terms of query processing time. Next, we evaluate the
spatio-temporal tradeoffs of delay-tolerant mix-zones that helps understand the best
tradeoffs in terms of the incurred temporal delay and the query processing time. Our
final set of experiments evaluate the effectiveness of the delay-tolerant mix-zones in
terms of the average temporal delays, query execution time and success rate in pro-
viding the desired value of k. Our default setting uses the map of Northwest Atlanta
that has 6831 road junctions and 9187 road segments as shown in table 20. Among the
6831 junctions in the road network, 1025 (15 %) road junctions are chosen as the can-
didate mix-zones and the experimental results are averaged among these mix-zones.
By default, each delay-tolerant mix-zone is constructed over a non-rectangular road
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network mix-zone with pairwise Entropy lowerbound after timing attack, α taken as
0.9 so that the effective anonymity set of the mix-zone comprises only of users who
have pairwise Entropy greater than 0.9 with each other. Similarly for comparison,
each conventional mix-zone is also constructed using the non-rectangular geometry
with α = 0.9. For both delay-tolerant mix-zones and conventional mix-zones, the
pairwise Entropy lowerbound β after transition attack is taken as 0.9. We assume
that all continuous queries are unique and by default 10% of users in the system run
continuous queries.



















(a) Entropy after CQ-attack


















(b) Entropy Timeline - CQs















(c) Entropy Timeline - SQs
Figure 58: Comparison with Conventional Mix-zones
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6.4.2.1 Comparison with Conventional Mix-zones and CQ-cloaking
This set of experiments compares the delay-tolerant mix-zone approaches with the
conventional mix-zones and CQ-cloaking techniques in terms of their anonymity mea-
sured by Entropy. Here, the delay-tolerant mix-zones are constructed over a conven-
tional road network mix-zone whose size is chosen to offer an anonymity of 4. In
Figure 58(a), we compare the average entropy of the temporal, spatial and spatio-
temporal delay-tolerant mix-zone approaches (t-M, s-M, and st-M) with the con-
ventional mix-zone approach and the temporal and spatial CQ-cloaking approaches
(CQ-t and CQ-s) for various values of required anonymity, k. Here, the temporal
window and spatial region size are chosen based on the arrival rate of the users in the
mix-zones to ensure the required number of users, k with a high probability, p = 0.9.
For the spatio-temporal delay-tolerant mix-zones, the spatial region size is fixed as
800 m and the temporal window is varied according to the required value of k. We
find that the average entropy of the conventional mix-zone approach is significantly
lower than that of the delay-tolerant mix-zones as they can not adapt to higher levels
of anonymity but the delay-tolerant mix-zones always provide the required anonymity
level for all values of k as shown by the high Entropy. Here, we also note that the
CQ-cloaking approaches (CQ-t and CQ-s) have low level of Entropy due to the ef-
fect of CQ-timing and CQ-transition attacks. In Figure 58(b) and Figure 58(c), we
plot the timeline of the Entropy obtained by continuous queries (CQ) and snapshot
queries (SQ) respectively. Here, we use the spatio-temporal mix-zone as the candi-
date delay-tolerant mix-zone and temporal CQ-cloaking as the candidate CQ-cloaking
technique. We find that with conventional mix-zones, the continuous queries obtain
low initial anonymity and it stays constant throughout the timeline. With the CQ-
cloaking approach, the queries obtain higher anonymity in the beginning but their
anonymity is gradually reduced due to the impact of CQ-timing and CQ-transition
attacks. However, the delay-tolerant mix-zones offer very high anonymity to meet
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the privacy requirements of the continuous queries under the CQ-attack model. For
snapshot queries, we find that the techniques have a different trend as shown in Fig-
ure 58(c). The conventional mix-zone model shows an increasing Entropy timeline
where users gain more anonymity at the intermediate mix-zones as CQ-attack has
no impact on snapshot queries. We also find that the delay-tolerant mix-zone offers
greater anonymity to snapshot queries with a much steeper Entropy timeline but the
CQ-cloaking technique offers only similar anonymity as the conventional mix-zone.
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Figure 59: Performance of Continuous and SnapShot queries
6.4.2.2 Performance of Continuous and Snapshot queries
Next, we study the performance impact of the proposed approaches for continuous and
snapshot queries individually. We measure the average temporal delay incurred and
the average query execution time of the techniques in figure 59(a) and 59(b). Here,
all queries are anonymized corresponding to a k = 50. The spatio-temporal delay-
tolerant mix-zone uses its default spatial region size of 800 m. The query execution
time represents the average time to process a snapshot of a k-NN query for a k-nearest
neighbor value of (kq = 7) over 14000 uniformly distributed objects on the road
network using the road network based anonymous query processor described in [135].
We find that with the CQ-temporal cloaking (CQ-t), only the continuous queries
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incur delay before getting processed and in CQ-spatial cloaking (CQ-s), neither of the
queries incur any delay. With the spatial cloaking approach, we obtain the results of
the query for all possible locations within the cloaking region, however the continuous
queries in the CQ-spatial cloaking approach result in higher query execution time. In
temporal delay-tolerant mix-zones (t-M), both continuous and snapshot queries incur
temporal delays but have low query execution time. Conversely, the spatial delay-
tolerant mix-zones (s-M) do not incur any delays for the queries but have increased
query execution time for both snapshot and continuous queries. The spatio-temporal
delay-tolerant mix-zones technique (st-M) finds a tradeoff between these approaches
and has more than 55% lower average temporal delay compared to the temporal


































































































































































































Figure 61: Comparison of Query Execution time
6.4.2.3 Evaluating Spatio-temporal tradeoff
Our next set of experiments compares the performance of the delay-tolerant mix-zones
in terms of the average temporal delays incurred and the query execution time under
various values of required anonymity, k. Figure 60(a) shows the average temporal
delay required to anonymize users for various anonymity levels. The X-axis shows the
anonymity offered by the conventional mix-zone and the Y-axis shows the anonymity
level offered by the delay-tolerant mix-zones constructed over the conventional mix-
zones and the Z-axis represents the average temporal delay, dt used by the delay-
tolerant mix-zones. We find that the temporal delay increases with increase in the
anonymity level of the delay-tolerant mix-zone. Also, we find that there is only a
small decrease in temporal delay with increase in mix-zone anonymity as the temporal
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window has a significant impact on the obtained anonymity.
Similarly, we study the performance of spatial delay-tolerant mix-zones in Figure
60(b). The X-axis represents the anonymity offered by the conventional road network
mix-zone and the Y-axis represents the anonymity of the delay-tolerant mix-zones.
We plot the required spatial resolution along Z-axis. We observe a similar trend
with spatial resolution values as with the temporal delay in Figure 60(a). We notice
that higher query anonymity levels require larger spatial cloaking regions for location
perturbation. In the context of delay-tolerant mix-zones, we measure the data quality
in terms of the size of the spatial region (spatial resolution) instead of the number
of objects as those in the location k-anonymized cloaking [45]. This is because the
spatial perturbation in a delay-tolerant mix-zone is focused on changing the pseudo-
identity with a higher anonymity rather than obtaining a perturbed location with a
k-anonymized cloaking region. However, we refer the interested readers to [45] for
additional object distribution based metrics for measuring data quality of the location
perturbation process.
Next, we study the spatio-temporal tradeoff between the spatial resolution that
determines query processing cost and the temporal delay incurred before processing
the query requests. In Figure 60(c), the spatial resolution value is varied along the
X-axis and the Y-axis represents the delay-tolerant mix-zone anonymity level. Here,
the conventional mix-zone anonymity is set as 12. We find that the average temporal
delay along Z-axis is much smaller with the effect of spatio-temporal perturbation
compared to the temporal and spatial delay-tolerant mix-zones. Higher spatial res-
olution greatly reduces the temporal window size required to provide the required
anonymity. However, the right trade-off between the temporal window size and the
spatial resolution can be made based on the acceptable delay in processing the user
queries and the desired cost of query processing.
Our next set of experiments compares the delay-tolerant mix-zones in terms of
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their average query execution time. In Figure 61, the average query execution time
to process a snapshot of a k-NN query with (kq = 7) over 14000 uniformly dis-
tributed objects on the road network is shown. In Figure 61(a), observe that the
temporal delay-tolerant mix-zones incur very low query execution time (less than
1 msec) as these queries use the point location of the mobile client with a tempo-
ral delay. Whereas, the query execution time of spatial delay-tolerant mix-zones in
Figure 61(b) increases with increase in the required anonymity as larger anonymity
requires larger spatial regions for processing. The query execution time of spatio-
temporal delay-tolerant mix-zone approach in 61(c) shows the reduction in the query
processing cost at the expense of the incurred temporal delay in processing the queries
(Figure 60(c)).
6.4.2.4 Impact of fraction of Continuous Query users
The anonymity of the delay-tolerant mix-zones also depends on the fraction of total
users who run continuous queries. For instance, if a number of continuous queries
exist in the system, each uniquely identifying the querying user, the anonymization
process might result either in long temporal delays or large spatial regions leading
to higher query processing cost. The continuous query fraction denotes the fraction
of the total users who currently execute a continuous query. Here, each query is
anonymized with an anonymity, k = 50. In Figure 62(a), we measure the average
temporal delay incurred by the approaches for varying values of fraction of continuous
queries. We find that the average temporal delay of both (t-M) and (st-M) approaches
increases steadily with increase in the proportion of continuous queries till a point,
(0.6 in the figure) and then increases steeply indicating that it could be expensive
to anonymize continuous queries if more than 60% of the users execute continuous
queries. A similar trend is exhibited in Figure 62(b) for query processing cost sug-
gesting that the anonymization cost could be higher when the fraction of continuous
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queries approaches 0.7. As a large number of mobile users are passive in general (i.e.,
execute no queries while traveling), we believe that a 60% continuous query fraction
of the entire user population is expected to be rarely crossed in practice.
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(b) Query processing time
Figure 62: Fraction of Continuous Query users
6.4.2.5 Success Rate and Relative-k
Our final set of experiments evaluates the performance of the delay-tolerant mix-zones
in terms of their success rate in providing the desired level of anonymity. The success
rate represents the fraction of the cases where the proposed framework is able to
provide an anonymity equal or greater than the requested value, k. In Figure 63(a),
the query anonymity level is varied along the X-axis and the Y-axis represents the
obtained success rate. Based on the arrival rate of the users in the mix-zone, the
expected success rate is chosen as 0.9 so that the delay-tolerant mix-zones provide
an anonymity of k or higher in more than 90% of the cases. We find that all the
delay-tolerant mix-zone techniques obtain a success rate close to the expected success
rate of 0.9, however the success rate of the CQ-cloaking approach is much lower (less
than 0.3) and the conventional mix-zone approach has a even lower success rate of
less than 0.06. Similarly, we study relative-k which is defined as the ratio of the
anonymity obtained by the queries to the query anonymity requested. In Figure
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63(b), we find that the relative anonymity level of delay-tolerant mix-zones ranges
from 1.5 to 2.0 showing that the queries on an average obtain an anonymity which
is 1.5 to 2.0 times the requested value. The successful cases of CQ-cloaking and
conventional mix-zone approaches have a lower relative anonymity as the mix-zones
have lower success rate and provides lower value of k in general. In order to evaluate














































Figure 63: Success rate and Relative k





















(a) Varying CQ fraction



















Figure 64: Success rate
the success rate under different fractions of continuous queries in the system, we
study the approaches by varying the fraction of users executing continuous queries.
Here, each query is anonymized with an anonymity of 50. Figure 64(a) shows that
the obtained success rate is close to the expected success rate for the delay-tolerant
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mix-zones across different fractions of CQs in the system. However, the CQ-cloaking
and conventional mix-zone techniques have much lower success rate. Similarly, the
success rate of the techniques is compared across different scales of geographic maps
described in section 6.4.1. We compare the success rate of spatio- temporal delay-
tolerant mix-zones in Figure 64(b) that shows that the technique performs well across
different geographic maps.
6.5 Related work
Location privacy has been studied over the past decade along two orthogonal di-
mensions: spatial cloaking through location k-anonymity represented by [64, 98, 33,
135, 45, 29] and mix-zone based privacy protection and its variations represented by
[35, 60, 61, 39, 104, 96]. However, these approaches are suitable only for snapshot
queries and are inadequate and ineffective for protecting location privacy of mobile
users with continuous query services.
In recent years, there had been research efforts that dealt with location privacy
risks of continuous queries. [36] describes various attacks in Location-based systems,
including the continuous query attacks and the challenges of supporting continuous
query services. [54] proposes spatial cloaking using the memorization property for
continuous queries. This is further used in [107] for clustering queries with simi-
lar mobility patterns. However, this type of techniques may lead to large cloak-
ing boxes resulting in higher query processing cost as users may not always move
together. [58] identifies that location cloaking algorithms with only k-anonymity
and l-diversity guarantee are not effective for continuous LBS and therefore propose
query m-invariance as a necessary criterion when dealing with continuous location
queries. However, m-invariance based approach is ineffective when the mobile users
ask uniquely different CQ services as they move on the road. An alternative thread
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of research is represented by the Personal information retrieval techniques as an al-
ternate to location cloaking for anonymous query processing [66]. PIR techniques
guarantee privacy of mobile users regardless of which types of queries (continuous
or snapshot) they ask. However PIR based solutions are known to be expensive in
both computation and storage overheads, even with the recent new techniques such
as hardware-assisted PIR techniques [138], developed to improve the scalability and
efficiency of the PIR approach. Another general issue with PIR based solutions is its
limitation in terms of what kinds of queries can be protected under PIR [136].
The concept of mix-zones was first presented in the context of location privacy in
[35]. The idea of building mix-zones at road intersections is proposed in [60] and [39].
In [61], a formulation for optimal placement of mix-zones in a road map is discussed.
Almost all existing mix-zone techniques follow a straight forward approach of using a
rectangular or circular shaped zone and their construction methodologies do not take
into account the effect of timing and transition attacks in the construction process.
The MobiMix framework presented in [104] is the first road-network aware attack-
resilient mix-zone that guarantees an expected value of anonymity by leveraging the
characteristics of both the underlying road network and motion behaviors of users
traveling on spatially constrained road networks. However, all existing road network
mix-zone approaches, to the best of our knowledge, fail to protect mobile users from
continuous query attacks.
Inspired by the mix-zone concept, the Cachecloak algorithm [96] employs an alter-
nate technique for path-mixing by using cache prefetching to hide the exact location
of mobile user by requesting the location based data along an entire predicted path.
Although these techniques are effective when all users obtain the same service, they
are vulnerable to continuous query correlation attacks when the mobile users obtain
uniquely different CQ services. Recently, content caching[27] has been proposed as an
alternate solution to location privacy. However, caching large amounts of information
203
on tiny mobile devices may not be effective. In addition, they may limit the usabil-
ity of the services by restricting mobile clients to ask only services that are cached
before-hand.
In this chapter, we introduce delay-tolerant road-network mix-zones as an effective
countermeasure against CQ attacks. We show that by performing a combination of
both location mixing and identity mixing in the mix-zones, the delay-tolerant mix-
zones offer greater level of anonymity that is sufficient to meet the anonymity levels of
continuous queries under the CQ-attack model while maintaining acceptable quality
of continuous query services. Though both location perturbation based techniques
and mix-zone anonymization are well researched topics by themselves, to the best of
our knowledge, this is the first work to systematically study the benefits of combining
location perturbation based techniques with mix-zone based location anonymization
schemes to tackle sophisticated attacks such as the continuous query attacks. In
general, we believe that an effective combination of location perturbation with mix-
zone based techniques has the potential to provide the strongest defense against the
sophisticated CQ attacks.
6.6 summary
We presented a delay-tolerant mix-zone framework for protecting location privacy of
mobile users against continuous query correlation attacks. First, we described and
formally analyzed the mix-zone anonymization problem under the CQ-attack model
and showed that spatial cloaking or temporal cloaking over road network mix-zones is
ineffective and susceptible to CQ-timing and CQ -transition attacks. We introduced
three types of delay-tolerant road network mix-zones that are free from CQ-timing
and CQ-transition attacks and in contrast to conventional mix-zones, perform a com-
bination of both location mixing and identity mixing of spatially and temporally per-
turbed user locations to achieve stronger anonymity for the continuous queries under
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the CQ-attack model. Extensive experiments using traces generated by GTMobiSim
on different scales of geographic maps showed that the delay-tolerant mix-zones are




CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Cloud computing and its pay-as-you-go cost structure have enabled infrastructure
providers, platform providers and application service providers to offer computing ser-
vices on demand and pay per use just like how we use utility today. This growing trend
in cloud computing with the exponential data growth witnessed in recent years calls
for resource management techniques that are highly cost-effective, consumer-driven
and privacy conscious. This dissertation addresses these challenges with systematic
approaches and techniques with the focus on parallel processing of large scale data
using Map-Reduce and scaling and delivering privacy-aware services in the Cloud.
In this chapter, we first summarize the contributions made by this thesis and then
discuss open problems and interesting directions for future work.
7.1 Summary
In summary, this dissertation makes the following contributions. First, we argued that
existing cloud services for MapReduce are highly cost-inefficient and inadequate for
production workloads. We presented a new MapReduce cloud service model, Cura,
for large scale data analytics in the cloud. In contrast to existing services, Cura
automatically creates the best cluster configuration for the jobs using MapReduce
profiling and leverages deadline-awareness which, by delaying execution of certain
jobs, allows the cloud provider to optimize its global resource allocation efficiently and
reduce its costs. Cura’s resource management techniques include cost-aware resource
provisioning, VM-aware scheduling and online virtual machine reconfiguration.
Second, we developed Purlieus, a locality-aware resource allocation system for
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MapReduce in a cloud. We discussed the Purlieus system architecture for MapRe-
duce cloud service and described how existing data and virtual machine placement
techniques lead to longer job execution times and large amounts of network traffic
in the data center. We identified data locality as the key principle which if exploited
can alleviate these problems and developed a unique coupled data and VM placement
technique that achieves high data locality. Uniquely, Purlieus’s proposed placement
techniques optimize for data locality during both map and reduce phases of the job by
considering VM placement, MapReduce job characteristics and load on the physical
cloud infrastructure at the time of data placement.
Third, we developed a suit of techniques for enabling privacy-preserving access to
data and compute services in the Cloud. In this context, we developed VNCache: an
efficient solution for MapReduce analysis of cloud-archived log data without requiring
an apriori data transfer and loading into the local Hadoop cluster. We showed that
current solutions are highly inefficient as they require large encrypted datasets to
be first transferred to the secure enterprise site, decrypted, and loaded into a local
Hadoop cluster before they can be processed. We presented our filesystem layer called
VNcache that dynamically integrates data stored at multiple public storage clouds
into a virtual namespace at the enterprise site. VNCache provides a seamless data
streaming and decryption model and optimizes Hadoop jobs to start without requiring
apriori data transfer, decryption, and loading.
The next contribution in this context extended our cloud service framework to sup-
port privacy-preserving ubiquitous data access and query processing. In a cloud, mo-
bile users request location dependent data services having their own location privacy
constraints. We have presented MobiMix, a framework for building attack resilient
road network mix-zones that enables handling cloud service requests with respect to
system-defined location privacy requirements. The construction techniques proposed
in MobiMix are efficient and are more attack-resilient than the existing mix-zone
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approaches. We then extended the MobiMix framework to develop a delay-tolerant
mix-zone framework for protecting location privacy of mobile cloud users against
continuous query correlation attacks (CQ-attacks). We introduced three types of
delay-tolerant road network mix-zones (temporal, spatial and spatio-temporal) that
achieve stronger anonymity for the continuous query services.
7.2 Open issues and Future directions
Large-scale data processing in the Cloud is an interesting area of research both from
performance and cost-optimization perspective as well as from the perspective of
system privacy. We are interested in pushing this research in several interesting
directions. We highlight some of them below.
7.2.1 Performance and Cost-optimization
As we argued in Chapter 2, most of today’s Cloud services for Big Data applica-
tions function merely as a Virtual-Machine-as-a-service model leading to poor re-
source utilization and higher cost for customers. In such models, we notice that
there is a significant wastage of I/O and CPU resources due to virtualization over-
heads. Given the exponential data growth witnessed in the recent years, customers
often look for cheaper services given that many Big Data analytic jobs do not require
strong performance guarantees. One interesting direction of future research is to de-
vise Cloud solutions that leverage such opportunities and optimize job performance
in non-virtualized cloud environments to minimize cost for customers who are willing
to trade off strict performance guarantees. As an extension of this research direction,
we are interested in exploring to build service models for fine-grained resource sharing
using a layered virtualization approach. We note that conventional server virtualiza-
tion virtualize every aspect of the physical resources leading to higher virtualization
overheads and poor cost-effectiveness. We are interested in building fine-grained
virtualization techniques that virtualize physical resources at different granularities,
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virtualizing precisely what customer jobs need while leaving the rest of the physical
resources to perform without the virtualization overhead and cost. We believe that
such fine-grained virtualization would make future cloud services more utility-aware
and cost-effective.
7.2.2 Locality-optimizations
Our research on locality-aware MapReduce processing continues in two directions.
First, for placement techniques, we would like to capture relationships between datasets,
e.g. if two datasets are accessed together (MapReduce job doing a join of two
datasets), their data placement can be more intelligent while placing their blocks
in relation to each other. Second, we plan to develop online techniques to handle
dynamic scenarios like changing job characteristics on a dataset. While core prin-
ciples developed in this work will continue to apply, such scenarios may use other
virtualization technologies like live data and VM migration.
7.2.3 Dealing with Geographically Distributed Data
We also plan to extend our cost-optimization and locality-aware resource management
frameworks to deal with the upcoming challenges in effectively processing globally dis-
tributed data where massive amounts of data get generated from disparate sources at
possibly different geographical locations of the world. While conventional MapReduce
framework and MapReduce algorithms assume that the data is present in one physical
location, scalable processing of geographically distributed big data brings an entirely
new challenge. Such scenarios require both framework level optimizations to MapRe-
duce as well as middleware-level solutions to support analytics over geographically
distributed sites.
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7.2.4 Cloud System Privacy
In the cloud system privacy context, an important challenge that cloud computing
poses is a way for customers to delegate processing of the data to the cloud without
giving away access to it. While completely homomorphic data encryption techniques
enable query processing on the encrypted data so that the Cloud provider does not
have direct access to the plain text, such techniques consume a lot of time and compu-
tational resources making them difficult to scale. One direction of our future research
is on designing private query processing techniques that protect data privacy through
anonymity while retaining high utility of the data, enabling the process to scale higher
than encryption-based query processing techniques. Such techniques would primarily
involve private query processing using both homomorphic encryption as well as data
anonymization. When computation on an anonymized dataset is delegated to the
Cloud, an attacker observing the computed output has the uncertainty in associat-
ing the actual result of the computation as the computation in this case, will return
several possible values, one out of which represents the actual result. Under such
a scheme, the Cloud provider can process the final outputs using homomorphically
encrypted secrets so that the encrypted final results are sent back to the clients while
the Cloud itself has no access to the actual result. We believe that ensuring execu-
tion privacy through anonymity based guarantees would provide a more realistic and
practical solution to leveraging public clouds for sensitive data analytics on private
data.
7.2.5 Cloud Consumer Privacy
At the cloud consumer tier, we plan to carry out further research on our mix-zone con-
struction frameworks presented in Chapters 5 and 6 along multiple directions. First
we would like to develop attack-resilient mix-zone anonymization schemes considering
more sophisticated attack models based on background knowledge about the users’
210
trajectory patterns and travel behavior. In this context, we would like to consider
more powerful attack models based on background knowledge from location-based
social networking information such as user location check-ins. While many principles
developed in the MobiMix framework will apply in such scenarios, we will require
more dynamic and adaptive mix-zone construction schemes that effectively consider
the additional information leaked through such background knowledge.
Further, we plan to extend our consumer-tier privacy protection schemes to deal
with online social networks. With the extensive popularity of social networking appli-
cations and the enormous amounts of social network data being generated, supporting
privacy preserving analytics and queries on real-time social network data needs sup-
port for anonymizing dynamically evolving social graphs. For instance, how can one
understand and predict the real-time propagation of information based on social in-
fluence of the users without compromising user privacy? Another example will be
an anonymous voting system in a social network which exposes the graph proper-
ties corresponding to the trust among the users without compromising individual
user privacy. We intend to devise anonymization algorithms that provide utility on
these dynamically evolving datasets while being attack-resilient on exposing various
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